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INTRODUCTION 
The steel industry is a classic symbol of industrialization. 
It has been taken as such in Latin America and promoted as a 
"leading sector" carrying with it the flag of national pride and 
prestige. Steel has been singled out for special protection and 
promotion by the governments of Brasil, Argentina and Mexico since 
the Second World War, by Colombia and Chile since the early 1950s 
and by Peru and Venezuela since the later 1950s. Paraguay, Ecuador, 
Bolivia and even Honduras are now joining in. 
A good reflection of the priority giver, to steel is that -
combining figures for all Latin America, steel production has grown 
at an average compound rate of over 10% per year for the past 
three decades! By 1978, total Latin American production was 24 
million ingot tons, roughly 8 0% of total steel consumption. 
Another reflection of the importance governments attach to steel 
is that well over half of total production takes place in majority 
government-owned and controlled plants. 
Furthermore - whilst the Latin steel industry is already of 
great size and significance, the region's governments are planning 
to more than quadruple its size by the year 2000 to meet a 
predicted average annual 7.5% increase in domestic steel demand 
between now and the end of the century. These expansion plans 
are not mere fantasies on paper. Latin governments and steel 
companies in the last few years have been investing about 
U.S. $ 2.5 billion annually in new and expanded steelplants, not 
counting additional investments in related infrastructure. This 
corresponds to some 15-20% of the world's investments in the 
steel industry in this period. 
Clearly then both the actual and the future importance of the 
steel industry in Latin America justify studies by economists 
to evaluate past performance in the industry and extract lessons 
that might help in managing the vast expansions now underway. 
Yet -sad to report- the record of the Latin American steel 
industry is only sparcely covered by retrospective scholarly 
analysis. For example, not one published book exists on the 
economic history of the Argentine steel industry. We could trace 
only two on Brasil's (dated 1957 and 1964), one on Mexico's 
(dated 1958), none on Colombia's, none on Peru's. Quite 
probably there do exist other published books or Ph.D theses to 
supplement the above small list - but we can assert that, if these 
exist, they are neither readily available nor easily traceable 
by librarians. 
True, there is remarkably good technical, statistical and 
-increasingly- economic documentation regularly published on the 
industry by the National Steel Industry Associations and through 
the Instituto Latinoamericano de Fierro y Acero (ILAFA) whose 
publications and congresses have been going continuously for over 
seventeen years. But these sources only rarely provide information 
of a truly critical kind. For their raison d'etre is to promote 
the future growth of the steel industry rather than to conduct 
searching scholarly analysis of past performance. A similar 
problem applies to the information in government planning reports 
on the industry which are always heavily influenced by political 
and promotional considerations. 
Therefore, what is largely missing is the "independent voice" 
of the scholar, the academic, the historian in evaluating the 
past performance of the Latin American steel industry. In fact 
we have calculated that on average, for every one million U.S. 
dollars invested in the continent's steelplants only about $30 
has been spent on retrospective scholarly studies on how these 
investments have developed. Most Latin American steelplants have 
not been subject to any scholarly "hindsight" analysis at all. 
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Considering the valuable experience now built up in the 
Lat in American steel industry, and its obvious relevance to 
improving future performance, this particular ratio of "scholarly 
research" dollars to "investment" dollars seems laughably small. 
The present book -and the case-studies on which it is based-
may be regarded as a contribution to improving this ratio. 
Our book is based on five detailed case-studies of individual 
Latin American steel firms, namely: Acindar, in Argentina (the 
leading private-sector Argentine firm which produces non-flat 
products), USIMINAS in Brasil (one of the big three Brasilian 
state steel firms, producing flat products), AHMSA in Mexico 
(the largest state steel firm producing both flat and non-flat 
products), Acerías Paz del Rio in Colombia (the largest Colombian 
steel firm,producing mainly non-flat products), and the state-
owned Siderúrgica de Chimbóte in Peru, later renamed SIDERPERU. 
All these firms have a long record. Acindar began producing 
steel in 1943. Altos Hornos de Mexico in 1946, Acerías Paz 
del Rio in 1954, Chimbóte in.1958 and USIMINAS in 1963. So 
all the plants have had roughly between two and four decades of 
experience. This is important from the research yiewpoint because, 
as Werner Baer has put it: 
"Given this length of time, a more definitive analysis 
may be made of the adaptation of factors of production 
to the technology, of technology to factor availability, 
and of changes in the relative efficiency of the industry. 
That is, a long enough time has passed for the economist 
to be able to make some judgements about the extent to which 
the infant industry has grown Up" 
The central idea in our case studies was to trace out in 
detail the "learning process" which occurred in Acindar, USIMINAS 
and AHMSA as regards choosing, mastering and developing the 
technology of steel production. We sought to 
identify the particular "learning path" and the associated 
"technology path" followed in each firm. What technology was 
initially chosen and why? How did the firms learn about its 
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availability? How did they build-up experience in getting 
the plant going? What was the relationship with foreign 
technology suppliers in this process? What learning processes 
were associated with the increase of production experience gained 
by these firms and what consequent technical changes did they 
introduce so as to upgrade their plants? What role was played 
by factors external to the firm - such as government planning 
decrees, crises in the availability of raw materials or other 
problems - in these learning processes? What role was played 
by internal firm policies such as the setting up of new technical 
departments? By exploring these questions we aimed to build 
up a detailed picture of the "learning path" which these plants 
followed from their inception through to recent times. 
Our book now fdLlows up these individual studies of Acindar, 
USIMINAS, Acerias Paz del Rio, AHMSA and Chinibote by presenting 
and comparing information from the 5 case-studies, with the 
following aims in mind: 
(a) to clarify some of the factors which influenced and 
determined the learning and technological paths 
followed by our five, firms in their plants 
(b) to identify particular learning paths, learning 
sequences and methods that seem to have been efficient 
and successful, and if possible see why 
(c) to identify other learning paths, sequences and methods 
which were clearly less satisfactory, and again to see 
why 
(d) to draw practical policy conclusions for steelplant 
managers, government steel planners, and institutions 
providing' finance for the steel industry 
Notice that we shall not be attempting to make 
any "absolute" evaluation of how effective the learning process 
in the plants has been. So we do not, for example, provide 
evidence which would enable retrospective judgements to be made on 
whether or not infant industry protection was justified in 
the particular plants examined. 
Instead,our approach in this book may be said to throw 
some light on relative, not absolute, learning performance. 
Our assumption is that,first,if a country is going to have a 
steel industry, then there are bound to be some "learning 
paths" which lead to more efficient and successful plant 
performance than others; and,second, that a close look at 
actual historical experience in a number of Latin American 
plants might reveal some useful lessons in this respect. 
Chapter 1 describes basic characteristics of steel tech-
nology and innovation. It shows how these generate three 
major"issues" for those responsible for planning and running 
steelplants. 
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Chapter 2 provides a brief synthesis of the five plant 
case studies and comments on the kind of learning paths 
revealed and on the factors which appear to have influenced 
the paths taken in the plants. 
Chapter 3 examines some of the determinants of the initial 
choices of technology made both for new plants and subsequent 
major expansions. It points to the strong influence which 
"planning imperfections" and "economies of scale concepts" had 
in determining some of these choices. This chapter then goes on 
to examine the duration of the "gestation period" that was 
involved in the whole process of planning, constructing and 
starting up the plants, and pinpoints several factors which 
tended to prolong the gestation period. 
Chapter A concentrates on one aspect of the upgrading of plant 
performance over time - namely the stretching of plant capacity. It 
explores the extent of capacity stretching achieved in the plants, the 
facturs that stimulated it and the methods used to bring it about. 
Chapter 5 explores further aspects of the "upgrading" of plant 
performance achieved over time in all the plants, through the introduction 
of minor technical changes. 
Chapter 6 contrasts the "defensive" and "offensive" approaches to 
introducing technical change as illustrated by the experience of two of 
the plants, and argues in favour of the "offensive" approach. 
Finally Chapter 7 summarises the main findings reached in the study 
and the planning conclusions which derive from them. These relate (1) to 
more effective planning methods in the selection and gestation of technology 
(for new plants and major expansions), and (2) to suggestions for a more 
systematic approach to the upgrading of existing plants via minor technical 
changes introduced at low investment cost. 
Some "caveats" are in order: First, it would be quite wrong to pretend 
that this study summarises all the worthwhile findings from the individual 
case-studies. These case-studies stand in their own right and have more 
findings and insights than the representation of them we have given here. 
For example the USIMINAS study has excellent material on the evolution of 
government policy, which is only very briefly touched on her. 
Second, the chapters of our study have, in the main, had to be written 
at great speed. This was necessary in view of the time constraints on the 
comparative study. Our objective was to bring to light a significant 
percentage of the important research findings contained in the case-studies 
rather than aim to be more comprehensive. 
Furthermore, on the whole we have tried to maximize "content" as against 
"polished exegesis". Therefore the reader is asked to forgive the many rough 
spots he will detect in the study. 
Finally there is no doubt that the present study could greatly benefit • 
from a round of detailed comments and reactions. That is why the designation 
"'•forking Monograph" is the appropriate one for the work as presented here. 
Nevertheless the study does, we think, fulfil its promise of showing 
that comparative analysis can be a powerful tool for extracting worthwhile 
planning conclusions. It will be up to the reader to see if he agrees. 
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CHAPTER 1 
STEEL TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND PLANNING ISSUES 
Scope of the Chapter 
As this book describes case-studies of technology in steel-
plants, it is obvious that the specific technological characteristics 
of steelmaking -as opposed to cement, plastics or woodworking-
are going to play a prominent role in the analysis. 
It is therefore useful for the non-specialist reader to 
grasp some basic elements of what steel production technology 
involves, i.e. the kinds of processes and machinery involved, as 
well as the kinds of products produced and the types of plants 
that exist. Furthermore, it will be useful for the reader to have 
some notions about how steel technology has been evolving - i.e. 
progressing through innovations. 
Accordingly, this first chapter provides a brief introductory 
guide to some key characteristics of steel technology and innovations. 
It also shows how these characteristics generate specific "issues" 
that confront steel plant planners, executives and engineers, and 
which we shall be exploring in the case-studies. 
1. Outline of Steel Production Processes 
As a first step it is vital for the reader to know what steel 
production involves. 
"Steel" itself is the generic name given to metals which 
contain mainly iron plus controlled small amounts of other chemical 
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elements such as carbon, manganese and silicon which impart 
valuable strength characteristics and other useful properties 
to iron. 
Its production starts from iron-ore or scrap and involves 
several successive process stages which lead through to the 
range of finished steel products such as plates, sheets, bars, 
beams, wire, tubing, etc. 
The principal processing stages and products of industry are 
shown in diagram 1.1 below. Steel itself is made at the "Steel-
Works" stage and involves a chemical and metallurgical process 
whereby pig iron (or scrap or sponge-iron pellets) gets 
transformed in a vessel into batches of homogeneous hot liquid 
steel of exactly the required chemical composition, ready to be 
poured out of casting. 
The purpose of the steelmakirig process is to change the 
chemical composition of the pig iron a/ (or of the melted scrap or 
pellets b/) through adjusting downwards the proportion of some 
elements, and upwards the proportion of others, so as to achieve 
the precise proportions of carbon, silicon, manganese and other 
elements -together with the majority element iron- which conform 
the particular 'grade' of steel which it is desired to produce, 
a_f The pig iron from blast furnaces contains about 94-
96% of iron, plus 3-4% carbon, plus smaller percentages of 
other elements such as silicon, manganese, phosphorus, etc. 
b/ Melted scrap, depending on its source (e.g. from 
outside or inside the works) also contains various impurity 
elements, and sponge iron pellets made in Direct-reduction 
plants consist of about 90% iron, 8% unreduced ore, 2% 
carbon plus other minor impurities. 
- 1 2 -
co I 
Producta fron rdnos and quarries 
llMOfíoiiQ. .. 
r <00? 
Diagram '1.1: Principal Processes an<M t^^^n ^  thg Btrr>1 













































out of the Industry 



















V.I HE ROD 
MILLS 










Source: Adapted by author from P. Nueno, A Comparative Study of the Capacity Decision Process in the Steel 
Industry: The U.S. and Europe, Ph.D., Harvard Business School, 1973, p. 3 5 
and which in turn give the required mechanical and physical 
properties to the final product, a/ 
The output of steelmaking is hot liquid steel which must 
then be immediately cast. This is done either in ingot moulds 
forming "ingots", or, increasingly, it is done by pouring the 
liquid steel directly into continuous casting machines. In 
ingot casting, the ingots after cooling get reheated and then 
rolled in "semi-finishing" mills to either blooms, billets or 
slabs, which are the key intermediate products of steelmaking 
operations. In continuous casting, the blooms, billets or slabs 
are produced directly in a single process which results from 
the cooling of liquid steel in the casting mould. 
In both cases, the resulting intermediate products then 
form the input to one of the range of different kinds of 
finishing mills, as shown in the diagram. 
These finishing mills display a considerable variety, 
depending on the end-products being produced. "Merchant" mills 
for non-flat products are often fairly general-purpose, and 
may alternately be set to turn out bars, sections, beams, wire-
rod etc. Hot mills for flat products can also be general purpose, 
but the modern tendency in large plants is for these mills to 
be specially designed for plate, sheet or strip. Similarly 
aJ Common "mild" steels contain typically. 0.10 to 0.25% 
of carbon, whilst so-called "special" steels include both "high-
carbon" steels (e.g. above 0.6% carbon) and "alloy" steels 
(which are steels containing alloys such as molybdenum, tungsten, 
vanadium, chromium, nickel and manganese, etc. in proportions 
above some specified minimum). During steelmaking, steps must 
also be taken to control the level of "impurity" elements such 
as phosphorus and sulphur which are contained in the steel, as 
too much of these may produce metallic "inclusions" or other 
metallurgical defects which reduce the quality or performance of 
the end products containing them. 
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in non-flat products, there exist specialist bar mills, and 
wire-rod mills, as well as tubing mills. Beyond the hot mills, 
flat products may also pass into cold reduction mills, or in the 
case of wire-rod, to be"drawn" into fine wire. Further 
processing such as heat treatment, annealing, and providing 
special surface finishes to products is also carried out in 
steel plants - so that the "finishing" technology of steelplants 
is actually considerably more complex than is shown in the 
diagram. 
Most plants specialize in producing either "flat" products, 
or "non-flat" products, though some big plants produce both. 
In any event, it is normal for plants to produce several different 
classes of flat or non-flat products. E.g. a flats producer 
may turn out sheet, strip and tinplate for cans; a typical non-
flats producer may turn out reinforcing bars, sections, and wire-
rod. In addition it is usual for steel plants to service a wide 
variety of different customer specifications as to the shapes, 
sizes, thicknesses, grades of steel required and surface-finishes 
needed. 
Thus most steelplants are decidedly multi-product plants as 
well as multi-stage plants. This fact, coupled to the wide 
variety of physico-chemical, mechanical and metallurgical 
transformations carried out in steel processing, and to the 
sophisticated machine-intensive nature of most of the processing 
stages, means that a central characteristic of steelplants is 
their inherent technological complexity -both in construction 
and operation. 
An important consequence of the multi-stage character of the 
industry is that steelplants can differ greatly according to the 
degree of vertical integration embodied in their operations. 
Thus at one end of the scale are "fully-integrated" plants, 
which incorporate all the processing stages through from iron-
making to at least the basic finishing operations, a/ Then 
come "semi-integrated" plants, which involve just steelmaking 
and finishing (starting out from scrap). Finally, there are 
"non-integrated" plants, which only have finishing mills 
installed and which buy all their supplies of billets, slabs, 
etc. from outside sources. 
In most countries, from 70-95% of crude steel is produced 
in integrated plants - while some 5-30% is produced in semi-
integrated plants. 1/ 
As for the scales of plants in the steel industry, these 
vary widely but - in terms of sheer size, space occupied, and 
tons of product produced - are often extremely large compared 
to plants in most other industries. 
The majority of fully-integrated steel plants in the world 
are producing in the range of 1 million to 6 million tons of 
steel per year. 
Semi-integrated plants tend to be much smaller, usually 
producing some 100,000 to 500,000 tons per year. 
Non-integrated plants rolling semis into finished products 
are rarely much bigger than 300,000 tons per year, and can 
produce as little as 10,000 tons per year. 
However -leaving aside small non-integrated plants (which 
we shall not be concerned with in this book)- it is quite 
obvious from these output figures that we are dealing here with 
a very large-scale industry indeed. 
a/ It is quite common for integrated plants to sell an 
appreciable proportion of their semi-finished products to other 
firms. 
A further interesting feature of steel processing technology 
-which can be noted by referring back to the diagram- is that 
there exist several alternative combinations of technologies 
(i.e. different process routes) for producing the same final 
product. Thus the initial raw material for plants may be iron ore, 
scrap,or pellets of nearly pure iron. Reduction of ore may 
take place in blast furnaces or in direct reduction plants. 
Refining to steel may occur in oxygen converters, open-hearth furnaces 
or electric arc furnaces. Transformation to semi-products may 
occur via ingot casting followed by primary conversion (i.e. 
rolling), or directly via continuous casting. Hot-rolling of 
semis may take place in one or more mills, which may be continuous 
or discontinuous. Some further variations are also possible in the 
finishing stages. This means there are often important issues of 
"choice of techniques" to be resolved by governments and firms 
planning new steelplants or major expansions of existing ones. 
In summary, we have noted how steel plants straddle a 
whole range of different technologies, scales, techniques, degrees 
of vertical integration and product mixes. 
Nevertheless, the multi-stage, multi-product, and complex 
character of steel technology, and the fundamentally "large-
scale" character of most steelplants compared to plants in other 
industries constitute a set of notable common features. 
2. Nature of Innovations in the Steel Industry and at the Plant 
Level 
So far, we have outlined the processes involved in steel 
production, and briefly sketched the different kinds of plants, 
processes, machinery, products etc. that exist in this industry. 
However, as steel technology is not static, but has been 
constantly evolving over the past century, and is still doing so, 
it is clearly relevant to a historical study such as ours to know 
17 
something about how the technology has been progressing -i.e. 
to know something about the characteristics of innovation and 
technical change in the industry. The following remarks are 
therefore addressed to this. 
The first point to note is that steel technology has been 
undergoing momentous changes in the last three decades. So 
much so that it is common nowadays to read that the steel industry 
is still in the midst of a "technological revolution". This 
revolution can be considered to have started in the 1950s with 
the introduction of the oxygen converter and it has been followed 
up by the advance to commercial feasibility of such major innova-
tions as continuous casting, direct reduction, very large blast 
furnaces, ultra-high power electric-arc furnaces, high speed 
rolling mills, etc. 
Although at first sight the relatively low published 
expenditure of the steel industry on R 6 D might seem to 
contradict the idea that a "technological revolution", is 
ocurring it is nevertheless an accurate description - at least 
if one judges the "revolutionary" character of a period of 
innovation by the results it produces. Thus, the combination of 
several major "breakthrough" innovations added to the cumulation 
of the many thousands of minor improvements made in steelmaking 
processes and plant design in the last three decades have had 
very notable repercussions. In particular they have radically 
affected such matters as the optimum scale and location of plants, 
the different types of process technologies used, the balance 
amonst raw materials and energy sources used in the industry, 
the types of transportation required for getting the raw 
materials to the plants as well as the manning requirements, 
skill levels and management needs of the industry. 
These repercussions have in turn helped to fuel some major 
shifts in the competitive patterns of the world steel industry, 
as is shown most notably by Japan's striking emergence as the 
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world's N°1 steel exporter, displacing traditional exporters, 
and by the rapid growth in many domestic markets of steel output 
coming from "mini" plants offering sharp competition to longer 
established giant rivals. 
In view of these dramatic developments deriving from the 
"technological revolution" in the steel industry, it is not 
surprising that quite a number of studies of innovation, diffusion 
of innovations, productivity of new technology, etc. in the steel 
industry have been carried out by economists and technologists 
in recent years. 
However, the interest of economists seems to have been 
"one sided" in the sense of leaning mainly towards the study of 
"major"breakthrough innovations. This is reflected, for example, 
in the relative frequency of studies of the innovation and 
diffusion of the oxygen converter 2/, of continuous casting 3/ 
and, direct-reduction technology 14/. In contrast, studies of 
"minor" or "incremental" innovations in the steel industry seem to 
have been neglected. Yet, as Gold has pointed out: 
"Concentration on major innovations cannot 
be regarded as adequate coverage of tech-
nological advances in view of the possibility 
of comparably significant contributions from 
the cumulation of numerous smaller improvements" 5/ 
In support of Gold, we can refer to abundant evidence in the 
technical literature which shows that "incremental" innovations 
have been exceedingly important in such areas as improving the 
performance and increasing the scale of blast furnaces 6/, increasing 
the efficiency and capacity of open-hearth furnaces 7/, 
increasing the speed of rolling mills 8/, developing higher-
powered and more efficient electric arc furnaces 9/, etc. 
There can therefore be no doubt that, technologically 
speaking, the revolution in steel technology is the result of the 
combination of (i) major "breakthrough" innovations, and (ii) 
evolutionary improvements both in the pre-existing and the new 
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technologies. However the economic literature on the industry 
has concentrated rather one-sidedly on major innovations, and 
has not yet gone very deeply into the economics of the "evolution-
ary improvements", i.e. minor innovations. This is, therefore, 
an important area requiring further exploration. 
Another significant feature of steel industry innovation, 
is that its sources have been multiple. They include equipment 
manufacturers, steelplant contractors, engineering consultants 
and steel firms who develop innovations and improvements directly 
on their own plants. As a matter of fact, innovation at the 
individual steelplant level -which is of central concern in this 
book- has not been very much studied by economists though 
steel producing firms are certainly significant contributors 
to the overall innovation process. 
Once again, the reason why the contribution to innovation 
made by steelplants is not much written about is that it mostly 
has to do with minor innovations. This is because the majority 
of steel producing firms are never "early adopters" of frankly-
still-experimental major new processes. Indeed they understandably 
prefer to,adopt major new processes only once these have been well 
proved and that fact becomes widely acknowledged in publications. 
Nevertheless, a considerable amount of minor improvements 
and adaptation to steel production processes, equipment and 
operating procedures are constantly being developed in most 
steelplants. 
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that it is 
operating experience in steelplants which provides much of the 
vital "feedback" of information to equipment and process suppliers 
which they use in introducing their own successively improved 
generations of equipment. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the phenomenon of plant 
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level innovation is definitely not confined only to 
tuning up9 adaptation and improvement" work in new plants 
to iron out their initial design errors and debug the process. 
This was shown by A. Bailetti in his study of capital 
investment in the U.S. Steel Industry, 10/ where he reported 
that, between 1950 and 1974, capital investments for 
modernizing existing steelplants (i.e. for upgrading these 
plants and replacement of individual units) amounted to 55% 
of all capital investment in the industry. The point is that upgrading 
expenditures introduce a whole series of usually minor im-
provements and additions to existing plant and equipment. As 
for replacement expenditures, Bailetti himself pointed out that 
"in an industry faced with continual technological innovations, 
such as the iron and steel industry, plant facilities seldom are 
replaced by equipment with identical operating characteristics" 
- in other words, replacement expenditures are also often used 
for the introduction of minor technical changes. 
Therefore, if the experience of the U.S. steel industry is 
any guide, one would expect to find in all steelplants that 
minor innovations form a prominent element in their overall 
technological evolution, aj 
3. Technology-related Characteristics that Influence Steelplant 
Planning 
Several notable characteristics of steel technology and 
aV It is, of course, true, that much minor technical change 
comes to plants directly "embodied" in additional and/or replace-
ment equipment ordered by the plant from suppliers. Similarly, 
much of the improvement and "upgrading" of plant performance involves 
the acquisition of supplementary equipment. Nevertheless there is 
always a significant level of experimentation and original technical 
input required by the plants themselves in order to correctly 
formulate their requirements, specify the precise equipment and its 
characteristics that will do the job, and then integrate this 
successfully into the unique existing complex of equipment, materials 
flows, etc., which characterize their particular plant. 
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innovation generate difficulties that repeatedly arise in 
planning, constructing, and starting-up steelplants, and 
then subsequently in modernizing them. These characteristics 
include: 
•the extremely large capital investment requirements 
for plant and equipment 
.marked indivisibilities in equipment units 
.the long gestation period of steelplant investments 
.the irreversibility and profound future influence of 
initial process choice 
.the idiosyncratic nature of each individual steelplant 
.the complexity and incomplete theoretical specification 
of steel processes 
In this section, each of these characteristics are now 
described in turn, as a prelude to a summary of their effect 
on planning which will be taken up in the subsequent section. 
(i) Large Capital Investment Requirements 
These arise because of the heavy, sophisticated and 
specialized nature of steelmaking equipment. Even in small 
plants, additional stages or expansions may cost tens of millions 
of dollars. For new capacity, investments of hundreds of 
millions of dollars would be normal for semi-integrated plants, 
and thousands of millions dollars for integrated plants 
(roughly $1,000 million per million tons of annual ingot 
capacity). This level of investment has several implications. 
First, it means that for large, integrated plants, the level of 
resources required usually far outstrips what private entrepre-
neurs in most developing countries can borrow, or afford to 
invest; therefore, if a developing country is going to have one 
or more large integrated steelplants, the government has to step 
in as majority owner and provider of the capital required. This 
is one main reason why the large integrated steelplants in 
Latin America are nearly all state-owned. Second the fact that 
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such large investments are required means that it is frequent 
practice for both state and privately-owned plants to borrow much 
of the required funds via long-term loans from banks or in the form 
of long-term credits from equipment suppliers; in practice, 
the negotiation of these loans is often a protracted process 
lasting months and sometimes years - and this of course injects 
considerable delays and uncertainties into the investment-process. 
Third, the size of investment requirements means that they often 
simply exceed what steel firms can convince budget-minded 
governments or skeptical bankers to lend. This has the effect 
that steelfirms are frequently -or even chronically- unable to 
carry out desirable investments in modernization and expansion, 
and so have to "make do" with their existing facilities at lower 
levels of investment. Thus the existence of huge capital require-
ments plays a critical role in steelplant planning, technological 
choices, and the way plants get developed throughout their 
lifetime. 
(ii) Marked Indivisibilities in Steelplant Equipment Units 
Closely related to large capital requirements are the marked 
indivisibilities a/ that obtain in several stages of the steel-
making process, for instance in blast furnaces, oxygen converters 
and rolling mills, b/ A major effect of these indivisibilities 
is that incremental capacity in these individual stages cannot 
economically be supplied by adding whole new units. The solution 
usually adopted to this problem by steel plant planners is to 
a/ These indivisibilities are associated with economies 
of scale in capital investment costs per ton of capacity and in 
operating costs per ton of output. 
b/ For example in modern large integrated plants the average 
output per unit of equipment such as blast furnaces, oxygen con-
verters and strip mills can be over 2 million tons per indivi-
dual unit per year. The Japanese have built blast furnaces with 
outputs of over 4 million tons per year. 
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deliberately "oversize" the most indivisible equipment units 
when a plant is first installed (or during subsequent major 
expansions). Then as demand expands, addition of auxiliary 
equipment to the main units and/or additions of capacity in the 
more "divisible" stages of the process mean that production 
capacity can be raised in incremental steps without having to 
invest in new principal units or engage in the corresponding 
major disruptions of plant foundations, wiring, services, layout, 
materials flows, etc. which would be required whenever a very 
large new unit has to be integrated into an existing production 
scheme, a/ 
These considerations mean that the initial scaling and 
sizing of steelplants and their main equipment units pose 
genuinely difficult problems for the consultants and executives 
who plan plants. How big should the main unit be? It is better-
to have three medium-sized converters or two larger ones? Two 
blast furnaces or one? How much "imbalance" between and within 
stages should be deliberately built into the design? 
Successful decisions on these matters hampered by the 
difficulties of making accurate demand forecasts, and by political 
considerations which make it uncertain when one will next be able 
to get government approval or funds to add new capacity, b/ 
Moreover there is sometimes also a major '-'technological" 
uncertainty to deal with -i.e. will plant management and staff be 
able to efficiently run very large (and correspondly sophisticated) 
units? 
a/ This is the classic problem studied by H. Chenery (1952) 
11/, and A. Manne (1967) 12/. 
b/ This is often a decisive consideration. Indeed, "It is 
very deep in every steel manager's training that his first duty 
is to keep the works 'unbalanced' in order to have a claim for 
the next round of investment funds". Fabian Society (1974) 13/ 
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In any event, marked indivisibilities in steelplant 
equipment units mean that initial plant scale and sizing 
decisions are very influential on a steelplant's technological 
and economic future - and therefore deserve extremely careful 
consideration at the planning stage. 
(iii) The long gestation period of steelplant investments 
A third influential characteristic of steel-technology is 
the "long gestation period" that is usually required for 
bringing steelplant investments into operation, which can range 
from two to ten years depending on the size and sophistication 
of the plant concerned, as well as on the previous experience 
of the owning firm. 
According to Hunter (1970) 14/ who reports on British 
steel experience, "a time span of two to three years from the 
final investment decision until the commissioning of the plant 
....is by no means unusual", while E. Gana (1976) 15/ reporting 
on Latin American experience, notes that "four to eight years 
normally run from the feasibility studies through to.the start up 
of finished plants". 
These estimates refer to the time taken up to the 
commissioning of the plant (i.e. up to the point at which, 
following equipment and plant trials, the project owner accepts 
that the contractual obligations and contractually guaranteed 
performance levels of the plant units have been fulfilled). 
However a good deal of further time is often subsequently taken 
for plants to actually achieve in practice and on a sustained 
basis, the full levels of productivity and rated output for which 
they were designed. 
The overall period of time taken from initiating production 
to achieving rated output on a sustained basis is called the 
"start-up period", and was found by Baloff (1963) 16/ in his 
studies of start-ups in two U.S. steelplants to range from two 
25 
months for an electro-tinning process to over three years for 
oxygen steelmaking furnaces. 
These years that pass in the gestation period naturally 
have an important economic impact on the firm concerned due to 
the heavy capital charges it has to pay in the interim on its 
new installations whilst they are still idle or not fully 
working. 
Hence it is a critical matter for the economic future of 
steelplants whether they can manage to get through"gestation" 
period efficiently, or whether, on the contrary, they encounter 
major construction mishaps or serious delays in learning how to 
control their plant's technology and run it at rated levels. 
The sheer complexity of steelplant technology, the by-no-
means completely determinate nature of the processes involved a/, 
and the many "idiosyncratic" elements of process technology that 
are associated with each individual steelplant b/ mean that 
a complex, protracted and difficult learning process is nearly 
always required to get new plants properly "run in", and to permit 
their staff to acquire sufficient experience to adequately control 
the overall process and set of variables involved. 
a/ The inherent complexity of process variables and the 
lack of precise theoretical models to describe what is going on 
in blast furnaces, steel furnaces and rolling operations means 
that a great deal of empirical knowledge and experience needs 
to be gained so as to control them efficiently. See Subsection 
3 (iv) below. 
b/ The actual detailed process conditions that characterize 
each steelplant are highly idiosyncratic because of innumerable 
variations between plants in terms of different equipment and 
raw material characteristics, distinct grades of steel being 
processed, different size-ranges of intermediate products, variations 
in operating practices and end-product specifications, etc. -
which means that simple copying of techniques used in other 
plants is usually impossible. See Subsection 3(v) below. 
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In view of these considerations, there can be no doubt 
that the gestation period of steelplants deserves special 
consideration by planners, particularly as it is well known 
that gestation time and costs are frequently underestimated, 
and often deliberately so, to make projects appear more 
economically attractive that they really are. 
(iv) The "irreversibility" and profound future influence of 
initial process choices 
A fourth characteristic worth drawing attention to, because 
of the long amortization periods which are normal in steelplant 
investments (often 10 to 25 years), is the "irreversible" 
nature to the initial process choices. 
In this context, it should be recalled that steelplant 
investments are very much location bound, as the technology 
involves "large, heavy very specialized equipment units which 
are expensive to build, difficult to move, and have limited 
salvage value" 17/ 
Furthermore, as Bela Gold (1976) has explained, once the 
process has been selected, this has an extremely important 
determining effect on the future range of technological 
possibilities open to the plant - for "it is apparent that the 
basic nature of (steel) productive processes is less amenable 
to managerial manipulation than output and capacity levels" 18/ 
In other words, once the process has been selected, firms then 
have to live with their choice for at least the next ten years, 
and very possibly twenty or even thirty years or more. 
Given the existence of a range of alternative processes 
and process-routes for obtaining particular kinds of steel 
products (including varying degrees of plant integration), the 
question of what process to choose is often a difficult one to 
answer. This is compounded by the fact that the technological 
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possibilities for improving the efficiency or flexibility of 
different processes are also likely to be distinct. Further-
more, relative prices of key energy inputs like coal, fuels, 
and electricity are likely to change (sometimes drastically) 
over such long periods as 10 to 25 years, so that optimum 
process choice at current relative factor prices is not the 
right criterion for making the decision. 
In any event, their long lasting effects mean that 
initial process choices are extremely influential in the 
steel industry. This is why in our case studies we shall be 
exploring if lessons can be learned from the way past process 
choices were made by our plants and how these worked out in 
practice. 
(v) The "idiosyncratic" nature of every individual steelplant 
This refers to the fact that there are significant elements 
of novelty and "idiosyncracy" in every new steelplant (or ex-
pansion of an existing one), that gets built. In fact major 
items of steelplant equipment are nearly always customized 
"one-off" items, incorporating either some new features, or 
constituting an individual and unique combination of existing 
features. Overall plant design is also unique in the sense of 
representing a specially considered solution to the particular 
(unique) combination of requirements and conditions laid down 
by the customer. Hence steel firms are always in the position 
of operating plants which, though they may have many similar 
features to other plants, are never quite the same. This fact 
alone is sufficient to generate a requirement for minor innovation 
at the plant level. 
Besides differences in plant and equipment design, steelplants 
are also "idiosyncratic" in terms of the particular set of raw 
material characteristics that they handle, and in the detailed 
nature of the product-mix that they have to produce. So this 
adds further "variables" which differentiate one steelplant from 
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another and lead to a requirement for plant-level innovation. 
(vi) The inherent complexity and incomplete theoretical 
specification of steelplant processes 
A related powerful reason which reinforces the need for 
plant level innovation is that the physico-chemical and 
metallurgical processes taking place inside such equipment 
as sinter-plants, blast furnaces, oxygen converters, continuous 
casters, rolling mills, etc. are by no means 100% scientifically 
known and theoretically specifiable. Even minor changes in the 
levels or combination of process variables can introduce 
significant, and not always predictable, changes in the process 
and its output, yield, etc. The consequence is that theoretical 
insight needs, in all cases, to be supplemented by (and often 
preceeded by) the acquisition of empirical experience with the 
process. Indeed empirical experience is indispensable in permitting 
gradual improvement in the plant's "control heuristic" over the 
process, as well as in suggesting to personnel useful adaptations 
and innovations to improve control, raise yields, reduce down-
time, etc. 
In other words, both process "idiosyncracy" and technological 
complexity leading to incomplete theoretical specification of 
processes lead to the need for plant-level innovation. Experience 
acquired in other (always somewhat different) plants cannot 
simply be copied without adaptation even in the event that this 
experience is fully placed at the disposal of other plants besides 
the originating one. 
4. The Planning Issues Raised 
Having now described several influential technology-related 
characteristics, this section proceeds to identify some major 
planning issues which are raised by them: 
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The first issue has to. do with the difficulties that 
surround the making of economically satisfactory initial 
decisions regarding process selection, plant scale and sizing 
decisions in the steel industry. Thus: 
Huge capital requirements mean that capital market 
imperfections and political considerations impinge heavily 
on these initial choices - both delaying the investment decision 
process and biasing its outcome. 
Also, planners may seriously underestimate the skills that 
will be needed by plant managements and staff to get through 
the gestation period of their plants successfully. Mistakes 
and mishaps in design and construction, and underestimates of 
the time that will be needed to learn to operate and control 
the new investment once production is started, may lead to 
serious financial problems early on in the life of new plants. 
These problems are, of course, additional to the already 
difficult process-selection problems involved in estimating 
future demand correctly, and estimating how relative factor 
prices will shift - problems which are particularly acute in 
the steel industry because of the long amortization and planning 
horizons involved. 
Added to this is the problem of the "irreversibility" and 
long-lasting effect of initial process choice, which puts a 
premium on the planners getting these choices right to start 
off with. 
All these factors boil down to a major planning issue which 
we can - in the context of the present reasearch - formulate as 
follows: 
ISSUE N° 1 What factors do, in fact, determine initial process, 
scale and sizing chocies, and what factors -from 
and economic viewpoint- should be allowed to deter-
mine them? 
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However there is, of course, more to steelplant development 
than just the making of these initial choices. For, right or 
wrong, these initial choices have to be lived with. Hence, for 
all existing plants, (other than those which it is profitable 
to scrap and replace), the firms who operate them are naturally 
faced with two further issues, namely: 
ISSUE Nc 2 What steps, what organization, what investments, can 
help to get plants through the critical "learning" 
period needed to master the acquired technology and 
get it working at rated capacity? 
ISSUE N° 3 Once rated capacity and performance levels are 
achieved, what further steps can be taken so as to 
improve plant productivity, output and performance? 
I.e. what further steps can be taken to modernize 
and upgrade the technology of existing plants? 
So far as these latter two issues are concerned, plant 
managements will find themselves in an area in which the 
availability of "embodied" technical innovations from outside 
suppliers, and of technical assistance from other steel firms 
does not by any means solve all their problems - because of 
plant idiosyncracy and because of the need for "in-plant" 
empirically-developed process control heuristics. 
This naturally puts a premium on how plants develop their 
own internal technical and organizational capabilities - and 
this is one of the key topics examined in the case-studies. 
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Chapter 2. SYNTHESIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES 
This chapter provides a brief description and synthesis of the 
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cover the following firms and periods. 1) Acindar, Argentina 1943-
78 a/, 2) USIMINAS, Brazil .1956-77 b/, 3) Acerias Paz del Rio, 
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These case-studies were all planned to form part of the same 
inter-related set, and although in practice they were executed with 
some differences in methodology, their main objective and subject 
matter were basically similar. 
The principal aim in all cases was to carry out a detailed 
empirical investigation into the technological development of these 
plants from their planning stage, through their construction, 
start-up and entire subsequent evolution up to recent tames. 
The idea was to generate detailed descriptive information on 
the overall stage by stage process of technological evolution inside 
these Latin American steelplants; to understand the main determinants 
of this evolution in terms of both the internal (firm and plant) 
variables and the .external (contextual) variables affecting it; 
and to identify some of the main consequences of this technological 
evolution as expressed in improvements over time in plant performance. 
It was also an implicit aim in each case-study to make use of 
the collected"package" of detailed descriptive information to generate 
some insights which would be useful to steel firm executives and 
engineers in specifying, operating and improving steelplants in the 
future, and useful to government planners or financial institutions 
anxious to evolve better guidelines for investments in this industry. 
One other implicit aim, reflected in the Argentine, Brazilian 
and Mexican studies, but not in the Peruvian or Colombian ones, 
was to throw light on certain theoretical aspects of learning, 
technical change, and innovation activities at the plant level which 
could be of interest to the economics profession. 
As might be expected, the various case-studies made better progress 
with some of these aims than others. For the general reader, much 
of the material in the studies would undoubtedly prove heavy going -
as it contains a large dose of technological descriptions. The 
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economic historian on the other hand, would probably be dismayed 
at the volume of "technological narrative" without too many 
organizing hypotheses to help make the story intelligible. There 
is indeed a certain "tyranny of facts" in the reports which makes 
them literally indigestible at one sitting. 
However it is notable that despite all their manifold defects, 
produced in part by the novelty of this kind of study and in part 
by the enormously time-consuming and problematic data requirements 
involved, each study does manage (a) to bring forward and throw 
light on the same set of main explicative variables that are at work 
in plant technological evolution in all the cases, and (b) to 
illustrate, nevertheless, a strongly individua] and characteristic 
historical "combination" of these variables and their impact, in 
each particular case. 
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1. Acindar, Argentina 1943-48 
This first case-study looks at the technological record from 
1943 to 1978 of Acindar, Argentina's leading private sector steélfirm, 
which is today a fully integrated producer of some 500,000 tons of 
rolled non-flat products per year, employs over 5,000 people, and 
has annual sales currently around the U.S. $ 150-200 million-mark. 
Acindar was deliberately chosen for study because of its 
technically innovative record expressed in many "home grown" 
adaptations included in its plants, as well as in technical articles 
published by Acindar personnel in Latin American steel congresses. 
Also the firm's possesion of two fundamentally distinct ''vintages" 
of plants (in distinct locations in Rosario and Villa Constitución) 
suggested it would be possible to observe a variety of different 
"technological learning experiences" in its history (i.e.both intra 
vintage and inter vintage). 
Data was collected through several visits to the plants, through 
taped interviews, and analysis of various kinds of internal company 
memoranda, as well as through analysis of the firm's published Annual 
Reports and technical articles. 
The main results obtained are now synthesized under three broad 
headings: 1) findings about the "acquisition phase" for technology, 
i.e. about the selection, construction and start up of Acindar's plants 
or major subsequent expansions thereof; 2) findings about the 
"improvement phase" for technology, i.e. about how Acindar upgraded 
and adapted in plants over time through minor technical changes and 
investments; 3) findings concerning the overall "learning path" 
pursued by Acindar given the strikingly imperfect and distorted external 
economic context in which it evolved (due mainly to severe planning 
conflicts within the Argentine steel industry as well as to Argentina's 
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pronounced postwar macroeconomic instability). 
1.1 Findings about the Acquisition Phase: 
To explore the "acquisition phases" for technology in Acindar's 
record, the study examined first the selection, construction and 
start-up of the company's original plant built in Rosario in 1943; 
then that of its second plant built in Villa Constitución in 1947-51; 
and then that .of the expansion of this second plant with a-new 
rolling mill in 1969-71. Each of these acquisitions phases is now 
described: 
Acindar's original steelplant was built in the grain port city 
of Rosario (Argentina's third largest conurbation), at a time 
-during World War II- when all the usual channels of equipment 
purchase and technology transfer from abroad were closed. This 
meant the building of the plant could only be achieved by a do-it-
yourself operation using whatever technology Ac indar could acquire 
or devise, from whatever sources were available. The result 
-described in detail in the study- was a triumph of local improvisation 
which involved the building of a "home-made" Siemens Martin furnace 
and the acquisition of used rolling equipment from Chile. It was 
also a crash course learning experience for Acindar's men. a7 
the 
Thanks to their ingenuity,/ home-made Rosario plant was put 
together during 1943 and managed to turn out about 14,000 tons per 
year in its first few years, which, when sold at lucrative war time 
scarcity prices,enabled Acindar to amortize 75% of its initial 
capital costs after only three years of operations. 
a/ A young engineer was recruited from an already existing Argentine 
steelworks to design a scaled-up Siemens Martin furnace based on the 
drawings of a smaller furnace operated by the Argentine military; 
railway wagons were stripped down to provide structural beams for the 
furnace; some of the refractory bricks needed had to be "home-made" by 
crude glueing methods by Acindar's staff; second hand rolling equipment 
was brought across the Andes from Chile; and primitive improvised 
operating techniques were developed to actually produce the desired steel 
and round construction bars from the resulting assembly of machinery. 
Yet it worked. 
39 
Quite apart from the tangible economic benefits to Acindar 
reflected in these high operating profits and the ability of 
the firm's own men to design and build a second Siemens Martin-fur-
nace later on"' as well as modifying the first one,the early "do-it-yourself" 
years led to a very significant intangible benefit for the company. This was the 
great pride and confidence in their own innovative and technical 
abilities acquired by all the Acindar engineers and men whose efforts 
had brought the original plant to success -a pride still evident 
in interviews carried out more than thirty years afterwards. 
Indeed Acindar's willingness to undertake later ambitious expansions 
and to develop their own "home grown" innovations and adaptations 
in their plants probably owes much to their initial success in 
improvising their original plant in adverse conditions. 
Although this original plant was expanded and modernized by 
Acindar after the war (in 1947-50), the small inland Rosario site 
was not suitable for the large ore-based integrated steelplant 
planned by Acindar's directors. 
So, subsequently, Acindar's other steelplants were all 
constructed in Villa Constitución on a single large site actually 
on the banks of the river Parana some 50km. from Rosario and accesible 
to small ore-carrying or billet-carrying ships coming up river 
from Buenos Aires. 
Here, in the period 1947—51, Acindar put up its second plant 
-this was the rolling mill stage of what was intended later to 
be a fully integrated plant. It involved setting up a large, high 
speed continuous rolling mill of 215,000 tons per year capacity, 
on what was then a totally "greenfield" site, so that not just the 
plant, but considerable supporting infrastructure was needed. 
For this project -when imports of technology were again possible, 
thanks to the end of the war- Acindar relied heavily on the 
technology recommended by U.S. mill-suppliers Morgans and on the 
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technical training and assistance of several engineers from the 
major U.S. steel firm Republic Steel who had the initial operating 
responsibility for the plant and who tutored Acindar's men over 
a three year period to take their places. (At that time Republic 
Steel had an option to take out a 10% share in Acindar's equity). 
Superficially it may appear that Acindar had here "retreated" 
from its active role in specifying, fabricating and operating 
their technology, as compared to when the Rosario plant was 
founded. However, this is not a correct evaluation for two reasons: 
first, the technological "jump" from simple slow, discontinuous 
rolling mills to sophisticated, high speed, continuous mills meant 
that Acindar's experience in the design and construction of the 
Rosario plant was quite insufficient for taking on much of a role 
in the design of the mill needed for the Villa Constitución plant; 
secondly, there was a question of opportunity costs -for the 
enormous scale of expansion which its new plant represented for 
Acindar meant that this small firm's limited managerial-technical 
resources were fully stretched on tasks, such as helping to plan and 
organize the building of the needed plant infrastructure, recruiting 
and training many new workers and staff, expanding the firm's sales 
and marketing efforts, and simply learning to operate and manage 
the sophisticated large new mill and the greatly expanded scale of 
company operations that was now involved. Hence, even if Acindar's 
engineers had theoretically been able to make a bigger contribution 
to engineering design or auxiliary equipment fabrication for the new 
mill, this would have had a high opportunity cost in terms of 
other urgent tasks left unattended, due to the size and the rate 
of expansion then being undertaken. 
The case-study goes on to analyse a third acquisition phase 
in Acindar's record. This was the installation of another high 
speed continuous Morgan rolling mill in its Villa Constitución 
plant in 1969-71 some twenty years later than when the first mill 
was installed. 
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Foreign firms still had the overall responsibility for 
core equipment supply and project execution for this second mill. 
However, in this case, Acindar's engineers made significant technical 
contributions to layout and to equipment specification, including 
requiring scores of detailed modifications regarding particular 
equipment items. Ac indar engineers also supervised the local 
fabrication of many of the complementary items of the mill's 
equipment and support structures, etc. and actively took part in 
mill start-up. Evidently, the accumulation of 20 previous years 
of rolling mill operating experience in Acindar, plus experience of 
introducing their own modifications and improvements to their 
first mill, plus the superior knowledge of Acindar's own engineers 
fes compared to foreign suppliers) concerning their own specific 
technical requirements for the new mill - were what enabled Acindar 
to make significant technical contributions to the design and 
execution of the project 
In summary, each of the three acquisition phases analysed 
illustrates different economic factors at work in this phase. 
The first, i.e. the construction of the Rosario plant reinforces 
the view of Hirschman (1967)— that "crash" learning experiences 
which are induced when a firm has to find an improvised or innovative 
solution to meet the challenge involved (or else face the collapse 
of its project) can have valuable psychological effects in making 
firms more willing to take risks and innovate in the' future, provided 
the outcome of such "crash" learning experiences is successful, 
as it was in this case. 
The second (i.e. the 1947-51) foundation of the Villa Cons-
titución plant) illustrates that major 'jumps' in technology when 
a firm expands may render its previous experience relatively 
inapplicable to the technological and equipment requirements of the 
new technology being acquired, and also that large scale expansions 
may greatly boost the opportunity costs of applying a firm's limited 
managerial-technical manpower to carrying out equipment 
design, engineering or construction tasks that can be contracted 
from outside specialist firms. 
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The third (i.e. the 1969-72 expansion of the Villa 
Constitución plant with a second Morgan mill) suggests how a 
firm's learning-from-experience over the years in operating, 
maintaining and improving a set of equipment can lead to a sort 
of "comparative advantage" being possessed by this firm as 
compared to foreign engineers and equipment suppliers when the 
time comes to work out the precise technical specifications of 
technologically similar equipment which "the' firm decides to add 
later on.so as to expand its output. 
1.2 Findings about the 'Improvement Phase' for Technology 
The case-study also looked carefully at the kinds of investments, 
learning and research efforts and technical changes which were 
made by Acindar to improve, upgrade and adapt its plants in the 
years following the initial construction and the achievement of 
nominal (rated) capacity in these plants. This was done by 
analysing the expenditure on fixed assets in the firm's Annual 
Reports, and by examining data collected on some 263 minor 
technical projects carried out in the Rosario plant, 31 minor 
investment projects in the Acevedo plant, and a representative 
sample of 54- engineering and research projects carried out by the 
firm between 1970 and 1974. 
The main findings were that (1) some 25-30% of all Acindar's 
investments in fixed assets were devoted to minor improvement-type 
investment to its existing plants and this was clearly reflected 
in the upgraded performance achieved over time in all the plants; 
(2) these improvement-type investments usually involved technical 
changes rather than mere duplication of equipment; (3) the objectives 
of these technical changes were broader than just the search for 
product cost-reductions; they also included product diversification, 
the "stretching" of plant capacity in existing product lines; 
corrective steps to deal with shortages and problems emerging in 
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raw material supplies; and product quality improvements; further-
more many technical changes were aimed at more than one of these 
objectives simultaneously. (4) most improvement projects were 
clearly stimulated by the prior emergence of specific market 
demands, specific production problems or specific raw materials 
constraints; the firm was, in most cases,"reacting" to these stimuli 
by introducing technical changes, rather than "initiating" the 
changes itself; however a minority of improvement projects seemed to 
originate in the spontaneous suggestions of the firm's technical 
staff, or in the firm's desire to maintain its technological and 
market ascendancy by launching advanced products in certain product 
lines ahead of its competitors; (5) the minor technical changes 
introduced were apparently characterized by high expected rates 
of return (with payback periods estimated ex-ante in one project 
sample as being in the 6 months to 3 year range); also it was clear 
that, often, if minor technical changes had not been carried out, 
this would have had high opportunity costs in terms of the idle 
plant capacity that would have resulted from failure to introduce 
.such changes in response to plant bottlenecks, production problems, 
market needs or raw material supply problems; (6) many of the 
minor technical changes -particularly in the Rosario plant- were 
conceived, designed and, executed by the plant's own personnel, and 
often involved ingenious "sui generis" solutions which boosted plant 
performance at low investment cost; (7) even when the technical 
changes mainly involved the addition of ancillary machinery bought 
new from machinery suppliers (as was often the case in the main rolling mil 
plant) significant in-house technical effort from plant personnel 
was still observed, and was dedicated to specifying, adapting and 
fitting the new machinery into the pre-existing complex of existing 
machinery, process flows and procedures; (8) Acindar's capacity to 
specify, design and implement plant improvements was not "automatic" 
but depended on deliberate organization for its needed inputs of 
information, skills and resources;the main sources of these were the 
firm's Quality Control department and laboratory back-up, its Industrial 
Engineering department which does operations-research studies, the 
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Maintenance Engineering department, the Project Engineering depart-
ment, and last but not least, the experience and information obtained 
from the engineers and technicians directly in charge of production;(9) 
there was, in contrast, no separate RSD laboratory or separate RSD 
staff, nor any fixed budget for research work, even though a 
certain number of clearly experimental research studies, tests, 
and pilot production attempts as well as project engineering studies 
and operational research studies were detected in the various 
technical departments; (10) the formal allocation of resources to 
technical capabilities was mainly done at the level of the budget 
and the procedures of each of the technical departments; these 
departments were also regularly required to contribute technical 
resources within their sphere to help implement new equipment 
investments decided by the "Investments Approval Committee" of the 
Board of directors. 
These findings all point towards the economic and organizational 
importance of plant improvements in Acindar's record. In fact 
the large number of minor technical change projects encountered, 
the" cumulatively high level of investment in them, the sophisticated 
organization needed to make them possible, and the need for minor 
technical changes created by changing external conditions in the 
firm's factor and product markets and by production problems in 
the plant itselfyall show this. So, too, does the significant 
cumulative upgrading in performance obtained in all Acindar's plants. 
This was especially noticeable in the "old vintage" Rosario plant 
where effective capacities in the steel shop and rolling mills were 
increased by amounts ranging from 66% to 130% beyond nominal 
(original) capacities. 
So Acindar's record suggest that the "improvement potential" of 
steelplants,and the "in-house" capacity to make good use of this 
potential, may repay careful consideration by steel finis who might 
45 
well find it profitable to invest more money in minor plant 
• improvements -and in their technical personnel and organization 
who can implement these improvements- than they are currently 
doing. 
1.3 Findings concerning the overall "learning path" pursued by 
Acindar given the strikingly imperfect and distorted external 
economic context in which it evolved 
A third set of findings from the case-study concern how factors 
in Acindar's external economic environment caused the firm's 
"technological learning path" to be rather less satisfactory than 
what the firm was capable of, both from Acindar's own private viewpoint 
and the social viewpoint. 
One indicator of this is to compare the very rapid growth of 
Acindar's steelmaking assets and output in tis first decade 1943-53 
with the much slower growth of these assets throughout most of the 
1960's and 70s. 
Thus in its first ten years of operations Acindar's energetic 
management and technical staff managed to build 
two plants and to become market leader with around 
a 40 % share of the domestic non-flats market. 
Acindar's 
However/further growth in steel production was greatly stunted 
by exogenous factors beyond the control of the firm, having chiefly 
to do with the "troubled" postwar macroeconomic performance of the 
Argentine economy, the poor performance of the state steelworks SOMISA 
and the erratic official planning of the industry. Broadly speaking, 
official plans tended to overload the capacities of SOMISA with 
ambitious expansions, whilst holding back the semi-integrated private 
producers from integrating their plants. 
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The net result for Acindar was that, in its second and third 
decades, much of the technological development of the firm's steel-
plants involved its management and engineers in seeking "second-
best" and "third-best" expansion patterns and technological 
solutions, given that (a) the most obvious and desirable expansion 
path for the firm -which involved becoming an integrated producer 
much earlier on during the 1950s or 60s- was repeatedly delayed or 
blocked by the opposition of the official planners of the industry; and 
(b) development as a semi-integrated.producer was made difficult for 
Acindar since it could not always count on getting all its needed 
supplies of semis (billets and slabs) either from SOMISA (due to 
the latter's performance problems) or from imports (owing to 
foreign exchange constraints for macroeconomic reasons). 
A striking illustration of Acindar having to follow a "sub-optimal" 
technological path in response to such circumstances is provided by 
the technological record of the Rosario plant, which is documented 
in detail in the study. What emerges is that although this plant 
was acknowledged as obsolete some twenty years ago, it was 
nevertheless kept going by Acindar and subjected to a prolonged series 
of piecemeal technical adaptations and improvements before finally 
being scrapped only in 1978. The apparently "paradoxical" 
strategy of Acindar in improving this obsolete plant is shown to 
have been a rational response to the marked "imperfections" recurring 
in the Argentine steel industry in the form of raw materials import 
rationing and erratic government policy towards the private steel 
sector. So this is a case of a firm being forced to channel some of 
its resources down a "minor technological road" (i.e. improve an 
obsolete technology) when the "main road" involving switch to 
better practice technology was blocked by exogenous economic distortions 
and public policy. 
Another clear instance of a "sub-optimal" technological learning 
path being pursued was the nearly eight years of planning, 
engineering, and management efforts uselessly expended by Acindar on 
a major plant integration project in the pEriod 1961-68, during which, 
on four successive occasions, the Argentine government ratified their 
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approval of the project, only to eventually cancel it in 1968 after 
" Acindar had already invested heavily in planning and 
training many of its engineers,as well as in initial preparations 
of the site,and even in some equipment for the project. 
In order to view this situation from the "social welfare" 
standpoint, the case-study also explains the position of the Government 
which believed that expanding the large integrated state steelworks 
SOMISA would lead to steel production at lower, costs than in 
Acindar's projected integrated plant, because of economies of scale. 
But the actual learning path pursued by SOMISA,when required by the 
state to undertake rapid expansion up to 2 1/2 million tons of 
capacity, turned out to be clearly "sub-optimal" . This was because of the 
long delays experienced by SOMISA in this expansion due to some 
important constructional and operational mistakes made which required 
extensive "compensatory" engineering and investment by SOMISA to 
put things right. 
On the basis of these outcomes for Acindar and SOMISA -as well 
as some data collected about the development of other firms 
in the industry- a criticism of Argentine official steel industry policy 
emerges: it is that the pattern^of Argentine state interventions to 
determine choice-of-techniques,scale of plant and division of labour 
between public sector and private sector firms in the steel industry seems 
to have consistently underestimated the economic importance of 
learning activities - in effect underutilising the learning 
capacities of Acindar and other private sector firms, whilst over-
loading the learning capacity of the state steel firm, SOMISA. 
The result was to generate "sub-optimal" learning paths and 
compensatory R&D in both private and state sectors - implying a 
notable waste of resources, many years of lost time in achieving 
national self-sufficiency in steel, and consequent more acute 
national balance of payments problems. 
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An important lesson from the Acindar case-study is that policy 
should seek to take advantage of available learning resources 
(whether these are in the private or public sector firms) via 
steps which not only put these resources to work (and avoid 
leaving them idle) but which also ensure that they learn in 
the right areas and/or techniques, rather than being partially 
wasted by being applied to obsolete techniques, or to "compensatory" 
activities made necessary by previous planning blunders. 
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2. USIMINAS, Brasil 1956-77 -
The Brasilian study tracks the technological record of USIMINAS 
(Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais) which by 1979 was producing over 
3 million tons of flat steel products per year and which is the largest, 
most successful and efficient of Latin America's state-owned integrated 
steelplants. 
It shows how USIMINAS profited and then emerged from their 1956-66 
stage of dependence on their Japanese joint-venture partners, how they 
greatly boosted the capacity and productivity of their initial plant 
design at near zero investment cost during 1966-72; how they subse-
quently undertook on schedule a series of very rapid expansions in the 
period from 1973 to the present day; and how they have now evolved to 
the point of developing technology of their own and selling technical 
assistance both nationally and internationally. 
Apart from analysing and contrasting the two different principal 
methods of technical change used by USIMINAS - viz. upgrading existing 
plants versus acquiring new plant - the study shows that USIMINAS owes 
its success to a consistent, long-term, and aggressive technological 
strategy emphasizing intensive learning alongside foreign technology 
suppliers, heavy investment in upgrading and training of own technical 
personnel, and the development of a comprehensive technological infra-
structure including basic engineering, project engineering and research. 
So this is a case, as its authors explain, of a firm which "rather than 
seeking to resist foreign technology .. has successfully sought to 
pull itself up by it" .. and "shows what is possible when the domestic 
a/ This study is based largely on secondary sources of data, as 
direct plant visits were ruled out by •••he reluctance of the company to 
co-operate in this regard. However, access was provided to the 
company's excellent information and documentation services, and this 
enabled the joint research team of an economist and an engineer to> bring 
together a very substantial volume of technical,economic and organizational 
data on USIMINAS's record. 
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partner pursues an aggressive technological strategy". 
Several of the particular facets which help to explain USIMINAS' 
remarkable performance, and which are disclosed in the case-study, will 
now be briefly reviewed. 
One such facet is the workings of the "joint-venture" arrangement 
between USIMINAS and a consortium of Japanese firms led by Nippon Steel 
(later to prove itself the world's number one steel company in size and 
technical performance). This arrangement proved excellent from 
USIMINAS' point of view. This was because the Japanese put an unusually 
heavy and dedicated engineering, technical assistance and financial 
effort into getting USIMINAS's original plant.built, started up and 
operating successfully - their motivation being that they wanted to 
provide the world a "showcase" of what the Japanese could do as 
equipment suppliers in the world steel plant market then dominated by 
the U.S.A., Germany and England. Equally important is .that USIMINAS's 
management made very good use of the rich "learning" opportunities 
provided to their OTO staff by this partnership with the Japanese. 
This rapid learning enabled the Brasilians to completely take over the 
running of the plant in 1966, and begin introducing their own substantial 
changes in organization to improve on what the Japanese had set them up 
with. The study also shows that USIMINAS made carefully planned and 
intensive use of continued technical assistance from Nippon Steel (and 
other companies) after the first ten year "apprenticeship" period 
(1956-66) was over. In a sense then, one can think of USIMINAS as 
having been "tutored" throughout its development by the world's premier 
steel company (Nippon Steel), and having proved capable of rapidly 
absorbing more and more advanced aspects of steel technology whilst 
steadily increasing their own independent technical and innovative 
capacity. 
A second facet analysed in the study relates to the "exogenous" 
conditions of USIMINAS' development including both the market demand 
situation, and the increasing levels of Brasilian government intervention 
and planning in the industry's expansions throughout the 1960s and '70s. 
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In this regard, it is shown how the'domestic steel market recession of 
1964-68 which began just as USIMINAS was starting production had the 
effect of greatly sharpening the firm's financial crisis (which had 
been caused mainly by the rapid inflation of the cruzeiro during 
USIMINAS's construction period) and how this situation provoked two 
very creative technical. responses from the firm. These were, 
first, a notable and successful effort to raise the quality of plant 
output so as to be able to break into export markets to mitigate the 
domestic demand-crisis; and second, a successful effort to .boost sales 
u-
revenne and reduce production costs at low levels of additional 
investment through squeezing more and more output out of the initial 
plant installations through a long sequence of minor operative and 
technical improvements to "stretch" their capacity. 
Subsequently, from 1969 onwards, quite new exogenous market _ . 
conditions prevailed. The market boomed, and the government came actively 
onto the scene offering subsidised capital to those firms whose expansion 
plans fitted with the government's investment criteria. In this 
environment, USIMINAS now faced the very different challenge of planning, 
engineering and bringing on stream and then up to full capacity working, 
a great deal of new plant and equipment so as to expand output up to 1.8, 
then 2.4, and then 3.5 million tons per annum, all during the 1970s. 
The remarkable thing is that this very fast rate of expansion, not just 
of capacity but of output, was achieved on schedule by USIMINAS, in 
contrast to some notable delays experienced in the similar expansion 
programmes of the two other comparable large Brazilian integrated flat 
products firms, COSIPA and CSN. This was mainly due to the unusually 
effective internal organizational response developed by USIMINAS to 
cope with these "exogenously demanded" expansions. 
The analysis of this organizational response is another facet 
covered by the study. Already, earlier in 1966, USIMINAS undertook a major 
administrative reform to streamline plant operations when the Japanese 
left, which included the setting up of a "standard cost" system for the 
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tracing and detailed analysis of product cost components, coupled with 
making systematic contrasts of their plant's performance with that of 
comparable plants internationally. However, the beginning of the major 
expansion programmes stimulated the company to (a) reorganize itself 
to develop strong internal basic project engineering and detailed 
project engineering capacity, as well as equipment manufacturing 
capacity to help handle the expansions and (b) to boost its information 
search capacity and its internal technical-change capacity and research 
capacity to help in constantly improving plant performance and operating 
efficiency. To help make all this possible, the firm also invested 
very heavily in the training of its own staff and in technical assistance 
and technology contracts with the leading steel firms helping to supply 
inputs to the expansion projects. In other words USIMINAS systematically 
exploited and invested in the oportunity to learn from, and alongside, 
its foreign suppliers, so as to absorb relevant knowledge and skills, 
and so as to be in a position to handle things independently second time 
round. Moreover, in the course of this, they were guided by their own 
explicit long-term strategy of putting together within, their own 
organization all the essential engineering, technical, information, 
and research backup needed to manage their expansions, keep abreast of 
and introduce the latest technical changes, and develop their own 
specifically needed innovations. 
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3. Acerías Paz del Rio, Colombia 1947-76 
This case-study traces the technological record a/ of Colombia's 
leading steelworks, Acerías Paz del Rio, from its foundation in 1947 
through to 1976. Throughout this whole period, Paz del Rio was-the 
country's only fully integrated steelworks, b/ and it accounted for 
roughly 90% of national output of rolled products in the period 1955-59, 
roughly 75% in the 1960s falling to around 55% in 1976. The study 
therefore deals with easily the dominant firm in the Colombian steel 
industry. 
The technological record of this firm is, however, fundamentally 
a "troubled" one. which can be divided into two basic periods. The 
first is from 1947 to 1960. It corresponds to the founding of the 
enterprise, the planning and building of the plant, its start-up, and 
the difficulties experienced in building its output up to initially 
rated capacity levels. The second period, which overlaps with the 
first, is from 1957 to 1976 and corresponds to the firm's efforts 
to correct the design-defects of the original plant and simultaneously 
greatly expand the plant's capacity, a programme which proved subject 
to long delays and serious difficulties in execution, and in final 
results, and which was still incomplete in the last year covered by 
the study (1976). 
aj There is very little data in this case-study on costs, prices,productivity 
profits or the overall economic performance of the firm. However it can be 
deduced that several of the major technological difficulties experienced 
must have rebounded very negatively on plant productivity and product 
costs. 
b/ The study analysing Acerías Paz del Rio also documents the 
development of Colombia's four semi-integrated works. However, the record 
of these works is not analyséd in this book. 
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The following account -which is based strictly on the data 
provided in the case-study- now resumes several of the main features 
of these two periods. 
The founding of the plant was mainly the result of government 
promotion. The officially backed Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI) 
proved in the 1940s that large deposits of iron ore, coal suitable for 
coking, and limestone were available in the Boyaca region, which made 
an integrated steelplant based entirely on local raw materials feasible. 
This led to the official founding of the "Empresa Siderúrgica Nacional de 
Paz del Río" in 1947 with 20% of its capital provided by IFI, but most 
of the rest still needing to be subscribed. 
In fact, this points to the main immediate difficulty experienced 
by the company,which was shortage of finance. True, further help was 
provided by the Government in terms of capital contributions from the 
treasury and a special steel promotion tax which was deductible for those 
individuals buying shares in the company. However these measures 
could only partially finance the project -which made the obtaining 
of substantial foreign loans essential. 
Following the delivery of the first feasibility report, commissioned 
in 1948, the World Bank was approached for a loan of $US 50 million to 
build an integrated plant with 193,000 tons per year of capacity. The 
Bank, however, refused this request alleging that the Paz del Rio project 
as set out in the feasibility report was overoptimistic in its demand, 
price and cost projections. In fact the Bank recommended that a semi-
integrated coastal steelworks based on imported scrap should be built, 
rather than the projected integrated Paz del Rio works which would be 
located at Belencito, 200 km north of Bogota, at 2570 meters above sea 
level in the mineral rich zone discovered by IFI in Boyaca. This refusal 
of the loan touched off an intense national, political controversy, 
which ended with the government permitting the Empresa Nacional Side-
rúrgica Paz del Río to negotiate and obtain an alternative loan of $ 26 
million dollars, on tougher interest terms, from a consortium of 
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French suppliers and Banks, to build a somewhat smaller version of 
the integrated plant at Belencito, with 126,000 tons of steelmaking 
capacity. 
This loan was signed in 1951. The engineering was done by a U.S. 
engineering firm with help from the French equipment suppliers and the 
plant was built, and started up in October 1954. However, it then took 
virtually six years, until 1960, before the plant was producing at its 
nominal capacity. According to the case-study - which was based largely 
on evidence drawn from plant personnel - this long delay was due to 
several conceptual errors, as well as design, construction and equipment 
defects, in the plant's original technology.* The most fundamental 
problems were (1) the lack of a sinter plant in the original design -
badly needed for exploiting the high percentage of fine particles 
a/ 
characteristic of the iron ore mined in the Boyaca region— ; (2) the 
lack of provision for an adequate electric energy supply, which troubled 
the first five years of the operations of the plant's electric arc 
furnace and held up the creation of adequate haulage capacity by 
electrified railway to bring the iron ore and coal to the plant; 
(3) the lack of inclusion in the plant's original technology of a 
versatile primary rolling mill, which forced the company to specialise 
in producing a narrower range of products than was set out in the plans; 
(4) various construction weaknesses and defects alleged in the coke 
washing plant, blast furnace and steelshop-. 
Perhaps some of these problems may be partly attributable to the 
nature of the agreement signed with the French equipment-supplying 
consortium, which was a "tied" loan, made available to Acerias Paz 
del Rio mainly in the form of equipment provided by the consortium 
itself. Hence there appears to have been little or no bidding around 
for alternative equipment suppliers 
aj The point is that fine particles were unsuitable for direct 
charging to blast furnaces. So the lack of a sinter plant forced 
the firm into having to mine an uneconomically high tonnage of 
iron ore per ton of pig iron produced in the blast furnace. 
* One should not, however, assume that fault lay with the suppliers, 
since no evidence was collected from them, and the case-study does 
not indicate under what constraints or instructions they were operating. 
possibly not enough-
or specifications, and / control by the Colombian side over what 
their suppliers provided, 
The net result of these serious technological problems, coupled 
undoubtedly to the inexperience of the company's own staff (40% of 
The workers were illiterate, and the company had to set up its own 
schools for them), led to a delay of six years from the start up of 
the plant in 1954 through to the point in I960 when it achieved 
production levels at its nominal capacity of around 120,000 tons 
per annum. 
The "second" period of Acerias Paz del Rio mentioned above 
i.e. 1957-76 involved the "correction" and improvement of the initial 
plant, and substantial additions of new equipment a^s well as 
adaptations to increase its capacity. Like the first period, this 
second period was also plagued with difficulties though it contains 
within it a remarkable technological "success story" in regard to 
the plant's blast furnace. 
The original plan for the correction-cum-expansion of Acerias 
Paz del Pa.o was put forward in 1957, and would have included a second 
ilast furnace to lift pig iron capacity from 177,500 to 377,000 tons 
per year. However an acute demand crisis of 1957-58 forced postponement 
of the whole plan until 1960, and in fact, the main finance for the 
plan was only secured (froiii the World Bank) in 1963. 
Furthermore, for reasons not described in the report, (but 
which may have had to do with low demand projections and financial 
restrictions within the company)', this second blast furnace was never 
built within the period covered by the study, i.e. right up to 1976. 
Instead, the main corrections and expansions of the plant that took 
place (mainly in the 1963-68 period) were (1) the installation of the 
sinter plant, (2) the installation of a versatile, large-scale 
blooming-slabbing mill with a capacity of one million tons per annum 
i.e. nearly four times the existing steelmaking capacity of the plant, 
(3) the installation of a 400,000 ton per annum 'Steckel' mill for 
a/ Possibly too, the lack of finance for the project encouraged the 
firm to try to get its plant"on the cheap" by accepting the omission of 
key installations . 
the -hot-rolling of flat sheet steel, and (4) several modifications 
to the existing blast furnace to boost its productivity and capacity. 
Unfortunately, there was a major problem with this expansion 
which was that it did not include a cold-rolling mill for flat products. 
Yet, during the 1960s the rapidly growing internal Colombian demand 
for steel flat products was mainly for cold-rolled, not hot-rolled sheets. 
In fact demand for the latter was calculated in 1975 as only about 
35,000 tons per annum. The consequence was that the Steckel mill could 
only be operated, right up to 1976, at around 5% of its capacity. As 
for the 1 million ton blooming-slabbing-mill, this could only be 
operated at up to 25% of its capacity, producing mainly blooms for 
Paz del Rio's main line of non-flat products,but very few slabs, for 
lack of a cold rolling mill beyond the Steckel to feed them to. 
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installation of a cold rolling mill. However by 1972 when Acerías Paz 
del Rio wished to acquire this mill, they postponed purchase due to lack 
of adequate electrical energy supplies. (In fact the energy problem 
dating from the founding of the plant was still not completely solved 
in 1976, owing to low thermoelectric generating capacity from the local 
power company and inadequate transmission lines to the plant.). 
A further blow to the projected acquisition of the cold rolling 
mill fell in 1974 when the acute shortage of steel on the world market 
and the consequent plant investment boom led the equipment suppliers 
to double the price of the mill, which Acerías Paz del Rio could not 
afford - especially since the shortages of steel also meant that the 
company would have had difficulty in importing the needed supplies of 
slabs with which to produce the coils to feed its new mill. 
A further relevant point is that from 1975 to the end of 1976 
(the end point covered by the study) the major rationalisation and 
expansion programme needed for Acerías Paz del Rio - at a cost of some 
US$ 500 million - has been stalled for lack of finance and lack of 
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agreement with the Colombian government on its form of participation 
in the company. 
For all these reasons, the expansion programme put forward in 1957 
still cannot be considered as having been properly completed by 1976, 
nineteen years after its formulation. 
By way of interpretation, one can see that financial problems 
(themselves partly connected to the difficulties experienced with the 
initial plant) have plagued Paz del Rio's expansion programme. Also, 
there seem to have been some very faulty demand projections for flat 
products underlying the programme. Furthermore one can surmise that unstable 
Colombian demand conditions have been a negative factor in the growth 
and finances of the firm. Thus, out of the twenty five years from 
1951 to 1976, apparent internal steel consumption in Colombia rose 
13 times, and dropped 12 times. Moreover the last few years covered 
by the report, 1972-76 ,were ones of clear economic stagnation. Clearly 
too, exogenous factors such as the world steel crisis, and the firm's not 
fully satisfactory relations with the Colombian Government, have not 
helped. 
Nevertheless, not all the record is one of gloom. For one thing, 
the case-study hints but does not document that in spite of the manifold 
difficulties the company has managed to be profitable, exploiting its 
dominant position in the Colombian steel market. 
For another thing, Acerías Paz del Rio has achieved some . 
remarkable increases in the productivity and the capacity of its blast 
furnace between 1954 and 1976:- for example, in 1960 over 4 tons of 
raw material had to be charged to the blast furnace per ton of pig iron 
produced. In 1975, only 3.24 tons of raw materials were required. The 
original (nominal)capacity of the blast furnace when first operated 
was 500 tons per day of pig iron. In 1976 this had been boosted by 
multiple modifications to 840 tons/day, and plans were imminent to 
boost it further to 1,000 tons per day — i.e. a 100% increase compared 
to the original capacity. Furthermore, the plant's engineers and 
technical staff had by this stage (1976) clearly achieved considerable 
internal capacity to conceive and execute their own technical changes 
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and innovations. 
Nevertheless the two points that stand out strongest in the 
Acerias Paz del Rio case-history are (1) the extent to which the 
technical efforts of the plant have had to be devoted to corrective or 
"remedial" measures and investments to cope with the difficulties 
provoked by the localization of the plant, its poor initial "technol-
ogical profile" and the investment constraints 
which afflicted its expansion plans; and (2) the immensely long time 
taken from the planning stage through to full implementation of both 
the initial plant (13 years), and the expansion programme (19 years), 
as well as the extent to which various exogenous factors as well as 
faulty planning helped to exacerbate these situations. 
60 
4. Altos Hornos de México (AHMSA), Mexico, 1940-1977. 
The Mexican study covers the technological evolution of the 
state-owned integrated steel plant Altos Hornos de Mexico (AHMSA) 
which was constructed during the Second World War. 
The analysis shows how (a) the initial choice of AHMSA's 
technology (which consisted of obsolete, used,"scrap" equipment 
which was all that could be obtained at the time), and (b) the 
effects of the successive "imperfections" introduced by government 
policy, and (c) the virtually permanent excess demand situation 
in the protected Mexican domestic market, have all strongly 
conditioned the technological strategy followed by the firm — a major 
consequence of excess demand being that technical changes to increase 
output were more important in most periods than technical changes to 
reduce production costs. 
At the level of individual plant sections and equipment units, 
the study found that an impressively large number of minor technical 
changes were introduced by AHMSA, in most cases as reactions, or 
"defensive" responses to specific urgent operational problems or 
needs, rather than as the result of carefully pre-planned efforts. 
It was also discovered that most of these technical changes could be 
classified into a relatively discrete number of recurring "areas of 
engineering challenge" or, to use another phrase, "natural trajectories 
of technical change" that apply in steelplants. 
The authors' conclusion is that it would be profitable for 
steelplants to have a more explicit and offensive strategy towards 
the generation of minor technical changes than the almost wholly "defensive" 
strategy observed in the present case. 
A further feature of AHMSA's record is that - following upon the 
notable effort of improvisation which was made by AHMSA to get their 
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initial plant going (based on reconditioning used equipment) 
the firm acquired great confidence in their own abilities and adopted 
the policy of always using a heavy input of their own design and cons-
truction skills^in subsequent plant expansions. As a result, AHMSA's 
second and third blast furnaces, were substantially AHMSA designed 
and constructed rather than merely being commissioned from international 
suppliers. 
However the firm's fourth blast furnace which started up in 1971, 
was, in a change of policy, bought from international suppliers-of 
engineering and equipment, and AHMSA experienced considerable 
technical problems in getting this rather more sophisticated furnace 
to work properly. 
Even more troublesome appears to have been the results of acquiring, 
also from international suppliers, a new B.O.F. steelmaking plant with 
three oxygen converters which started up during 1971 and 1972. AHMSA's 
acquisition of this technology is alleged by the AHMSA engineers interviewed 
in the case—study to have involved some design errors by the foreign 
a/ 
suppliers —, and to have been undertaken with inadequate technical and 
organizational preparation on AHMSA's side. As a result, AHMSA's technical 
efforts had to be devoted first to a longish process of "learning-by-doing" 
with the new technology (they had used Siemens-Martin steelmaking before) 
and, subsequently, to undertaking several "remedial" technical changes to 
mitigate or remove the problems alleged to have been inherent in the original 
plant design. Some indication of the problems experienced is that by, 1977, 
the last year covered in the study, this steelshop was still not working 
at its nominal capacity even though start-up had begun six years before, 
in 1971. 
This example illustrates a possible error that even experienced steel 
firms with considerable technical ability, like AHMSA, are prone to making. 
This is to underestimate the problems involved when firms make "jumps" to 
fundamentally different (and more sophisticated) technology. Such "jumps" 
probably make it more difficult for the firm to specify correctly or to 
understand what it is acquiring, and unless very active steps are taken 
by firms to get first class advice on these matters and to engage in 
very energetic prior consultations, paying 
a/ One should not, however, assume that fault lay with the suppliers, since no 
evidence was collected from them, and the case-study does not indicate under 
what constraints or instructions they were operating. 
maximum attention to specific local conditions, then the technology 
selection may slide out of the firm's hands to such an extent that 
design errors, construction errors and start up errors are 
more likely to ensue. 
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5. Siderurgica de Chimbote. 1943 - 1967. 
This case-study looks at the period from 1943 onwards to 1967 
covering the foundation and early years of operation of the plant known 
as the Siderurgica de Chimbote, which was. later renamed SIDERPERU. 
Most of the data in the report relate to the period from 1956-67 
during which the plant produced a maximum annual output of 82,000 
ingot tons. It was the original intention of the study to cover the 
whole period from the foundation of the plant through to 1976, 
including the major amplification of the plant implemented in the second 
half of the 1960s and the subsequent "plant balancing project" of 1975. 
Circumstances, unfortunately, ruled out completion of the study. The 
part completed was the analysis of the first-stage up to 1967. So it 
is only some selected features of this first stage which will now be 
resumed here. During this period virtually the entire output of the 
plant consisted of non-flat, mild steel products for the construction 
industry. 
The main feature of interest in the study is, without doubt, 
the very badly mistaken choice of initial technology that was made 
for the Chimbote plant. This consisted in the use of an unprecedented 
and technologically inefficient and costly steelmaking method which was highly 
intensive in its use of electricity, coupled with the use of a method 
for making pig iron that was also electricity-intensive, for a plant 
whose supply of electric energy proved to be very costly as well as 
insufficient in quantity. 
How did this happen? Several factors seem to have contributed. 
First the main government objective in promoting this project seems 
to have been to gain political capital by launching steel production 
in Peru rather than by any marked concern with the efficiency of the 
operations once launched. (A concern which begun to show itself more 
clearly after the first few years of very high cost operations). 
Secondly, the project was not implemented in a planned, unified and 
organic way but in piecemeal fashion, in fits and starts, owing to 
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financial shortages and administrative reorganizations within the 
corporation managing the project. Third, there was apparently an almost 
complete lack of technical capacity at that time on the Peruvian side, 
which led to passive reliance on the specifications, equipment and 
training recommended by the chosen foreign suppliers. Fourth there 
seems to have been a badly mistaken assumption underlying the Chimbote 
project that the plant would be able to count on a fully adequate and 
cheap supply of electric energy; in practice thè opposite proved to be 
the case as the cost of its energy to the company included helping to 
pay for the installation of local generating and transmission facilities. 
Fifth, the small size of the initial capital of the company in charge 
of operating the plant (U.S.$2,1 million) suggests that, possibly, the 
effort to have a plant of some kind at rock-bottom initial investment 
cost may have played some role in the lack of selectivity displayed. 
Yet even with all these contributing factors, it is difficult to 
understand the actual choice of steelmaking method that was made. 
This consisted of the technologically unprecedented method of refining 
a charge consisting of 50% molten pig iron and 50% solid scrap in electric 
arc-furnaces. Normally it is considered that pig iron should only be 
used as up to 10% of the charge in arc furnaces, and should be charged 
in cold solid form, not as hot metal, and in any event is only advisable 
for use when the carbon content of the scrap is less than 0,5%. 
The 50 - 50 hot-metal/scrap charge used in Chimbote, in contrast, is 
reckoned to require the input of about 50% more electric energy, and 
to take up 50% more refining time than the normal method of melting 
a 100% scrap charge with adequate carbon content. It also produces 
violent chemical reactions in the furnaces, which make the refining 
process difficult to control and which cause abnormally heavy wear 
on the furnace refractory linings. 
In other words, the steelmaking process selected for Chimbote was 
inherently inefficient, even supposing the availability of a satisfactory 
and cheap supply of electric energy. 
The pig iron making technology chosen was also mistaken in the sense that 
it involved the electricity-intensive method of electric-reduction 
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furnaces rather than a conventional blast furnace. In the event, both 
the high cost of producing pig iron (due to electricity costs) and 
the undesirability of charging so much pig iron to the steelmaking 
furnaces resulted in the firm deciding never to work these two reduction 
furnaces at their full nominal capacity. In fact production from these 
furnaces began to be deliberately reduced from 1962 onwards. 
Another element of poor initial selection of technology was the 
small, obsolete, manually operated flat products rolling mill initially 
acquired, but closed down five years after plant start-up, in 1963. 
Altogether, then, it is clear that the Chimbóte plant had an 
inauspicious technological start. 
Another aspect worth noting is the long gestation time involved 
in the foundation of the plant. Thus, it took seven years from the 
initiation of the project in 1943 to the first contract for acquiring 
major pieces of plant equipment, in 1950. It then took four more years 
until the corporation organizing the project had got itself fully nobilized 
for the construction work, which it managed to complete by 1956 under the 
supervision of the foreign suppliers. It then took approximately 
two years more until 1958. before most of the plant installations can 
be considered to have definitely started up. And then a further 
three years until crude steel output had reached the nominal capacity 
of the electric arc furnaces. These long construction and 
start up delays added to the economic burdens imposed by the 
physical inefficiency of the process itself(caused by the erroneous 
initial choice of technology). This led to very high unit 
production costs which were additionally inflated by overmanning and 
excessive administrative costs. 
The case-study suggests that the problems described in 
the previous paragraphs were partly caused or aggravated by 
(a) the lack of managerial or technical capacity in Peru at that time 
able to handle the very great "jump" in scale and complexity vhich 
the plant then represented in terms of Peru's previous industrial experience, 
and (b) the complete lack of any coherent government policy or 
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adequate government criterion towards this state enterprise 
in its early years. 
So this was, given the country and the period, a large "infant 
enterprise" launched with a difficult birth into an unprepared 
environment. 
Interestingly, however, the subsequent development was somewhat 
more encouraging - for the case-study documents an important learning 
process on the part of the Chimbóte plant's staff signalled by (a) an 
initial period from roughly 1958-61 of learning to control the original 
process, and then (b) a period from about 1962 onwards of gradually 
introducing some minor technical changes at very low investment cost 
into the plant'Which led to improved productivity,especially in the 
steel furnaces and merchant rolling mill whose effective production 
capacities were stretched substantially beyond the initial nominal 
levels, and where costs were reduced between 1961 and 1965 by 25% and 
26% respectively. 
It is notable however, that the Chimbóte plant hardly diversified 
its production at all during the period under study, nor introduced 
special grades of steel,and in this sense fell behind the requirements 
of the more diversified steel demand profile then emerging in Peru. 
This failure of the plant to diversify is in part attributable to 
the difficulties posed for such diversification by the steel making 
process used, in part to the great heterogeneity of the imported 
scrap supplies used by the plant, and in part to the lack of the 
investment funds that would have been needed. 
However, probably more important than all these reasons was that 
the restricted goal set by management of improving the plant's productivity 
and output in its few, existing specialised products for the construction 
industry was coherent with the political pressures under which the Chimbóte 
plant then operated in Peru. For its management needed to justify 
the extensive tariff protection granted to the plant in 1962, lower 
its criticisable high prices, and thus help persuade the government 
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to contribute the, large sums needed for the expansion of the plant 
that was planned since the early 1960s. This led to the objectives 
of (a) setting prices as low as possible (which cut into profits 
and reinvestible surplus) and (b) trying to achieve cost reductions 
via low-cost technical changes designed to expand plant output in 
existing lines and increase efficiency. 
This policy did cut costs considerably, but 
the low profit margins implied an increase in the plant's degree 
of dependence on government financing for its proposed expansion. 
This expansion,implemented at the end of the 1960s, involved a 
conventional blast furnace, two LD steel converters, and a continuous 
billet caster, all quite different from the technologies originally 
selected. 
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6. Comments on the "synthesis" of the five case-studies 
6.1 The kind of "learning path" involved in steel plant development: 
The longish retrospective look that was possible in four out of 
the five case-studies makes it clear how the "learning path" in a steel 
plant is not merely a process of learning to manage efficiently the 
initial steel plant that is built. For the path also consists of 
learning to expand and improve the efficiency of the initial plant beyond its 
nominal(i.e. initially rated)performance levels through introducing 
"incremental" investments and technical changes. 
Yet the matter does not end there either. For the learning path, 
when viewed in the long timescale we are talking about, also involves 
introducing major (not just incremental) new expansions into the existing 
plant, which may literally double or treble the size of the plant over a 
period of just a few years, and may usually be expected to involve 
profound changes not just in plant scale but also in plant technology and 
organization as well- plus all the problems attendant on having to graft 
major new activities onto a pre-existing complex. 
Hence the "learning path" for steel plants is really not a simple 
one at all. It involves learning to manage the initial plant, learning to 
incrementally improve it, and learning to organize and "digest" subsequent 
major plant expansions, a/ 
a/ This latter point does not seem to be much reflected in 
infant industry literature, yet it is too important a feature of steel 
plant development to be left out of account 
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6.2 Different steelplant "biographies", and differential performance 
along the learning path:. 
A second point emerging from the above synthesis is how different 
the "biographies" of the five plants were. Each plant's path is seen to 
be profoundly historical and idiosyncratic, and the performances of the 
five plants along their learning paths also appear to be distinct. This is 
important to grasp as a counterweight to the idea that all steel plants 
are destined to develop in exactly the same way following the.same 
sequence and the same kind of path. 
Notice, for example, the enormous differences between say, the 
development of Acerias Paz del Rio and that of USIMINAS, or between 
Chimbote and Acindar. Some plants started out with poor technology selection, 
others with adequate or exact selection^  Some plants appear to have had 
greater initial internal managerial and technical capacity than others. 
Some plants made more use of outside technical assistance than others. 
Some plants had more help from their government than others, etc. etc. 
The different pattern of initial conditions plus different subsequent external 
conditions and also different internal firm "adaptive capacities" 
clearly differentiate the paths along which steelplants develop, and 
this should be a "sign of alert" to steel industry planners to avoid the 
simplistic belief that learning to "drive" a steel plant is as assured 
a process as learning to drive a car. There are a large number of difficult 
and complicated variables that need to be managed, and a long , and 
difficult learning process is involved. 
6.3 Factors affecting steelplant learning paths and performance: 
Many factors appeared to be at work in influencing the observed plant 
learning paths and performance. However it was noticeable how the same 
main group of influential factors cropped up in virtually all cases. 
These can be briefly summarised as follows: 
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. The nature of the technology initially selected (both for the 
original plant, and in subsequent expansions). This factor 
is clearly of such long lasting importance that it merits the 
closest analysis. 
. A set of "internal capability" factors such as the degree of pre-
vious technical and managerial experience of the firm's staff; 
the extent to which plant staff were active or passive learners 
in relation to foreign technology and technical assistance, and the 
character of the plant's technical organization and the changes 
introduced in it over time. 
. External factors: especially the impact of the government as planner, 
regulator, price-setter, financier, guarantor, owner (in state 
companies), supporter, or opponent, in steel industry policy; also, 
too,external factors such as macroeconomic demand conditions; the 
nature, quality and reliability of the plant's key raw material 
supplies, such as ore, coal, or scrap; the advance of world steel-
making technology; the availability and conditions attaching to 
external sources of finance. 
6.4 Topics for subsequent chapters: 
Our analysis in subsequent chapters does not try to trace the 
.impact of all the above mentioned factors in anything like a comprehensive 
manner. 
Nevertheless, the major influence of (1) initial technology 
selection (2) various internal capability factors, and (3) various 
external factors, does emerge clearly in the chapters that follow, whose 
subject matter is now detailed. 
Chapter 3 , that follows next,analyses some of the determinants 
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of" the technology initially selected for the plants (and expansions). 
It also looks into the duration of the gestation period that was 
involved in planning, constructing and starting up the plants and 
expansions, up until the point when nominal capacity was achieved. 
Thus the chapter throws light on some of the factors that made for 
relatively efficient or inefficient technology selections. 
Chapter 4 then explores in detail just one dimension of the 
process of incremental improvement of the plant beyond their nominal 
performance levels. This is the dimension whereby a plant's production 
capacity gets "stretched" beyond the nominal capacity. There is a 
good deal of empirical material in the case - studies on this topic. 
Chapter 5 provides a discussion, based on the case-study material, 
of the kind of internal strategy (organizational, technical and investment 
strategy) steel plants might be advised to pursue with regard to the 
improving of steel plant performance and productivity over time. 
Finally Chapter 6 develops some conclusions for steel plant 
planners based on the material in the previous chapters. Various 
external factors in steel plant development come into the analysis here, 
including the fact that decisions made by government planners constitute 
a major component of the external environment in which steel plants 
evolve. 
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Chapter 3. TECHNOLOGY SELECTION AND THE GESTATION PERIOD 
Scope of the Chapter 
This chapter compares and analyses evidence from the case-studies 
about (1) some factors affecting selection of technology for new 
plants and major expansions, and (2) the duration and determinants 
of the "gestation period" involved in planning, constructing and 
starting up new steelplants or major expansions of existing ones. 
In assembling this evidence we have been able to draw on items 
of information derived from the following technology selections and 
gestations listed on the next two pages in Tables 1 and 2. 
Our information on these various technology acquisitions and 
gestations (mentioned in Tables 1 and 2) comes mainly from the case-
studies. The information on SOMISA comes from Savio 1/, Castineiras 2/, 
and various SOMISA annual reports; the information on Acindar's direct 
reduction project comes from recent Acindar Annual reports. 
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Table 1: SAMPLE OF "GREENFIELD" (ENTIRELY NEW) PLANTS 
Name of Firm, and Type of Plant Nominal Capacity Chronology of 
location of Plant Built (tons/ yr.) (a) Overall Gestation 
Period (b) 
Acindar, Rosario Scrap-based 18.000 1943-47 
(Argentina) steelmaking and 6 re-bar rolling 
AHMSA, Monclova Integrated plant 100,000 1940-50 
(Mexico) producing plate 
and sheet. 
Acindar, Villa Rolling plant, 215,000 1947-54 
Constitución chiefly for 
(Argentina) non-flats 
Acerias Paz del Rio Integrated plant, 152,000 1947-60 
(Colombia) producing non-
flats 
Siderurgica de Integrated plant, 66,000 1943-61 
Chimbote based on electric-
^x . v reduction furnaces, (Peru) (c) , , . . and electric-arc 
furnaces, producing 
non-flats. 
SOMISA, San Nicolas Integrated plant 500,000 1947-64 
(Argentina) Producing mainly 
semis and sheet 
steel. 
USIMINAS, Minas Integrated plant 500,000 1956-66 
Gerais producing thick 
(Brasil) plates, sheet, and 
coils. 
(a) Expressed in ingot tons/year, except for the Acindar, Villa Constitu 
cion rolling plant for which capacity is expressed in rolled product 
tons/year. 
(b) The exact definition of the "overall gestation period" will be given 
later on below. 
(c) The name of the firm which initially operated this plant was 
S.O.G.E.S.A. Today the owning firm has been renamed SIDERPEF1J. 
Table 2: SAMPLE OF MAJOR PLANT EXPANSIONS 
Ñame of Firm Type of Expansion Involved Nominal Chronology of 
Increase Overall 
in Capacicy Gestation 
(tons/yr.) Period 
Acerías Sinter plant, blooming- 162,000 to 1957-76 
Paz del Río slabbing mill, hot-rolling 350.000 
mill, modifications to 
coke plant, (+new blast-
furnace, not built). 
USIMINAS Additional coke battery, 500,000 to 1965-74 
sinter machine, and oxygen 1,400,000 
converter. Modified 
blast furnaces. 
AHMSA Installation of BOF Additional 1965--77 
(Oxygen)steelshop with capacity of 
3 converters. 1,000,000 
SOMISA Installation of large new 1,200,000 1968-78 
blast-fumace, a BOF to 
(oxygen) steelshop, and 2,500,000 
continuous casting machines. 
Acindar (Villa Installation of new Morgan 215,000 to 1969-73 
Constitución) wire-rod rolling mill 475,000 
USIMINAS Large new blast-furnace 
y 
1,400,000 1970-77 
new BOF steelshop, new plate to 
mill, and continuous casting 2,400,000 
machines 
Acindar (Villa Installation of new direct- Additional 1972-79 
Constitución) reduction plant, electric- capacity 
arc furnaces and continuous of 
billet casters. 450,000 
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1. SOME DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGY SELECTION 
In this first part of the chapter we illustrate a series of the 
factors which influenced technology selection, which came to light 
in the course of out case-studies. These factors were: 
1. the shifting scale and technology frontier 
2. the conditioning effect of plant 'heritage' 
3. supply restrictions in international technology markets 
4. financial conditioning factors 
5. impact of government planning measures 
6. convictions regarding economies of scale 
7. relationships with previous technology suppliers 
Each of thise factors is now briefly illustrated, in turn, and 
then a summary is provided at the end of the section which suggests 
that technology selection in steelplants often results from a quite 
severely restricted rather than open-ended "search" process. 
1.1 The shifting scale and technology frontier: 
We already pointed out in Chapter 1, section 2 that world steel 
technology has been constantly evolving in the last hundred years. 
This evolution certainly had its effect -over time- in the choice 
of technology for the plants and plant-expansions in our sample. 
Two effects are clearly noticeable -namely a 'scale effect1 and 
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a 'new technology effect'. Let us now see this: 
A glance back to Tables 1 and 2 shows a rough relationship 
between the 'age' of the new plants and expansions, and the amount 
of new or incremental capacity installed. Thus in the ore-based 
integrated greenfield plants (i.e. ones using blast furnaces) in 
Table 1, the oldest plants AHMSA» started off at 100,000 t.p.a., 
the next oldest, Paz del Rio; at 162,000, and then S0MISA and 
USIMINAS at 500,000 t.p.a. each. 
Also the average size of the expansions (i.e. the incremental 
capacity added), -which, logically, came later than the greenfield 
plants- was greater than the average capacity of the original greenfield 
plants. For instance the average size of the USIMINAS, AHMSA and S0MISA 
expansions mentioned in Table 2 is over 1,000,000 tons incremental 
capacity per annum, i.e. more than double the original installed capacity. 
This trend to installing higher initial or incremental capacities 
over time was paralleled by an increase over time in the size and 
capacity of the individual main process units introduced. For example 
AHMSA started off,in its first ten years,with Siemens Martin furnaces 
of 135 tons per heat (batch) capacity, but then began adding further 
furnaces of over 200 tons per heat capacity. AHMSA's first blast 
furnace had a capacity of 100 tons per day. Its second, third, fourth 
and fifth blast furnaces had capacities of 1,000, 1,300, 1,500, and 4,500tons 
per / day respectively. The later blast furnaces of SOMISA and USIMINAS 
were also much bigger than their earlier ones. 
Parallel phenomena were noted in electric-arc furnaces, and oxygen 
converters, and, to some extent, in rolling mills,in our sample of plants. 
Next, coming to the 'new technology' effect, Tables 1 and 2 show 
that, in many cases, major plant expansions were seized as opportunities 
for introducing new and different steel production technology than 
what these plants had used before. Thus we find AHMSA and SOMISA for their 
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major expansions switching from Siemens Martin to BOF steelmaking tech-
nology (for the incremental capacity), Acerias Paz del Rio acquiring 
a sinter plant, various of the plants introducing continuous rolling 
mills, continuous casting etc. In contrast, in the period between the 
start up of the original greenfield plant (Table 1) and the major 
expansions (Table 2), such smaller expansions as took place were 
achieved either by "stretching" the capacity of the existing technology 
(see next chapter for details) or by adding further units (e.g. 
additional Siemens Martin furnaces) of the same technology already 
in use in the plant. 
Broadly speaking, then, the major plant expansions in Table 2 
nearly all represented not just the installation of a much larger 
increment to capacity than the originally installed capacity, but 
also usuallv involved the incomoration of eauiDment based on new «•' A A 
technological processes which the plant concerned had not used before. 
Both these "effects" -towards larger scale, and new technology-
were consistent with, and influenced by. the advancing world state-of-
the-art in steel technology, in which the trend to larger and larger 
integrated plants, based on large blast furnaces, oxygen steelmaking, 
and large scaj.e continuous rolling mills has been a strong one, and 
in which there have been important breakthroughs in high-power large 
electric arc steel furnaces, in continuous casting and in direct 
reduction technology, which have been adopted all over the world in 
so called "mini" steel plants (in our sample, the Acindar example). 
So in this sense, there is nothing obviously surprising about 
the scale and technology choices made in the expansions observed in 
our sample of plants. 
precisely because 
Nevertheless it is appropriate to note that/most of the Table 2 
expansions did involve very large "jumps" in scale and technology 
compared to the original plants , these expansions (and the 
technology selection and gestation problems involved in them) cannot 
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be thought of as posing simply a repeat of the problems faced earlier. 
lv. 2 The conditioning effect of plant "heritage" on subsequent plant 
expansions: 
Another clear influence on the technology selections in our sample 
of plant expansions was that the design/selection of technology for 
incremental capacity had to be done whilst bearing in mind the important 
constraints and requirements posed by the production flows and processes 
of the already existing plant. In other words the pre-existing "heritage" 
of plant (and its organization) had an important impact on the character 
of the expansions selected. (Obviously technology for expansions has 
to be designed, and the new and pre-existing equipment mutually adapted, 
to optimize the performance of the whole of an expanded plant, not just 
the expanded part of it). 
En passant, we noted convincing evidence from the AHMSA case-study 
that the disruptions to existing operations caused by major expansion 
programs can be greatly underestimated. For example the building and 
start up in 1976 of AHMSA's "Steelplant N°2" drew many staff away from 
the old Siemens Martin steelshop with serious negativ§ effects on the 
latter's productivity. Even in USIMINAS, which has been outstandingly 
successful (compared to most other major integrated steelplants) in 
"digesting" its expansions, it was stated by company president Lanari 
that "one of the greatest costs of an expansion plan like USIMINAS's 
was the disruption it caused in normal operations", and he estimated that 
"these could be in the order of 20%" 
However, to return to our theme of the determinants of technology 
selection,the main difference which "heritage" introduces into 
technology selection for expansions is a strong additional element of 
specificity in the selection process. For, besides the idiosyncratic 
elements which derive from the localization of a plant, the kinds of 
raw materials it will use, and the kinds of markets it will serve, 
the existence of a unique technological "heritage" in every plant adds 
greatly to the idiosyncracy of the expansion to be undertaken. It is 
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in this context that the remark of Ing. R. Pujals of Acindar is 
relevant - "you might leave to outside consultants a completely new 
plant, but it is very problematic to hand over to outsiders the 
responsibility for expanding a plant that already exists". 
1.3 Supply restrictions in international technology markets: 
A further determinant of the technology selected in the plants 
in our sample was -particularly in two of the cases- the severe 
supply restrictions then obtaining in international technology markets. 
We are referring here to the greenfield plants built during World 
War II by Altos Hornos de Mexico (AHMSA) in Mexico and by Acindar in 
Rosario, Argentina. 
Because of war-time conditions there was no question of "shopping 
around" on the international market for steelplant equipment, because 
this was simply no longer available from the belligerent countries. 
So improvisation- was the only course open. 
In AHMSA's case they were able to secure some help from the 
American company ARMCO, and then located a small, old, disus . blast 
furnace in Illinois, which they managed to dismantle, transport, 
recondition and re-assemble in Mexico with great ingenuity. 
In Acindar's case, the firm managed to design and build its own 
Siemens Martin furnace, by doing an improvised scale-up based on some 
plans of furnaces already existing in Argentina; they were also able 
to locate and re-condition some primitive, second-hand rolling 
equipment from Chile. 
Evidently, in neither of these cases, was the technology chosen 
the "best-practice" one, or anything close to it. 
82 
The two above-mentioned cases were the most obvious ones of 
supply restrictions in international technology markets affecting 
technology selection in our sample of plants, but they were not 
the only ones. The original acquisition by SOMISA in the early 
1950's of a second-hand, but unused hot-rolling mill of American 
origin from the Czechoslovak government was held up for some years 
by objections from the U.S. government. And the hoped-for acquisi-
tion by Acerias Paz del Rio of a cold-rolling mill in 1974 was made 
impossible for the company when the suppliers failed to stick to 
their previously agreed price for the equipment when demand for this 
kind of equipment boomed. 
1-4 Financial conditioning factors: 
Amongst the most influential set of determinants of technology 
selection in many of the plants and expansions in our sample has been 
the availability (or relative non-availability) of finance to pay 
for- the investment involved, as well as the conditions attached by 
the sources of finance to their provision of it. 
Several examples of how financial factors and conditions have 
influenced technology selection in our sample of plants will now be 
mentioned, viz: 
Acerias Paz del Rio had to build a smaller greenfield plant 
than the one they originally planned due to lack of sufficient 
finance; and they were "tied" by the terms of the loan eventually 
obtained to having the equipment specified and provided by the 
French consortium supplying the loan (Acerias Paz del Rio greenfield 
plant). 
In the Chimbote greenfield plant lack of finance led, apparently, 
to a high degree of technical dependence, via a "tied loan" to a 
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French consortium. 
In the case of the USIMINAS greenfield plant the joint-venture 
arrangement with Nippon. Steel, and heavy reliance on Japanese equipment 
supplier credits, led to a largely Japanese supplied plant being 
erected based on Japanese designs and using deliberately chosen 
conventional(and reliable) technology, rather than trying out any of 
the latest developments in steelmaking technology at that time. 
The apparent willingness of international lending institutions 
(e.g. Ex-Im bank, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank) to 
lend large sums of money to national governments made several large-
scale state plants and plant expansions possible -e.g. SOMISA's 
greenfield plant, the Acerias Paz del Rio expansion, SOMISA's 2 1/2 
millions ton expansion, USIMINAS 2.4 million ton expansion. 
Huge capital requirements have meant that private sector firms 
have generally not been able to build integrated steelplants based 
on the "classical" technology (i.e. blast furnaces, Siemens Martin 
or oxygen steelmaking at large scales, rolling mainly flat products); 
therefore private steelmakers such as Acindar in our sample have 
generally concentrated on relatively smaller scale scrap-melting 
operations in Siemens Martin or, more recently, electric arc furnaces, 
followed by rolling of (mostly) non-flat products, especially for the 
construction industry. 
When Acindar attempted in the 1950s and 1960s to become an a 
small-scale integrated steel producer using classical technology the 
capital requirements of even this relatively small plant were still 
so high that the financial, legal and guarantee backing of the 
Argentine government was required for Acindar's project to be viable; 
but, as explained in the Acindar case study, the government did not 
-in the '50s and'60s co-operate, so this project fell through, a/ 
a/ Actually there was government support and approval for the 
project on several occassions, but in the end this support was not 
sustained. 
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The general principle which emerges from the above examples 
is as follows: that huge capital requirements in steelplant invest-
ments regularly bring national governments onto the scene as part 
providers of the finance, loans, investment incentives or financial 
guarantees which are needed to make major steelplant investments 
(even ones in the private sector) possible. The consequence is that 
not just steel companies, but also their governments participate in 
the-technology selection process. The point is that governments 
inject their own criteria into these selections, in addition to 
(and often over-riding) the companies' criteria. 
But, further to this, the capital investment requirements are ' 
often so large that even national governments find themselves short 
of the resources needed for building and expanding steel plants. 
This leads the steel companies and their governments to have recourse to 
international loan finance, e.g. from the Ex-Im Bank, World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank etc., or from bi-lateral government 
to government credits, or from private international banks or 
equipment-supplier credits. Now these sources of finance also impose 
their criteria and conditions on technology selection - which, once 
again, may not necessarily co-incide with the steel company's or 
national government's criteria. 
In fact technology selection for steel plants may not -in these 
conditions- necessarily be very open or wide-ranging in its considera-
tion of possible options, nor economically quite as rational as desirable. 
Capital market 11 imperfections" in practice can mean that the technology 
for steelplants may be determined at least as much by bankers as by 
engineers. 
1.5 Impact of government planning measures 
Another critical factor in technology selection was the government 
planning process for the steel industry, which affected several of the 
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technology selections in our sample, a/ 
The point that emerged in our case-studies is that this planning 
process often determined the fractions and sectors of domestic demand 
which state firms or private firms were required or permitted by 
their governments to fulfil. That is, government planning in several 
cases limited the spheres of action of the firms in our sample to 
satisfying certain types of demand -e.g. flats vs. non-flats, or 
semi-products versus finished products- and also played an important 
role in determining the scale of the plants whose construction would 
meet with government approval (and incentives). 
For instance, SOMISA in 1968 had already had approved an 
expansion plan up to 2 million tons capacity, and Acindar had one 
approved for around 750,000 tons capacity - but a decree in late 
1968 cancelled Acindar's project and required SOMISA to change its 
plans to expand up to 2 1/2 million tons capacity. 
Government planning in Brazil also played a crucial role in 
modifying USIMINAS's expansion plans in the 1965-80 period, as well 
as the expansion plans of the other major state steelworks, CSN and 
COSIPA. 
a/ Actually "government planning measures", in practice prove 
to be an amalgam of (a) the sets of laws, special taxes and 
administrative regulations applying to the steel industry in each 
particular country, (b) the policies adopted by governments in 
their capacity as owners or controllers of state steel firms like 
SOMISA, AHMSA and USIMINAS, and (c) the actual formal plans, -
targets and investment guidelines laid down for the steel industry 
from time to time by the official ministries concerned and/or by 
the official planning organs for the steel industry such as the 
Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares in Argentina, or the 
CONSIDER in Brasil. 
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Furthermore, it became clear in some of the case-studies that 
various political, not just economic factors, played important roles 
in the government planning and decision-making process - and hence 
in the decisions as to what scale and type of technology would be 
selected, and as to what kind of firm (state or private) would 
build the new plant or expansion concerned. 
For example, considerations of "national security", as well as 
the official planning goal of "self-sufficiency in steel" greatly 
influenced the entire postwar steel industry policy of the Argentine 
government. 
Another typically political theme which surfaced various times 
in the case studies (especially in the Argentine case, but also in 
the Brasilian and Colombian cases), was that of the political rivalry 
between public sector and private sector firms for influence and 
shares of overall national steel production capacity. 
The conclusion is simply that the "government planning process" 
-which was one of the most important determinants of technology selec-
tion in many of the plants in our sample- must be seen as a process 
which works on the basis of political as well as economic motivations. 
Hence technology selection in major steelplant investments is not 
merely a techno-economic problem. 
1.6 Convictions regarding economies of scale 
A further influential factor on technology selections appears to 
have been the convictions about the attainability of economies of scale 
in large integrated plants which were held by government planners. 
These convictions were clearly expressed on many occasions by the 
official Argentine planners (DGFM) right from the days of General Savio 
(founder of the DGFM) onwards, and have also obviously been held by the 
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Brasilian planners with regard to the big three Brasilian state firms. 
The selection of a 1 million ton per annum blooming-slabbing mill for 
the Paz del Rio expansion in the 1960s also suggests these convictions 
were held in Colombia, and the sheer size and scale of AHMSA's recent 
expansions suggests that this firm, too, is a "de facto" believer in 
the economies of scale attainable in large integrated plants. 
It is also interesting that in Acindar1s greenfield plant in 
Villa Constitución (gestation in the 1947-54 period), one of the main 
reasons advanced by the company's president for installing what, at . 
the time, was such a large rolling mill, was to benefit from the 
economies of scale it would bring. 
From the viewpoint of technology selection, the important point 
is that these convictions about economies of scale have certainly 
influenced both government planners, and private company executives 
in choosing the plant scales to be aimed at in the planning (and planning-
approval) stage. 
1.7 Relationships with previous technology suppliers: 
A further factor which in the case-studies seems to have had some 
influence in technology selection was the existence of previous contracts 
and relationships with former technology suppliers, who often got chosen 
again when it came to plant expansions. 
Thus Acindar has regularly made use of Morgans as mill suppliers, 
Republic Steel and H.K. Ferguson as engineering advisers, Boynton as 
consultants, and Concast as continuous caster suppliers. 
AHMSA had a long standing relationship with Armco in relation to 
the building of their first three blast furnaces. 
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SOMISA also had a long relationship with Armco, and later another 
long relationship with Kaiser Engineers. 
USIMINAS has had a permanent (and very effective) relationship 
for technology supply and technical assistance with Nippon Steel, and 
with various other Japanese and German suppliers. 
On the other hand, there were also cases observed when some of 
the plants in our sample broke off relationships with previous suppliers, 
apparently unsatisfied (or even very unsatisfied) with supplier 
performance. Without mentioneng supplier names, we can simply state 
that Acerias Paz del Rio has tried out a long list of changed equipment 
suppliers and engineering consultants over the years. SOMISA, has 
quite recently made important changes in this respect too. 
However the point remains that previous experience with equipment 
and engineering suppliers is a conditioning factor in future supplier 
selection. 
1•8 Summary. Technology selection as a "restricted" search process: 
As shown above, a wide variety of factors were seen to have 
influenced the technology selection process in our sample of plants, and 
it was clear from the case-studies that several other factors, in 
addition to those mentioned above, had some influence as well, a/ 
However, enough information has been presented above for us to 
reach a simple conclusion - namely that the process whereby a 
"technology" (i.e. a technique, a plant scale, and a set of suppliers) 
gets selected in steelplants does not necessarily resemble the "textbook" 
process in which entrepreneurs are supposed to be able to freely choose 
that combination of technique-scale-suppliers from the perfectly known 
"complete set" available on the world market,which will maximise their profits. 
a/ 0ne important one was forecast market growth rates, which influenced the "ojptimum degree of imbalance" that was built into steelplants as provision 
for future output expansion. 
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In fact it looks as though it may sometimes be mistaken to conceive 
of "the searching, screening and learning effort to choose a technology 
for steelplants as involving a comprehensive scanning over a wide range 
of technological possibilities, alternative scales, and alternative 
sources of supply, resulting in some optimal combination of all three 
(which is the kind of process that textbook entrepreneurs are visualised 
as performing). 
Instead, in many of the cases mentioned, technology selection 
seems to have resulted from a quite limited or restricted search process -
one which was conditioned by financial, political, planning, supply 
and heritage constraints to focus choice around a strictly limited 
portion of the techno-economic horizon, and sometimes, too, around 
a strictly limited range of different potential technology suppliers. 
In fact we saw that often the whole searching, screening and 
learning effort to select a technology got channelled strongly towards 
particular techniques, scales of plant, or technology suppliers in 
the early stages of project planning (e.g. the Acerias Paz del Rio 
and USIMINAS greenfield plants, SOMISA's 2 1/2 million ton expansion). 
Now whilst such a procedure may produce good results in some 
cases, the danger of "restricted search" is obvious: -namely, that it may 
miss-out on alternatives which offer greatly superior techno-economic 
prospects- but which get ruled out-of-court early on because of the 
presence of one or more of the previously mentioned financial, political 
or other constraints on the technology search and selection process. 
Given the enormous difficulty of making good technology selection 
choices in the steel industry (for the reasons outlined in Ch. 1) and 
given the irreversibility and profound future effect of the choices 
that do get made, it would seem, prima facie, undesirable that technology 
selection should be so hemmed in that only "restricted search" is 
possible. 
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If this is right, then it would be useful if the sometimes heavy 
costs of "restricted search" could be made sufficiently clear to 
national governments and steelplant planners so that at least some 
of the main constraints leading to such restricted search might be 
eased. 
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2. THE DURATION OF THE GESTATION PERIOD 
In this second part of the chapter our purpose is to analyse 
empirical evidence collected in the case-studies about the gestation 
period of the new plants and expansions that were listed earlier in 
Tables 1 and 2, The gestation period refers to the entire time-span 
involved in planning, building and starting up steel plants (or expansions) 
until they are producing at output levels equal to their nominal capacity. 
Our focus is on how long the various different stages of steelplant 
gestation last, and on the determinants of gestation time. This is because 
both the duration of gestation, and its determinants, are economically 
important factors to allow for in the planning of steelplants, and 
in estimating the profitability of investments in new plants and 
expansions. 
Our presentation of data on the gestation period comes in four 
sections. Section 2.1 classifies the overall gestation period into 
three sub-periods. Section 2.2 provides empirical evidence on the 
duration of each of these three sub-periods in our sample of plants 
and expansions, and discusses factors which helped prolong gestation 
in particular cases. Section 2.3 then presents some hypotheses about 
the determinants of gestation time-
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2.1 Framework for analysing the gestation period 
In what follows, we classify the gestation period into three 
distinct, successive, chronological periods. The division adopted 
is: (i)"Pre-investment period", (ii)"Construction period", (iii) 
"Start-up period". We also define (iv) an "Implementation period", 
and (v) an "Overall gestation period." This classification is now 
explained: 
(i) "Pre-investment period": 
For entirely new plants this period is taken to start from the 
date when the company which was to build, own, and operate the 
plant was first legally constituted. 
For major expansions of existing plants, the period is taken to 
start from the date when the first serious planning-study or 
feasibility study for the proposed expansion was begun. 
The pre-investment period includes all the time taken in the 
preparation and execution of all the needed planning and feasibility 
studies, and all the time taken in negotiating the necessary finance 
from equipment suppliers, national development banks, international 
development banks, etc. It also includes all the time needed to 
secure whatever interim and definitive political and planning approvals 
and financial guarantees prove to be needed from the government of 
the country in which the plant is built in order for the project to 
go.ahead. If basic and conceptual engineering studies was performed 
prior to the securing of project finance and definitive government 
planning approval, then those engineering studies are also included 
in the pre-investment period. 
(ii) "Construction period": 
This period will be taken to have formally started from the 
moment when both the overall financial "package" for the project 
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has been secured and the necessary definitive government planning 
approvals and guarantees regarding the project have also been secured. 
The construction period includes all the steps required to 
execute the building of the complete new plant or expansion. A 
classification problem that can arise is that in some projects, 
construction of individual parts or stages may be begun before 
overall project financing and/or final political approval has been 
secured, i.e. before the pre-investment stage is complete. Never-
theless we shall retain our formal definition of the "construction 
period" as beginning only when the pre-investment stage has ended. 
The activities that may be included in the "construction period" 
(and some of which may have been begun during the pre-investment 
period) include: the detailed engineering of the plant} procurement 
engineering, equipment specification; putting the various "packages" 
of equipment up for tender (if tendering is involved); inspection and 
reception of equipment from suppliers; on-site civil engineering ; 
design, procurament and construction of off-site installations; 
construction of roads, rail-links, port-facilities and other needed 
infrastructure; supervision of local and foreign contractors; erection 
and installation of plant equipment; dry-tests and commissioning 
of equipment units; leading up to the completion of the whole plant 
and the start-up of production from its main process-stages. 
In fact it is quite usual for the various main stages of 
integrated plants to have distinct start-up dates separated by 
intervals of up to two years. In these cases, when we are analysing 
such plants as a whole, we shall consider their "overall" start-up 
date e.3 coinciding with the start-up date of their steelmaking 
sections, which, according to our definitions, will simultaneously 
mark the end of the construction period. 
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(iii) "Start-up period": 
This period is considered to last from the beginning (i.e. 
start-up) of production from each of the main- production stages 
(or plant as a whole) up until the achievement of an annual output 
level from these main stages (or plant as a whole), which 
corresponds to their nominal production capacity. 
It often happens that the start-up periods of different main 
units vary somewhat in length. When analysing the start-up of 
integrated plants considered as a whole we shall focus on the 
start-up period of their steelraaking section. 
Note that the end of our "start-up period" is signalled when the 
plant succeeds, in an actual calender year, in producing the yearly 
output for which it was rated. It is possible, however, that prior 
to this point, the plant's staff had already learned to operate the 
plant on a sustainable basis at its nominal rate of working - but 
that low demand or raw-material supply problems prevented the plant 
from being actually operated at this rate for an entire year. The 
period from the stait of production tc when staff have learned to 
operate it at nominal capacity rates might, for example, be referred 
to as the "technical start-up period". So, on these definitions, it 
is possible for the "start-up period" to be much longer than the 
"technical start-up period" (which can happen if there are low demand 
problems or raw materials input problems). Of course it can also 
happen that the start-up period is long exclusively because of problems 
experienced in technical start-up. 
(iv) "Implementation period": 
This is simply the sum of the Construction period and the 
Start-up period, as defined formally above. 
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(v) "Overall Gestation period": 
This is the sum of the Pre-investment period, the Construction 
period, and the Start-Up period, defined above. 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence on Gestation Time 
In this section we present figures for the duration of the 
pre-investment period, construction period and start-up period, as 
defined in the previous section, for several "greenfield" plants, 
and for several major subsequent expansions of these plants. These 
figures are set out in Table 3 overleaf, and were derived from the 
sources mentioned previously. 
We now comment on the data contained in Table 3: 
2.2.1 Lengthy time-spans involved; 
The first obvious feature is the sheer length of time involved 
in steelplant gestation ranging in our sample from 3 to 19 years 
and averaging about 10-11 years both for greenfield plants and major 
expansions. This gestation period was split, on average, roughly 
evenly between pre-investment, construction and start-up, each of 
which required on average from 3 to 4 years duration. 
«3» 
Even if one leaves the pre-investment period out of account, 
and concentrates only on the "implementation period", i.e. construction 
plus start-up, we are still talking about average implementation 
periods of over 7 years. 
On the other hand there is a large range of variation in the 
durations of each period, viz. from 0 to 8 years in pre-investment, 
from 1 to 7 years in construction, from 2 to 8 years in start-up 
— and from 3 to 19 years in overall gestation. 
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TABLE 3: DURATION OF THE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF THE GESTATION PERIOD (Years) 
Nominal Pre- Construction Start- Overall 
Name of Firm Capacity Chrono investment Period up Gestation 
or Increase logy Period Period Period 
in Capacity 
GREENFIELD PLANTS 
Acindar (Ros.) 18,000 1943-47 0 1 2 3 
AHMSA 100,000 1940-50 n.a. 4 6 >10 
Acindar (V.-C.) 215,000 1947-54 1 3 3 7 
Acerías Paz del Rio 162,000 1947-60 4 3 6 13 
Sid. de Chimbóte 66,000 1943-61 8 7 3 18 
SOMISA 500,000 1947-64 8 5 3 16 
USIMINAS 500,000 1956-66 3 4 3 10 
AvLKAGub 4.Ö« 3.9 «"» rj o. / •^lX 
MAJOR PLANT EXPANSIONS 









1965-74 4 5 1 10 












2,400,000 1970-77 1 4 2 7 
Acindar (V.-C.) + 450,000 1972-79 4 3 1+ >8 
AVERAGES 3. 2** 3.9 >3.4 >10 
n.a. = Information not available. 
•h = Start up still in progress at the end of the period studied. 
* = Average of 6 plants for which information is available. 
'•'* = Average of 6 plants for which information is available. 
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The four shortest overall gestation periods involved the 
Acindar, Rosario plant, the Acindar Villa Constitución greenfield 
plant, the expansion of the Villa Constitución plant with a second 
rolling mill, and the most recent USIMINAS expansion mentioned in 
the table. 
The three longest overall gestation periods involved the 
expansion of the Acerías Paz del Río plant (19 years), and the 
gestation of the Chimbóte plant (18 years) and the greenfield plant 
of SCWISA in San Nicolás, (16 years). 
An obviously important question is -what factors account for 
such large variations in gestation time? 
But even without an account of the causes of these variations, 
the mere fact that gestation is, on average, so long is worthy of 
note in itself. Harold Wilson used to say that "a week is a long 
time in politics"; here what is at issue is that "a decade is a 
long time in industrial planning", never mind nearly two decades! 
For plainly it is very difficult to forecast what factor prices 
or product prices will be in ten years time, or what levels demand 
will have reached by then. 
2.2.2 Some reasons for the long duration of the pre-investment period 
The two basic factors underlying the incidence of long pre-
investment periods in our sample were (a) shortages of finance for 
highly capital intensive steelplant investments , and (b) political 
factors having to do with government planning of the steel industry. 
This can be illustrated by considering the various cases of 
prolonged pre—investment periods in our sample: 
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The clearest and most extreme case relates to the founding 
of SOMISA. This firm was founded in 1947 as a "mixed" enterprise, 
with a majority state shareholding, but with some private steel 
firms subscribing shares too. Right from the beginning, the idea 
was that the Argentine government would absorb the main financial 
burden implied by building the plant, as well as being responsible 
for its technical aspects (planning and operation) via the Direc-
ción General de Fabricaciones Militareis. However, contributions 
from the government treasury to the project for several years 
came only in drabs and drabs, and were inadequate to the real 
needs of the project. 
This lack of enough government finance for the project was 
not only the government's fault „ It was also caused by the fact 
that the initial planning of the project (and government approval 
of it), had greatly underestimated the true capital investment 
needs of the project. For one thing, rapid postwar Argentine 
inflation quickly made the originally planned budget contributions 
much too small. Secondly, SOMISA compounded its own problems by 
deciding to build a bigger plant than the one originally approved 
(viz. a 500,000 tons per year plant, rather than a 315,000 t.p.y. 
one), and by deciding to construct it with several additional 
installations which had not been included in the original plans. 
These factors, plus a rise in foreign equipment pricessall led to 
the capital investment requirements of SOMISA being vastly greater 
than was originally bargained for. 
This situation -when coupled to the apparently "luke-warm" 
political support for the project from the Peronist government-
meant the only possibility for proceeding with the project was to 
get large foreign loans, especially from the United States. 
However, at that time, a political dispute between the Argentine 
and U.So governments meant that official U.S. institutions such as 
the Ex-Ira bank were not extending loans to Argentine enterprises, 
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a situation which persisted until around 1954/55. There were 
also some payments and credit problems pending with European gover 
governments and banks which remained to be solved too. Only by 
1955/56 could U.S. loans be negotiated to enable SOMISA to acquire 
the majority of the equipment needed to complete its San Nicolás 
plant. 
So the plant which Savio had predicted would already be started 
up by 1950, only had its main construction phase begun in 1956, 
and its start-up of steel production came in 1962, twelve years 
behind Savio's schedule! Most of this delay, however, can be 
attributed to the underestimated pre-investment period. 
In the case of the foundation of Acerías Paz del Rio, the 
huge cost of an integrated steelplant also put the project beyond 
the limited resources that could be raised by the Colombian government 
together with private shareholders. This first led to an approach 
to the World Bank for a U.S. $50 million dollar loan to build the 
plant and, when this was refused after an official Bank mission 
to Colombia, negotiations were taken up for an alternative loan 
from a French consortium to build a smaller plant. This sequence 
meant that the pre-investment period for the Paz del Rio plant 
lasted four years. 
In the foundation of the Chimbóte plant, lack of finance again 
seems to have been the major difficulty which made the pre-investment 
period so long. 
In the expansion up to 1.4 million tons of USIMINAS, both the 
financial and the political factor were at work. Financially, 
USIMINAS at the time of planning this expansion was in an acute 
deficit situation owing mainly to substantial cost inflation 
on its original plant, /s a result it founr) its reeucsts 
for loan finance fror* international Lank refused. It turned 
to the Jrasilif.ri yovernmunt for subsidised capital, but the 
government -which was just then beginning to enter much more 
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strongly into steel industry planning - took from 1967 to 1969 
to make its mind up favourably about USIMINAS's proposed expansion. 
Further delays then followed in wrangling between the BNDE (Brasil*s 
•National Development Bank) and USIMINAS over the guarantees which 
the former was to provide the latter with respect to equipment 
purchases. This is why the pre-investment phase lasted four years. 
Obviously both the financial and the political factor combine when 
it is the government itself which has to decide whether to provide 
subsidised capital and other incentives to steelplant investment 
projects (whether these projects are put forward by private steel 
firms or state ones). Which projects will get a positive decision 
from the government and which will be delayed or refused, is obvious^  
ly not merely a technical process decided on entirely technical 
criteria. A major political element often enters the calculations. 
* In the' case of Acindar's expansion, involving the building of 
a direct reduction steelmaking complex, what delayed completion of 
the pre-investment period was, fundamentally, the long delays 
involved in the official project approval procedures of the Argentine 
government. Thus, although Acindar's project was presented to the 
Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares in September 1972, it 
was not until January 1976 that the "definitive economic and financial 
scheme" for the project was approved by the Executive Power. 
2.2.3Some factors causing construction period delays 
We now briefly resume some evidence on the causes of construction 
delays in the new plants and expansions. 
In the case of the greenfield Acindar Villa Constitución plant, 
the construction period took 3 years instead of the 18 months 
originally planned. The main factor at work here was exogenous to 
the company. It involved the suspension, by the Argentine Central 
Bank, of foreign exchange remittances for one year in 1947/48, which 
102 
delayed fabrication and delivery to Argentina of some of the 
equipment needed for the plant» 
—— In the Chimbóte plants the long construction period of 7 years 
appears to have been at least partly due to organizational problems 
in the State Corporation managing the project. It was only after 
a re-organizationj taking place already 3 years into the construction 
period, (whereby construction and management responsibility was 
vested in a separate corporation) that construction was able to move 
ahead more swiftly. (But even so, a further four years were taken 
in completing the plant, and getting it started up). 
— In the case of SOMISAss original greenfield plant, there appears 
to have been an unplanned delay of approximately one year in the 
production start-up of the steelmaking section, due to the delays 
involved in securing financing of the equipment for this section 
from a European consortium of suppliers. The steelmaking section 
had been deliberately left out of the overall financing for the 
plant as arranged with the Ex-Im bank of the U.S. Its acquisition 
was then delayed by the slowness with which the Argentine government 
was able to renegotiate some pending commercial debts problems with 
various European countries. 
In Acindar's Villa Constitución expansion involving a second 
rolling mill, a three month construction period delay was due to a 
U.S. dock strike which held up delivery of equipment. 
In SOMISA's 2j million ton expansion plan„ the planned 
construction period of about 2 years was completed some 15 months 
behind schedule due to (a) some equipment delivery delays, mainly 
from Britain, and (b) some additional installation delays which 
postponed the expected start of production from the new blast 
furnace. 
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2-, 2.4 Factors helping to cause prolonged start-up periods 
Several different factors causing start-up periods in the plants 
to sometimes be more prolonged than expected were detected in the 4 
case-studies. These factors can be resumed as follows: 
% 
(i) Conceptual errors in overall plant design 
(ii) Conceptual errors in the design of an individual plant 
stage or of equipment within this stage (NB Design errors 
may he intrinsic to the ¿lant or eruirment, or nay involve 
the inappropriateness-of the cnosen design to the specific 
local raw materials to be used or other local characterise 
tics cr working conditions). 
(iii) Weaknesses or defects in equipment fabrication or plant 
construction 
(iv) Inadequate preparation of the plant's workforce and/or 
. . > 
technical staff with .regard to the operation and management 
of the process being started up —leading to poor operating k, 
methods, slow learning about how to dominate the process, 
and (sometimes) damage to equipment requiring its premature 
shut-down and overhaul. 
(v) Shortages in the supply of key raw materials, e.g. ore, 
(vi) Shortages in the supply of key services, e.g. adequate 
electricity supplies. 
(vii) Overoptimistic demand forecasts. 
We now briefly illustrate these various factors using material 
from the case-studies: 
First, design and construction errors. The effect of these is tc 
render equipment, or stages within plants, or whole plants) incapable 
of producing at their rated capacity even if all other factors are * 
working correctly (e.g. adequate supply of raw materials, correct 
operating 
practice, adequate demand levels). In consequence, the 
achievement of rated capacity is necessarily delayed until remedial 
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technological measures (involving design modifications, repairs 
and very often additional equipment as well) have been taken in the 
plant concerned. The illustrations from the case studies are as 
follows: 
company claimed there 
In the foundation of Acerías Paz. del Rio, the; / were" 
construction weaknesses in the coke-washing plant, the blast as it may, 
furnace and steel-shop'." Be that/ ' the- blast furnace never reached 
its nominal .capacity throughout its first "campaign" (i.e. with 
its first refractory lining), and only reached nominal capacity 
after a relining with modifications." The lack of a sinter plant 
in the original plant design also negatively^ affected blast 
furnace productivity and the attainment of nominal capacity. 
* In the Chimbóte plant, the very basic conceptual error was 
made of making the plant highly dependent on electric energy 
Supplies, which were not available in sufficient quantity at the 
time and therefore involved the company in having to assist 
organize the building of new power generating facilities and 
transmission lines, which introduced further delays into the 
achievement cf nominal capacity in the plant. 
* In AHMSA's BOF (oxygen converter) steelshop, the company engineers 
interviewed in the case-study claimed that some design errors had been 
made by the suppliers of this steelshop, including errors arising from 
the inappropriatenses of the supplied equipment to local conditions. 
Mention was made of 11 specific design errors ranging from .inadequate 
space for materials handling within the steelshop building, to poorly 
designed systems for oxygen injection, cooling and gas purification, 
insufficient number of cranes, etc., all of which were said to require 
remedial measures by AHMSA in the course of the start-up period. (one 
should not however, assume that fault lay with the supplierss since no 
evidence was collected from them, and the case-study does not indicate 
under what constraints or instructions they were working). 
* In SOMISA's 2\ million ton expansion plan, design and construction 
errors were alleged by the company to have been made by the 
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suppliers of the large new blast furnace constructed as part of 
the expansion. According to company annual reports, serious operating 
problems were encountered, right from the beginning of start-up of 
the blast-furnace in March 1964 which could not be righted by the 
suppliers. Normal functioning was not achieved, and after 2j years 
of problematic, low-output working, the refractory lining of the blast 
furnace prematurely wore out, and the furnace was shut down. It remained 
out of action for an entire year whilst extensive design modifications 
and repairs were introduced in it, and was started up again in September 
a/ 1977, three and a half years after its first start up. — 
Next we come to the problem cf the 'inadequate training and 
preparation of the workforce, technicians and engineers for handling 
the many problems posed in steelplant start-up. 
* This problem v?as specifically mentioned in the Chimbote case-
study, in the study dealing with the foundation of the Acerias Paz 
del Pdo plant (where the majority of the workers taken on were 
illiterate and the company had to set up schools for them), and in 
the study on AHMSA in relation to the adoption of oxygen steelmaking 
technology by the company (for they had used Siemens Martin steel_ 
making previously). 
* . This prcblefn also seems to have arisen in the case of SOMISA's 
2— million ton expansion plan. Our reasoning is that for the 
second start-up of its new blast-furnace, SOMISA has new signed an 
extensive technical assistance contract with the Nippon Steel 
Company of Japan, which suggests that they judged the preparation 
of their own team to be insufficient by itself. 
With regard to shortages in the supply of key raw materials and 
services, the cases arising in our sample which affected the start-up 
period, are as follows: 
a/ It is noteworthy, however, that SOMISA apparently made no legal claim 
against the suppliers. 
* In the Paz del Rio plant, the lack of availability on time 
of the planned electrified railway to haul ore and coal from 
nearby mines to the plant led to some shortages in these raw 
materials during the original plant's start-up period. 
* Also, the lack of sufficient electricity supply slowed down 
production in both the Paz del Río and Chimbóte greenfield plants, 
(In Paz del Rio, the electricity supply problem persisted right 
through until 1976). 
Finally, we turn to the problem of inadequate demand as a cause 
of delaying a plant from producing at its rated capacity. This is, 
of course, an economic delay factor rather than a technological one. 
The case- studies provide two interesting examples of this problem: 
i'¡ The first relates to the Paz del Rio expansion programme 
where there appears to have been a gross overestimation of the 
demand for hot-rolled products. For whilst the firm in 1963 
bought a hot-rolling mill with 500,000 tons per annum capacity, 
the actual demand for hot rolled sheet steel in Colombia during 
the 1960s and 1970s never exceeded around 40,000 tons per annum. 
The real growth in flat products demand was for cold-rolled, not 
hot-rolled sheets, and it was only considerably later in 1968 
that the company first attempted to acquire a cold rolling mill. 
* The second example of the demand problem is topical and 
relates to SOMISA's level of steel output in recent years. The 
plant's million ton plan, conceived in 1968, expected that 
SOMISA would be producing and rolling over 2 million tons of steel 
per year by the mid 1970s. Yet this plan in retrospect can be 
seen to have been based on highly optimistic demand forecasts 
which did not prove out. To be fair, however, nobody in Argentina 
in 1969-70 or even in 1974-75 was predicting that the domestic 
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demand for steel in the years 1977, 78, 79, 80 would be as low 
as it has proved to be. So even though SOMISA's new blast furnace 
re-entered service in September 1977, the output of the plant 
since then, has been well below its nominal 2 ^ -million tons 
capacity — e.g. steel production was 1,441,000 tons in 1978, 
it was 1,527,180 tons in 1979 and it may well go lower in 1980. 
It is, of course, important for planners to look into the 
question of why demand gets overestimated, and how it might be 
estimated better, however we shall not go into that here. 
A point we do want to make, however, is that there is another 
way of framing the problem of less-than-forecast demand as a cause 
of start-up period delays: — namely, instead of saying that "demand 
has proved too small", one might suggest that "the plant was planned 
too big". We shall be taking up this idea later on. 
Another point worth making is that the factors causing start-up 
delays which were mentioned above mostly originate in decisions 
which were made earlier during the pre-investment or construction 
period (e.g. decisions on technology, on design, on plant sizing, 
on staff-capability to manage the selected process, on forecasts of 
raw materials and services availability, and on forecasts of expected 
demand). 
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Consideration of the foregoing evidence about the gestation 
period now invites the attempt to frame some hypotheses about the 
determinants of gestation time which might be helpful to steel plant 
planners (and to planners of other heavy, complex industrial plants). 
The framing of such hypotheses is not virgin territory, and we would 
3 / 
here like to draw specific attention to a paper by Eckhaus —- which 
has stimulated our work on this subject, and which we shall cite 
later on. 
Three possible "determinants" of gestation time for which some 
support from existing literature, as well as from our steel plant 
case-studies, can be adduced are: (1) the scale of the project that 
is contemplated; (2) the technological complexity of the proposed 
greenfield project or expansion; and (3) the extent of previous 
experience in steel plant design, construction, and operation 
cf the owning firm. 
We shall now mention some arguments in favour of the notion 
that longer gestation periods, and longer delays compared to planned 
gestation time, are likely to happen the greater the scale of the 
expansion is, the more complex the technology that it uses, and the 
less experienced the owning firm is in steelplant design, construction 
and. operation. 
One reason why larger scale projects are likely to involve 
longer gestation is that they involve greater capital investment 
requirements.—^ This means more investment money is at stake, and 
is likely to make the project more of a target and more sensitive 
to delays and interference from its political opponents, Also the 
greater volume of loans needed is likely to make overall project 
a/ Even in small plants, additional stages or expansions may cost 
tens of millions of dollars. For new capacity, investments of 
hundreds of millions of dollars would be normal for semi-
integrated plants, and thousands of millions for integrated plants 
-roughly U.S.$ 1.000 million per million tons of annual ingot 
capacity. 
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financing from government and other financial sources more difficult 
to negotiate.—^ In other words, the larger the scale of the 
project is, the more vulnerable it is likely to be to long government 
planning approval lags and project financing lags. (In this 
sense, the SOMISA greenfield plant and the Paz del Rio expansion 
provide graphic cases). 
A second reason which links greater scale with longer gestation 
is that it leads to more complex and therefore time-consuming tasks 
in the project planning and design phases, and in the procurement, 
construction, and start-up phases than is the case with smaller 
plants. This is not only because there is "more" to be done and 
co-ordinated in each of these phases when a plant is bigger but 
also because larger-scaled steel plants tend to be more technologically 
complex too. This has been noted by Nueno, ~ and also by 
c i Cartwright,— who has stated that 
"Construction times for minimills sre much shorter than 
for integrated BOS plants (18 months to 2 years as 
compared with 3 years or more), and the equipment is 
standardized and less technically advanced. As S 
consequence, returns on investment are obtained more 
quickly, and more certainly". 
a/ The marked dependence of conventional expansion projects on 
sources of finance external to the firm is shown by recent Latin 
American figures on the sources of finance for investments in 
new capacity in 1976 quoted by ILAFA. Only 14.3% of the required 
investments came from firms'own internal funds; 53.1% from other 
national sources; and 32.6% from international credits. 
b/ In large-si.ze blast furnaces, for instance, Nueno reports how 
"managers placed emphasis on the fact that larger sizes 
represented different, more advance , technologies, not only 
in the field of construction or operation of the units, but 
also in a variety of related fields", P. Nueno, 4/ 
cj W. Cartwright, 5/ 
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This hypothesis that short gestation times are related to 
smaller scales and lesser complexity of plants is consistent with 
what we found in our own sample, to the extent that three of the 
shortest gestation periods (Acindar's Rosario plant, and the two 
Acindar Villa Constitución plants involving the installation of 
rolling mills) relate to a very small scale plant, in the first 
case, and the building of just the rolling mill stages of a plant 
(rather than an entire multi-stage integrated plant) in the latter 
two cases. 
This bring us on now to the significance of the owning firm s 
previous experience in affecting the duration of the gestation period. 
6 / Here, we first turn to Eckhaus,—according to whom 
"experience in the installation and starting of new 
investment projects creates a stock of skills that 
facilitate installation and start up". These skills can 
be augmented by formal education but only at marginal 
rates of substitution between education and experience 
which are limited by the requirement for some minimum 
amount of experience" "There are diminishing 
returns to this stock of specialized skills which assist 
in bringing new investment projects to maturity" 
Thus, Eckhaus stresses how the experience that firms may gain 
in the course of previous construction and start-up periods, will 
help to shorten these two periods when it cosines to expansions —and 
he also postulates diminishing returns to a quasi-fixed stock of 
skills in the owning firm to explain why larger-scale projects, or 
faster rates of expansion, may lead to longer construction and 
start-up periods. 
However, a point that Eckhaus does not deal with, but which 
emerges as important from the evidence presented earlier, is the 
question of how a firm's previous experience (or lack of it) will 
determine how effectively" it will be able to participate in the 
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specification- of, and/or the design of the technology that is 
selected. Clearly, in grrenfield plants, inexperience predominates, 
and this appears to have been a principal factor leading, in the 
Paz del Rio case and even more the Chimbote case, to these firms 
having accepted what was basically a poorly specified technology, 
—with the consequent need in both cases for expensive remedial 
measures and long gestation lags. In coctrast, USIMINAS for its 
greenfield plant was able to solve its inexperience problem through 
a joint venture arrangment with the very experienced Nippon Steel 
Company of Japan. This meant USIMINAS received pretty sound advice 
on technology selection, and intensive technical, operational and 
managerial assistance to ensure that start-up would go smoothly. 
Acindar had done something similar previously, on a smaller scale, 
for the Villa Const it uc ion greenfield plant, on which they received 
technical and operational assistance frcm the experienced Republic 
Steel Co. of the USA, who at that tine had expressed interest in 
acquiring some 10% of Acindar1 s equity. 
Further evidence of the importance of a firm's previous 
experience (or- lack of it) at the technology specification/design 
stage comes from AHMSA*s problems in the acquisition and implement 
ation of its first BOF plant (one of the expansions mentioned in 
Table 2). The .ARMSA case-study suggests that the firm's complete 
inexperience with oxygen steelmaking technology (they had used 
Siemens Martin steelmaking before), plus their inadequate technical 
and organizational -preparation for the new technology contributed to 
their acquisition' oi S a T W c ? aSsxgn from their suppliers, 
and to their very slow start-up with the new technology. 
Also, SOMlSA's problems with the new blast-furnace for their 
2-i million ten expansion seem to have been partly due to SOMlSA's 
having contracted this new furnace on a turnkey basis (to assure 
rapid construction), with the consequence that SOMISA probably did 
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not contribute as much of their own know-how as would have been 
desirable in the specification of the new furnace. At any rate, 
after first experiencing grave troubles in operating with their new 
furnace (which were mentioned earlier on), SOMISA then proceeded 
to use a great deal of their own previous operating experience gained 
on their first blast furnace so as to modify the design of the new 
7 / one —with much better results, see Nicodemo.— 
Finally, it was shown in the USIMINAS case-study that this firm 
very actively used its previous operational know-how so as to suggest 
and insist on improvements to the design and specification of the 
equipment being installed in fullfillment of its ambitious expansion 
plans from 1968 through to 1980. These active design contributions 
from the firm itself contributed greatly to ensuring that the newly 
incorporated equipment was better adapted to the firm's experience 
and procedures, with less unknown variables to learn to manage, and 
more "bug-free", than if design and specification had been left 
entirely in the hand of outside consultants and contractors. The 
short start-up periods noted in Table 3 for both the USIMINAS 
expansions mentioned there are consistent with this. 
In summary it would appear that a firm's previous experience 
- and how it can be brought to bear not only on construction and 
start-up, but also on design and specification of the technology -
is an extremely important determinant of gestation time. 
This leads on to a corollary hypothesis, which is that the 
extent to which a firm's previous experience will be relevant to a 
technology gestation may well depend on how much of a "jump" in 
scale and technology the new project represents compared to the 
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scale and technology which the firm is used to working with —. Our 
case-study evidence suggests that steel firms sometime over-reach 
themselves by by making scale or technology "jumps" which prove too 
big for them to handles consequently greatly extending the length 
of the construction or start-up periods (e.g. AHMSA with its BOF 
plant. Chimbóte's management with their original plant, SOMISA perhaps 
trying to "jump" at too fast a rate up to 2i- million tons of output). 
The implication is that the length of the gestation period which 
firms should expect is partly determined by the firm's own previous 
experience, and by the firm's realism (or lack of it) in making "jumps" 
in scale and technology which are in accord with its previous experience. 
The problem with making big juirps is twofold:-
First, there is the "Eckhaus effect" whereby a big increase in scale 
may saturate (lead to diminishing returns from)the firm's quasi-fixed 
stock of staff who are sufficiently experienced to be able to adapt 
themselves to the complex construction and start-up tasks involved. 
Second, big jumps to new technology make it more difficult for the 
firm either to specify correctly or to sufficiently understand what 
it is acquiring from its suppliers, which increases the risk of 
acquiring poorly specified technology and the consequent risk of 
being involved in prolonged construction and start-up difficulties 
with attendant time and cost over-runs. 
There are two obvious implications: either firms should make 
small enough jumps so that their previous experience will be adequate 
a/ "The general opinion of those actually using large-scale technology 
is that it is not possible to extrapolate the know-how required to 
design, build and operate relatively small units to the design, 
construction and operation of large ones, but it is the experience 
at a certain scale which allows, step by step, the adoption of 
larger scales The companies that have tried to make big 
jumps in ironmaking scale and technology have relied heavily on 
purchase know-how, but in spite of this, they have often had 
serious problems", P. Nueno, op.cit. 
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to the challenges involved; or, if big jumps (in scale and technological 
complexity) are planned, then firms will need to very actively utilize 
and supplement their existing experience sc as to be able to jump 
successfully.. 
Utilizing existing design, constructional and operating know-how 
is essential so that plant "heritage" will be duly taken into account, 
and local and firm-specific conditions explicitly included in the 
planning and design of expansions. Supplementing existing experience 
(to help cope with big jumps) involves heavy investment in first class 
consulting engineering, and heavy investment in extensive technical 
assistance during planning, construction and early operation of the 
ambitious new facilities. It also involves intensive investment in 
the education, training, and qualification of the firm's own technical 
personnel and workers with regard to the new technology being installed. 
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3. SOME PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 
In this third part of the chapter, some implications for 
planners of the reported findings about technology selection and 
gestation are briefly mentioned. 
1) So far as the determinants of technology selection are concerned, 
we noted how these had led, in quite a few of the cases examined, 
to what we called a "restricted search process" for technology. 
In other words, the decisions as to the process technology to be 
selected, or the scale of the plant to be built, or the suppliers 
chosen -or, indeed, about other more detailed parameters of technology 
selection into which we did not go in detail- often seemed to get 
taken without what, to an economists mind, would be the desirable open 
and broad "scanning" of the techno-economic horizon in search of the 
most profitable technology. Instead, financial, political and other 
constraints led to early ruling out of vast parts of the techno-economic 
horizon in favour of particular technologies, scales and suppliers 
v^iy uu j.u Lijc g,a.iu<= . 
This would not necessarily matter much if those large parts of 
the techno-economic horizon thus ruled out were genuinely irrelevant 
to the needs of the prospective project - but who can say if this 
was so? Rather, when one considers bow poorly judged some of the 
technology selections reported on in the case studies turned out 
to be, the presumption must, in our view, be in favour of the idea 
that a broader-minded, more open and more intensive scanning of the 
techno-economic horizon of possibilities would be, at least from the 
economic point of view, an activity promising high returns. 
2) A second, and related issue for planners with regard to technology 
selection, has to do with the frequency with which "plant specific" 
factors were left out of account, or seriously underestimated, in 
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making technology selection decisions. The commonest problem 
which emerged in many of the case-studies, was failure to take due 
account cf the special characteristics of some of the key raw materials 
that would be feeding the plant once built - e.g. the type of local 
iron ore, or coal or scrap that it would be using. Another seriously 
underestimated variable in at least two of the plants was the impact 
of local climatic conditions. Yet another -extremely important-
"plant specific" factor underestimated in some cases was the degree of 
disruption that major expansions would cause to pre-existing plant 
operations and output. 
3) A third issue that emerged was how poor (and often grossly over-
optimistic) demand forecasts had turned out to be, with the consequence 
that very large expansions tended to be planned and constructed only 
to end up functioning for long periods at low utilization levels. 
4) When we looked at gestation periods, we noted that these often 
seemed to be quite badly underestimated - not only because of financing 
difficulties but also because the selected technology sometimes proved 
defective in design or conception, and sometimes,too, because the plant 
was planned on a scale or with a technology that represented too big 
a "jump" from the experience previously accumulated by the firm in 
question to enable the firm to carry out the expansion smoothly. 
5) This in turn suggested the value of considering it might prove 
wiser to build somewhat smaller plants (so as not to run into such 
long gestation periods), and that there would be a strong case for 
heavier prior investment by steel firms in the training, education 
and qualification of their own staff with regard to specifying, 
constructing and operation of the planned new or expanded plant 
concerned, as well as a strong case for heavier investment by them 
in getting first class external technical assistance in connection 
with the entire gestation process. 
6) The above "planning implications" can be considered as inter-related 
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and complementary in the following sense: that in the "pre-investment" 
stage of steel plants and expansions, more effort should be put 
into: 
scanning, the techno-economic horizon more broadly, and, careful 
consideration of the option to build smaller plants, as well 
as the option.to build bigger ones-
very careful examination of plant specific factors, including 
both "technological" factors connected to localisation and 
plant heritage, and an estimate of whether the experience and 
capability accumulated by plant staff will be sufficient to 
enable them to. manage the planned expansion reasonably smoothly 
explicit consideration of what prior investments in staff 
training and education, and what investments in technical 
assistance will be needed to be coherent with the "hardware" t 
that it is.planned to acquire 
the performance of real,not cosmetic,sensitivity analysis in 
feasibility reports which will show how project profitability 
will fall if gestation takes longer than expected, and if 
demand forecasts prove as inflated as they often are. 
The above recommendations are not merely in favour of what, in the 
consulting engineering profession, is called more "front end investment" -
i.e. investment in the pre-investment period when steel plants are 
being planned. Their real point is to concentrate attention on the 
particular group of. factors whose missestimation or underestimation serious 
is what seems to have led to or justified the more/ technology sélection 
errors and long gestation periods reported earlier. 
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Chapter 4: "CAPACITY-STRETCHING" IN THE STEEL PLANTS 
This chapter * takes up a finding which emerged during 
the case-studies: that the effective production capacity of the 
plants in our sample", (and of stages and units within these 
plants), seems to have been "stretched" over time, going far 
beyond nominal capacity in many cases. 
jV In this chapter, we often refer to the case-studies. 
These are denominated as follows: 
Acindar, Rosario Report(1976)= Philip Maxwell, Learning and Tech-
nical Change in the Steelplant of Acindar S.A. in Rosario, Argen-
tina, BID/CEPAL BA 18, December 1976. 
Acindar, Rosario Report (1978 version)= Philip Maxwell, First-
best Technological Strategy in an "Nth-best" Economic Context, 
BID/CEPAL BA 26, April 1978. 
Acindar Report (Draft Thesis Version)= Philip Maxwell, "Learning 
and Technology Policy in Developing Countries. A Case Study 
based on the Experience of the Argentine Steel Firm, Acindar S.A. 
1943-1978". Draft D. Phil Thesis, Buenos Aires, 1980 
USIMINAS Report= C. Dahlman and F. Valadares Fonseca, From Techno-
logical Dependence to Technological Development: The Case of the 
USIMINAS Steelplant in Brazil, Vols I and II, Working Paper N°21, 
BID/CEPAL/PNUD, October 1978. 
Colombia Steel Industry Report= Germán Puerta, El Desarrollo Tec-
nològico en la Industria Siderurgica en Colombia, (Tecnological 
Development in the Colombian Steel Industry). Working Paper N°26, 
BID/CEPAL/PNUD, April 1979, Spanish. 
AHMSA Report= L.A. Pérez £ J. Pérez y Peniche, Decisiones Tecnoló-
gicas al Nivel de Empresa. El Caso de Altos Hornos de México S.A., 
(Technological Decisions at the Firm Level, The Case of Altos 
Hornos de Mexico S.A.), Working Paper N°24, BID/CEPAL/PNUD, 
October 1978, Spanish. 
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To be clear on meanings, "effective" capacity refers to the 
production capacity of a unit (stage, plant) which is sustainable 
in the practical working conditions of the unit assuming that 
sufficient labour, materials and other inputs are available to 
service the full utilization of the capital facilities. "Nominal" 
capacity is the capacity of a unit (stage, plant) which was 
contracted for by the owner when purchasing it. In practice, 
effective capacity varies throughout the lifetime of a unit (stage, 
plant). It usually begins well below nominal capacity during the 
start-up period, then rises during start-up to a figure fairly 
close to nominal capacity, and then continues subject to further 
variations as process conditions change and/or as modifications 
are introduced into the unit (stage, plant) itself, a/ 
What was found in the case-studies was that these modifications 
in some cases had the effect of stretching effective capacity 
very far beyond nominal capacity, achieving for example, more 
than twice nominal capacity. 
Such large increases in capacity seemed intrinsically interesting 
to explore. Hence, this chapter is devoted to presenting several 
findings about capacity-stretching which were contained in the 
case-studies. 
Section 1 documents the great extent of the observed capacity 
stretching. 
Section 2 provides evidence of the "pervasiveness" in the 
plants of technical change projects which had capacity stretching 
amongst their objectives. 
a/ For valuable definitions and discussions of plant 
production capacity see Gold 1/ and Sercovich 2/. 
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Section 3 then documents one of the main reasons which 
led to extensive capacity stretching in the plants - namely the 
blocking of their "conventional" capital intensive investment 
options. 
Section 4 reports on a variety of other incentives to 
capacity-stretching noticed in the case-studies. 
Section 5 discusses the methods used to stretch capacity 
in the plants. 
Section 6 briefly summarises the overall set of empirical 
findings presented in the earlier sections. 
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1. EXTENT OF CAPACITY-STRETCHING OBSERVED IN STEELPLANTS 
The first finding we report on concerns the extent to which 
the effective capacity' of many of the existing installations 
in the plants was "stretched" - often far beyond 
nominal capacity - as a result of experience gained in 
operating these installations and the technical changes 
introduced in them. 
To illustrate this, we collect in Table 1 
below some figures on the extent of capacity stretching 
observed in the USIMINAS, Acindar, AHMSA and Acerías Paz 
del Rio plants in different kinds of steelmaking units 
within these plants. 
The feature which clearly emerges is the great extent 
to which the effective capacity of the units shown in the 
table was stretched beyond nominal capacity. These increases 
ranged from effective capacity reaching 2 5% above nominal 
capacity to reaching over 130% above nominal capacity, 
impressive by any standards! 
The'novelty* of these results is not in their documentation 
of the existence of capacity-stretching. For example, years 
ago both Enos (1958) .3/ and Hollander (1965) drew 
attention to the output increases that could be obtained 
from largely unchanged plants in the fields of petrochemical 
and rayon plants respectively. Rather, if there is novelty 
in the results, it lies in the great quantitative significance 
that capacity-stretching seems to have had in these particular 
steelplants that were examined in different Latin American 
countries. 
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Table 4.1 Extent of capacity stretching observed in different plants and types of equipment 
trrEcrive 
TYPE OF EQUIPHENT PLANT AND UNITS TIME PEBIOD NOMINAL CAPACITY OF CAPACITY REACHED AT END % CAPACITY -
THE UNITS AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD STRETCHING 
OF PERIOD. 
Sinter strands USIMINAS 
Original sinter plant 1967-73 770 000 tons/year—^ 1 5M4 000 "2/ tona/year— 101% 
Coke ovens USIMINAS 
Original coke plant 1970-73 507 000 tons/year^ 634 233 2/ tons/year- 25% 
Blast furnaces USIMINAS 
Furnaces 1 and 2 















Steel shops ACINDAR. (Rosario) 
Siemens-Martin N°1 194<t-73 2.75 tons/hour^/ 6. .32 tons/hour 130% 
Siemens Martin N°2 
i 
19U9-73 3,68 2/ tons/hour— 6. 32 tons/hour 72% 
Siemens Martin N°3 196U-73 2/ 3; 80 tons/ho ur^ - 6. 32 tons/hour 66% 
AHHSA 
Siemens-Martin N°1 to 3 1963T73 227 t/ tons/day- <»10 it/ tons/day- 81% 
Siemens-Martin N°»t to 8 1963-72 393 tons /day—'' 607 tons /day—'' 5H% 
USIMINAS 
BOF shop N°1 1966-72 5C0 ooo v tons /year^ 1 179 000 2/ tons/year— 13«% 
Rolling mills ACINDAR (Rosario) 
Billet mill 1955-71» 3/ 8,30 tons/hour- 19. .00 tons/hour 129% 
Bar E Section mill 1955-71 9.90 tons/hour—/ 17. ,20 tons/hour; 7t% 
Source: Derived from data in Acindar Report (1976), Usiminas report, AHHSA Report and Colombia Steel Industry Report. 
1/ These figures all refer to the nominal capacity of the units concerned. In every case this nominal capacity was actually 
achieved in the year shown'at the beginning of the time-period. Ti.e. the start-up period leading to the achievement of nominal 
capacity is excluded from the figures in the table). 
2/ These figures all refer to the working capacity of the uni':s after completion of their start-up period and refer to their 
capacTty in use (i.e. when not "down" for maintenance or rapairs). 
3/ Ditto as for 2/ except that capacity is expressed in tons, per shift hour. 
4/ Average per furnace for the three furnaces. 
5/ Average per furnace for the five furnaces. 
literature on the steel industry about this capacity-stretching 
phenomenon, even in the literature dealing with economies of scale. 5J 
One of the few exceptions to this rule is Rosegger (1975) 6_/ who 
noted that 
"An additional element of expansion was provided by the 
frequently remarkable increases in the rated capacities 
of existing plants through accumulation of smaller technological 
improvements and through "learning-by-doingM. Up-ratings of 
ten to fifteen percent over a five year span are not unusual. 
They constitute another variable in a more dynamic view of the 
determination of plant sizes and the achievement of targeted 
final outputs, further modifying the concept of optimal 
capacities" "If the history of iron and steel-
works in developed countries is any guide, continuous technolog-
ical changes and the concomitant creation of incremental capacities 
at individual stages can be regarded as the rule rather than 
the exception" 
The results obtained in the sample of Latin American plants 
strongly support these views of Rosegger's. But whereas he talks 
of upratings of up to fifteen percent over a five-year time-span, 
we have here got cases where much larger p e r c e n t a g e increases in effective 
capacity were obtained, for example up to 130% over a six to seven 
year time-span in the case of USIMINAS's first two blast furnaces 
and first steel shop, and 66% to 130% in Acindar's steelmaking 
and rolling units over periods ranging from 7 to 29 years. 
A central feature of all the cases of "capacity-stretching" 
that were observed, was that it was brought about mainly by 
the introduction and accumulation of minor, incremental technical 
changes to the existing equipment. Furthermore, this piecemeal, 
incremental capacity-stretching was usually brought about at 
relatively low investment cost compared to the investment in the 
original installations, ensuring that the investment costs per 
unit of extra (stretched) capacity were far below the investment 
cost per unit of nominal: (unstretched) capacity, a/ . 
a/ Between 1967-68 and 1976-77, approximately US$ 7 million was 
invested by Acindar in its Rosario plant (the one mentioned in the table) 
compared to $22 million in its "Acevedo" plant and $27 million in its 
•'¡Marathon" plant. The Investments in capacity-stretching projects in 
the Rosario plant were considerably less than $7 million, and appear to 
have accounted for less than half this total, Source of Data: Acindar 
Project Investment Approvals Archive. 
(N.B.this footnote continues overlea 
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As to the sources of the incremental technical changes 
introduced, these involved in all cases a combination of (i) 
carrying out changes suggested by the plant1s actual experience 
in operating the units concerned, i.e. "learning-by-doing, and 
(ii) copying technical changes and improvements adopted elsewhere 
on similar equipment after suitably specifying and adapting them 
to the idiosyncratic local equipment and conditions in the plant 
concerned. 
In any event the sheer cumulative extent and consequent 
economic significance of the capacity-stretching observed in 
this sample of plants justify an effort to look more closely into 
the factors which led to it. 
(continuation of footnote a/ from previous page) 
In USIMINAS, the costs of "capacity-stretching" expansion from 
500,000 tons nominal capacity to 1,200,000 tons was roughly 
estimated to have cost only US $ 40 millions compared to $ 261 
millions in the original plant: see USIMINAS Report, Vol. 1, p. 
186. Moreover, much of this $ 40 million involved technical 
assistance contracts and "what little investment occured was in 
small peripheral equipment such as sintering screens, roll crushers, 
minor modification in major equipment units etc." See USIMINAS 
Report, Vol. 1 p. 259. 
In AHMSA, investments in the Siemens Martin steelshop after 1967 
were minimal due to the priority given by the enterprise to investments 
in the forthcoming new BOF shop: see account in Section 4.3 
below. 
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2. EVIDENCE ON THE "PERVASIVENESS" OF CAPACITY-STRETCHING TECHNICAL 
CHANGE IN STEELPLANTS 
A second finding from the case-studies is that capacity-stretching 
projects were 'pervasive1. 
By 'pervasive' what we mean is that (a) in each of the plants at any 
moment there were always an appreciable number of technical projects 
leading to stretched capacity going on in at least one production stage 
and often in two or three stages of the plant at the same time; 
(b) these projects usually represented a very significant fraction 
of the overall set of technical change projects being undertaken in • 
the plants at any particular time. 
Moreover this 'pervasive' nature of capacity-stretching seems related 
to the observation that besides being frequently a priority objective 
of technical change in its own right, capacity-stretching was also 
noticed-to have frequently occurred as a secondary objective, necessary 
condition or spin-off benefit of technical changes introduced with 
other main objectives in view (e.g. reducing unit costs, raising product 
quality, varying input-mix, etc.) 
Some detailed evidence in support of these observations comes from the 
Acindar case-study where two samples of technical projects were examined 
to see what objectives motivated them: 
(i) a sample of 30 important technical changes introduced in 
the Rosario plant during its lifetime, obtained by listing all the 
technical changes at the plant which were singled out for mention in 
the complete set of Acindar's annual reports to shareholders. 
(ii) a representative sample of 54 R6D projects carried out by Acindar 
in its Rosario, Acevedo and Marathon plants between 1970 and 1974 on 
which detailed information was available thanks to its having been 
specially prepared for an Argentine government agency. 
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Regarding the first sample of 30 important technical changes 
introduced in the Rosario plant, the reasons cited for these projects 
were ; 
Table 4.2 Objectives of 30 important technical changes 
in the Rosario Plant 
Reasons given for introducing Number of technical changes carried out 
the technical changes for these reasons (out of 30 technical . 
changes ) 




To improve product quality 
To reduce unit costs 




ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL 
REASONS CITED 
5. To react to fulloff in input quality 2 
1. and 3. 3 ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE 
1. and 2. and 3. 2 REASONS IN THOSE 
2. and 3. 1 PROJECTS WHEN MORE THAN 
ONE WAS CITED 
Source: P.Maxwell»Learning and Technical Change in the Steelplant of Acindar S.A 
in Rosario,Argentina, Monograph BID/CEPAL, Buenos Aires, December 1976, p. 79. 
The most striking point to emerge is the high frequency of 
production capacity increase amongst the objectives for introducing technical changes. 
It is also clear that some of the technical changes were 
specifically aimed at more than one objective simultaneously. 
Coming now to the second sample - referring to the 54 RED 
projects drawn from all three of Acindar*s plants- the information on these is 
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Table 4.3 Classification of the objectives of 54 Acindar R&D Projects 
Classification of the 
objectives being sought 
dumber, and "Value" 1/ of the 
projects in which this was the 
primary objective 
Number and "Value" 1/ of the 
projects in which this was 
either the primary objective 
or a secondary objective 
Objective Number Value, U.S.$ Number Value, U.S 
Launch of new products 21 (39%) 532,000 (19%) 21 (39%) 532,000 (19%) 
Increased capacity for 
existing products 2/ 13 
* 
(24%) 1,304,000 (46%) 19 (35%) 1,793,000 (63%) 
Reduced production costs 10 (19%) 703,000 (25%) 17 (31%) 818,000 (29%) 
Improved quality of existing 
products 3 ( 6%) 35,000 ( 1%) 12 (22%) 492,000 (17%) 
Easing of raw material 
supply restrictions 6 (11%) 251,000 ( 9%) 6 (11%) 251,000 ( 9%) 
Better working conditions 1 ( 2%) 11,000 ( 0%) 3 ( 6%) 52,000 ( 2%) 
TOTALS 54 (100%) 2,836,000 (100%) 54 (100%) 2,836,000 (100%) 
Source of data: Calculated from data in Philip Maxwell, Implicit R&D Strategy and Investment linked RSD: 
A Study of the R&D Programme of the Argentine Steel Firm Acindar S.A., plus supplementary data in Acindar1s 
descriptions of these R&D projects as provided to the Argentine Sub-secretariat for Science and Technology. 
\ 
1/ By the "value" of the project, what is meant is the total expenditure incurred by Acindar on its own 
labour~input to these R&D projects, both skilled and unskilled labour. This figure gives a rough order of 
magnitude of the size of the project. However it is only rough because other project costs, such as on machinery, 
raw materials for pilot runs, expenditure on labour from outside firms etc, is not included. 
2/ In only one of these projects was the addition of completely new capacity, rather than the stretching 
of existing capacity involved. 
summarised in detail in Table 4.3. 
The importance of capacity-stretching emerges very clearly 
indeed from this table. 24% of these projects had as their primary 
objective to increase production capacity for existing products 
(in every case except one by modifying existing equipment, not adding 
new units -i.e. by stretching capacity.) And fully 35% of all 
projects had increasing capacity included amongst their objectives 
as either the primary or a secondary objective. Furthermore, if we 
pay attention to the "value" of the projects and not just their 
number, the significance of capacity-increasing projects is seen 
to be further enhanced. For projects with capacity-increase amongst 
their objectives accounted for 63% of total project value. Moreover 
all of but one of these capacity increasing projects involved capacity-
stretching and not duplication of facilities, and this one project was 
of low "value". So projects with capacity-stretching amongst their objective 
accounted for virtually 63% of the total value of all the projects in 
the sample. 
So, our analysis of both these samples of projects clearly supports 
our statements regarding both the pervasiveness of capacity-stretching 
projects and the importance of capacity-stretching as a primary objective 
for technical changes in its own right as well as a secondary or spin-off 
objective alongside technical changes undertaken for other reasons. 
Without going into details here, these assertions are also 
strongly corroborated by the material in the USIMINAS and AHMSA reports 
where innumerable examples of capacity-stretching change are given— 
and where in both cases the need to distinguish capacity-increase as a 
separate objective of technical change distinct from (though related 
to) cost-reduction is emphasized. 
Indeed the authors of the AHMSA study come to the conclusion 
that 
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"AHMSA's objective (was) not profit maximisation but to provide 
the steel products demanded by the country's industrialization" so 
that "AHMSA's technological efforts have been mainly directed to 
increasing production as the priority objective" rather than improving 
quality or reducing costs a/ 
In the USIMINAS study, the authors present extensive evidence of capacity-stret-
ching technical change in the original equipment installed by the firm, and 
explicitly state that it is "useful to distinguish an increase in production as 
a separate objective" of technical change b/ 
In short the "pervasiveness" of capacity-stretching projects and the fact that 
capacity-stretching was often an independent objective in its own right were 
observed in all three of the plants. 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 22, paragraphs 3 and 2 
L/ USIMINAS Report, p. 62. 
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3„ ONE MAJOR INCENTIVE TO CAPACITY STRETCHING: THE DELAYING 
OR BLOCKING OF CONVENTIONAL EXPANSION 
It emerged in the steelplant studies that one of the main incentives 
which actually led Acindar, USIMINAS and AHMSA to stretch the capacity 
of their plants to such a notable extent, was the blocking or delaying 
of these firms' "conventional" expansion plans. To see this requires 
us to dip briefly into the history of the plants: 
3.1. Capacity-stretching in Acindar's Rosario plant: 
We start with the case of Acindar's Rosario plant. Chart 5.1 
below shows that, apart from the notable "stretching" in the capacity 
of the plant's first Siemens Martin furnace achieved in 1949-50 a/, 
the main "stretching" in the capacity of the plant's installation took 
place from the early 1960s onwards. 
Indeed from 1963-64 through to the early 1970s, the chart 
shows how the capacity of the billet mill was stretched from around 
10 to almost 20 tons per hour, whilst that of each of the 
Siemens Martin furnaces was stretched from around 3.5 to almost 6 
tons per hour, b/ 
Considering the obsolete character of the Rosario plant's in-
stallations, and the fact that this capacity-stretching was achieved 
on a deliberately low, indeed "shoestring" investment budget, one can 
well understand the pride which the Rosario plant staff and indeed 
Acindar's management, had in this achievement. 
Nevertheless, the key to understanding the story of capacity 
stretching in the Rosario plant is that Acindar's management never 
wanted or planned to keep the Rosario plant going so long, nor to 
a/ This was achieved by rebuilding the furnace to enlarge its 
inner volume, and by introducing the use of cupola furnaces to melt 
part of the scrap load. This part of the load could then be charged 
into the Siemens Martin furnace as "hot metal", thus speeding up both 
the charging and the melting cycle in the Siemens Martin. 
b/ Rosario's first Siemens Martin furnace went into action in 1943. 
This was enlarged and modernized in 1949. A second Siemens Martin, 
closely similar to the enlarged and modernized first one was also 
installed in this same year (1949). Subsequently, a'third Siemens 
Martin furnace, similar in size and design to the earlier two was 
added in 1963-64. 133 
CHART 4.1 
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ingeniously "stretch" its capacity in the way they did. Far from 
wanting to extend the life of the Rosario plant, Acindar's 
management wanted to scrap it ever since around 1953. 
To see why, one must realise that the Rosario plant was built 
in 1943 at a time when the technology, the machinery and the skilled 
engineering help that would normally have been available from abroad 
to build a new steelplant was completely unobtainable, owing to 
World War 2 hostilities. So the plant got built thanks to the 
entrepreneurship and ingenious "do it yourself" technical improvisation 
organised by Arturo Acevedo, the founder of Acindar, and his 
colleagues. The result was a small-scale, patched-up, high-cost 
plant based on antique, partly second-hand technology. Even after 
the war when the plant was extensively modernized (with an additional 
samll Siemens Martin furnace, cupola furnaces for charging hot metal, 
a new ingot casting bay and a new small-scale billet mill) the plant 
was still far from the technological forefront. 
What was at the technological forefront was Acindar's second 
plant, built at Villa Constitución some 50kms. from Rosario, and 
started up in 1951. Quite unlike Rosario, the Villa Constitución 
plant was conceived right from the start as a large scale "high 
technology" plant. It consisted of a modern continuous Morgan 
combination rolling mill for bar, rod and skelp, with a capacity of 
215,000 tons per year, making use of billets as its raw material. It . 
was conceived by Acevedo as the first stage of what was to be a fully 
integrated plant at Villa Constitución. The idea was that iron ore 
would be delivered by river to the port at the Villa Constitución 
site; then blast furnaces, steel refining and primary rolling would 
turn the ore into pig iron, steel and finally into billets to feed the 
already-installed Morgan mill. 
Within this scenario, one can easily see why the small-scale 
originally improvised Rosario plant (which also had the disadvantage 
of being on a small inland site) was relegated to second 
place in the minds of Acindar's directors. The obvious place to 
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invest and expand was in Villa Constitución, not Rosario. That 
was why the scrapping of the Rosario plant was always considered 
as either desirable, or likely to happen soon once the "integration 
project" for producing billets in Villa Constitución actually got 
underway. 
What interfered with Acindar's plans -and thereby prolonged the 
life the Rosario plant- was that the company's ambitious.integration 
project for Villa Constitución ran into a succession of frustrating 
bureaucratic difficulties between 1953 and 1975 arising mainly 
from opposition on the part of the Dirección General de Fabrica-
ciones Militares (General Directorate of Military Production). 
Altogether six different specific projects put forward by 
Acindar -each of which would have led to the integration of the Villa 
Constitución plant- were stalled or eventually frustrated from 
securing the definitive official approval and financial guarantees 
that were needed to proceed, aj It was not finally until 1975 that 
Acindar got the green light to integrate its Villa Constitución plant. 
Thus Acindar's persistent desire to substitute high cost,small-
scale billet production on Rosario's outmoded equipment by lower cost 
larger-scale billet production on new equipment in Villa Constitución 
was persistently frustrated during more than twenty years'. 
Furthermore these same hopes and uncertainties surrounding the 
integration project also ruled out the idea of a really thoroughgoing 
modernization of the Rosario plant -which would have involved 
scrapping the old Siemens Martin furnaces, ingot casting and billet 
rolling equipment in favour of one or two modern electric arc furnaces 
and continuous casting facilities. This modernization was not carried 
out because of the expectation on the part of Acindar's directors that 
they would, before too long, get the go-ahead to integrate their 
a/ See Acindar, Rosario Report (1978 Version) p.10. 
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Villa Constitución plant and would thus be able to avoid all the 
disadvantages inherent in having to keep producing steel on the 
cramped Rosario site and then having to transport the billets 50 
kilometers to Villa Constitución for rolling on Acindar's Morgan 
mill. In other words Acindar's directors never wanted to invest 
heavily in modernizing the Rosario plant because they always expected 
that the "superior" option of producing billets in Villa Constitu-
ción would open up, and that the expected future lifetime of the 
Rosario plant would therefore be short. So the "planning horizon" 
for the Rosario plant was therefore (a) always uncertain, and 
(b) believed to have a sizeable probability of being extremely short. 
This explains why Acindar's directors always wished to minimize any 
new investments in Rosario. 
Finally, as we have shown in detail elsewhere, aJ all of 
the other natural ways for Acindar to have substituted Rosario's 
supply of billets by lower cost billets from other sources were also 
ruled out by the circumstances prevailing in the Argentine steel 
industry and economic context in successive years. 
These above circumstances combined to repeatedly keep Acindar 
in a most curious position, consisting of: 
1. having to maintain in action over more than twenty years an 
obsolete plant which they had always wanted to scrap 
2. having constantly to try to expand this plant's billet production 
from the early 60s onwards so .as to contribute to a reasonable 
degree of utilization of capacity in Acindar's main rolling mill 
plant, which could not be kept adequately provided by billets 
deriving from imports and domestic sources due to the frequently 
inadequate supply from the latter two sources. 
3. having to achieve these two goals whilst restricting investment 
in the old plant to a bare minimum 
a/ See Acindar, Rosario Report (1978 Version) p.p. 6 to 11. 
137 
In this position it was out of the question to completely 
modernize the plant, which would have cost far too much, or to 
purchase a whole additional new production line to work alongside 
the existing one, which would also have cost too much, a/ The 
main avenue open to Acindar was therefore repeatedly to seek to 
"stretch" the capacity of its existing installations at Rosario 
at the lowest possible investment cost. This is exactly what they 
did. 
3.2 Capacity-stretching in USIMINAS 
Our next example relates to the way in which production in 
USIMINAS's original plant was stretched from the level reached in 
1966 of 500,000 tons of flat products per year -which corresponded 
to the plant's nominal capacity- to over 1,200.000 tons per year 
by 1972. This was done without introducing any major new equipment 
units, and at very low investment cost. The reader is referred back 
to Table 5.1 where the impressive extent of capacity-stretching 
achieved in USIMINAS's various equipment units can be noted. Further-
more, Chart 5.2 below traces in detail the capacity-stretching 
achieved in USIMINAS's B0F steelshop. We now look at the circumstances 
in which these very notable results were achieved. 
Like in the Acindar, Rosario case it must be said straightaway 
that a "stretching" on this scale was certainly not contemplated in 
the original plans for USIMINAS. What actually sparked off the suc-
cession of technical changes with which USIMINAS stretched the capacity 
of its plant was a deep financial crisis in the firm. 
a/ Actually Acindar did add to the plant a third small Siemens 
Martin furnace identical to its two existing ones in 1964. (This 
was much to the chagrin of the plant's engineers's who wanted at 
the very least a much bigger and more modern Siemens Martin even if 
they could not have an electric arc .furnace!). But this was the 
only instance of expanding plant capacity by the "conventional" 
means of duplicating existing production units. In every other main 
plant stage, the capacity of the existing installations was "stretched" 
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Accordingly, we shall first describe how this financial crisis 
arose. 
Secondly, we shall describe how the "conventional" means which 
the directors of USIMINAS wished to use to increase their plant's 
output (and thence its sales and profits) so as to resolve their 
financial crisis were ruled out by the circumstances prevailing at the 
time -which then meant that the only alternative remaining was for 
USIMINAS to try to stretch the capacity of its existing installations 
at low investment cost. 
To begin with, let us see how USIMINAS got into a financial crisis. 
Several factors came together here. In particular: 
1. The original investment required to construct the plant escalated 
a lot compared to forecast. This was caused by rapid Brazilian 
inflation in between the plans and the actual construction period, 
as well as the devaluation of the Brazilian cruzeiro, a/ 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 47, 118, 119. 
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2. In 1964, just after USIMINAS started steel production, 
domestic steel demand in Brazil dropped by over 20% and 
did not fully recover until 1968. a/ 
3. Coupled to the retraction in demand, USIMINAS had the problem 
of the near simultaneous entry into the market of the flat-
products output of the other new state-promoted firm COSIPA 
-which accentuated excess capacity in several types of flat 
products, b/ 
4. Price controls introduced at the beginning of 1965 kept the 
price of steel at an artificially low level while the cost 
of inputs was allowed to increase as a result of rapid general 
inflation. This situation was not righted by the government 
until 1968. cJ 
5. Furthermore, tariffs on imported steel products were reduced from 
an average 60% to 50% in 1966 and then to 40% in 1967, 
and on a substantial portion of flat products to as low as 15% 
-thus stiffening the competition from imports, d/ 
The net result of these five factors was that USIMINAS first 
built up large unplanned debts before entering production (due to the 
inflated initial investment cost) and then found it difficult to 
correct the situation upon starting up production because its sales 
income was lowered by a combination of low prices, low effective domestic 
demand and competition from COSIPA and imports. 
Fortunately, this situation was perceived by USIMINAS early on, 
and led to two main responses by the firm designed to improve the 
situation. These were (a) a great emphasis on quality production for 
export sales which permitted USIMINAS to export 39% of its output 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 68. 
b/ Ibid. p.73, 74, 76. 
cj Ibid. p. 74, 75, footnote to p. 77. 
d/ Ibid. p. 76. 
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in 1965, 18% in 1966 and 33% in 1967, thus mitigating 
-the domestic demand crisis; and (b) the launching by USIMINAS' , 
directors of a strategy to greatly expand the plant's output so as 
both to increase sales income and reap economies of scale in 
investment costs and direct production costs. 
Indeed, as early as the 1965, USIMINAS's directors, in 
their annual report reckoned that to break even, USIMINAS would 
need to attain a minimum production level of 1 million tons per 
annum. In the same year, they accordingly drew up an expansion 
plan to reach 1 million tons, which estimated that investments 
of around U.S.$ 70 millions would be needed (on top of the 
figure of U.S.$ 270 million which the original plant was 
reckoned to have cost). a_/ 
This first expansion plan was submitted to an international 
financial agency in 1965 but was not approved because of the high 
debt-scales ratio of USIMINAS and the low prices and demand 
prevailing in the Brazilian market. Later on, in 1966, a more detailed 
project to expand up to 1 million tons and a preliminary project 
for 2 million tons were submitted by USIMINAS to the Consultants 
then doing the planning studies for the Brazilian government on the 
future of the national steel industry -but these projects to expand 
USIMINAS were not approved either. 
In the event, it was only in 1967 that the government-appointed 
Special Advisory Group on the Steel Industry finally recommended that 
USIMINAS should be authorized to expand up to 1.4 million tons, a 
recommendation that was accepted in the 1968 National Steel Plan. 
This expansion was planned on the basis of substantial new investments 
and additions to the existing plant, e.g. additional coke and sinter 
plants, remodelling of the two existing blast furnaces, addition of a 
third BOF converter, etc. However, although approved in 1968 the 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 47 
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implementation of these additional investments for the expansion plan 
was slowed down by negotiations with the government backed Brazilian 
National Development Bank on how they would be financed, and these 
were only finally resolved in late 1969, so that the new installa-
tions only began entering into operation from late 1970 onwards, a/ 
and the main new equipment units only in fact entered production in 
1973. b/ 
In summary, if we term the expansion of plant capacity by subs-
tantial additional equipment investments "conventional expansion", 
then what we have seen is that USIMINAS's own financial crisis 
coupled with the Brazilian Government's actual planning and 
financing decisions on the steel industry led to a situation whereby 
(a) USIMINAS's conventional expansion plans were blocked by lack of 
finance between 1965 and 1969, and (b) the facilities corresponding 
to conventional expansion only came on-stream in 1973. 
Yet USIMINAS had already in 1965 realized that it urgently 
needed to increase sales income and reduce production costs through 
doubling its original capacity and production levels, so as to reduce 
its high debt to sales ratio. 
In other words the firm already had an urgent need in 1965 to 
expand production and sales, but little money to invest in making 
this possible. 
It was in.these circumstances that "capacity-stretching" on the 
existing plant at low investment cost became a clearly attractive 
option and this option was then followed up consciously between 1965 
and 1972. 
3.3. Capacity stretching in AHMSA 
Our third example is from the record of AHMSA and refers to 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 120, 121 
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capacity stretching in AHMSA's Siemens Martin steelshop. Chart 
^.3 above . shows that there has been a constant increase over the 
years in the production per hour from this steel shop. This has 
been to a large extent due to the installation of additional Siemens 
Martin furnaces, as is shown in the chart. Thus, the plant started 
with just one Siemens Martin furnace in 1944. A second and third 
were quickly added in 1945 and 1947. Then five additional, and 
larger Siemens Martin furnaces were added between 1953 and 1964. 
However, a further effect can be noticed in Chart 5.3. This 
is the tendency for the output per hour to increase in successive 
years when the same number of furnaces were in use. This is partic-
ularly noticeable from 1964 onwards when all eight furnaces were 
n v/i JN. xtlg • 
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As we shall see, this post-1964 effect is closely related 
to a particular "circumstance" in the AHMSA expansion story: namely 
the fact that 1964 was the last year in which in an additional 
new Siemens Martin furnace was installed in AHMSA's steel shop -
its eighth and final furnace of this type. 
In the normal course of AHMSA's further expansion to meet 
constantly rising levels of domestic steel demand, one would have 
expected further new Siemens Martins to have been added during 
the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s — however this 
was not done because AHMSA, following world trends, decided in 
1967 that the more recently developed BOF (oxygen converter) 
technology for making steel was more economic than Siemens Martin 
steelmaking, and therefore that they would instal BOF in their 
further capacity expansions. 
As a result of this decision by AHMSA, it became apparent 
"that right from the planning stage for the first BOF shop the 
economic resources of the firm were principally directed to the 
future new steelshop, and the Siemens Martin shop began to get 
displaced so that investments in it were only directed to maintain 
it in operation rather than improve it". a_/ 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 90, paragraph 4. 
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This meant that -like in the Acindar and USIMINAS cases- any 
improvements from 1967 onwards of AHMSA's Siemens Martin steelshop 
were subject to a clear investment constraint (i.e. to a regime of 
low, or minimal new investment). 
It is interesting, therefore, to note -from the AHMSA study-
that this situation of being "relegated to secondary status", a/ 
and being "practically condemned to disappear" a/ led to a clearly 
competitive response from the Siemens Martin personnel, who made 
increased productivity the "central objective" of their steel shop, aj 
and who brought about a whole series of consequent technical changes 
at zero or very low investiment cost, whose principle objective was 
to reduce production costs, aj b/ 
The authors of the AHMSA study are emphatic that this series of 
changes would not have been carried out were it not for the competition 
provided by the BOF shop, cj and the challenge thus presented to the 
Siemens Martin shop to improve performance so as to survive, or 
survive longer. (Here there is a very clear parallel to the Acindar 
Rosario situation where plant personnel always knew that their 
plant was under "suspended sentence of execution"). 
A further point -which the authors of the AHMSA study sur-
prisingly do not make- is that in the years 1967 to 1972, when 
the new BOF shop was being planned and built, very considerable 
"stretching" of capacity in the Siemens Martin shop took place. 
This can be seen in Charts 4.4 and 4.5. Thus, in the three small 
Siemens Martin furnaces, performance was boosted brom around 1.8 
to nearly 3 heats per day between 1963 an 1971. In the five 
large Siemens Martin furnaces it was boosted from around 2.2 to 
near 2.8 heats per day between 1963 and 1972. 
a/ AHMSA Report, p.88, paragraph 5. 
b/ Ibid, p.89, paragraph 1, p.90, paragraph 5. 
c/ Ibid, p.91, paragraph 4. 
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At the same time, in both the small and the large furnaces» an 
additional element of capacity stretching was provided by noticeably 
raising the average weight of steel produced in each heat. 
The net effect of these two types of improvement was to stretch 
the production capacity of the small furnaces by approximately 81% 
between 1963 and 1973, and that of the large furnaces by approximately 
54% between 1963 and 1972. a/ 
Our interpretation of this notable capacity-stretching is straight 
forward. It is that the years 1967 to 1972 represented a period when 
it was known that the BOF shop was being planned and would be coming 
on stream, but when, nevertheless, the expected output that would be 
obtained from it was obviously not yet available. 
This must therefore have put a clear premium on squeezing the 
needed extra output to satisfy demand from the existing Siemens Martin 
units - yet at low investment cost because this increased output would 
only be needed from the Siemens Martin the relatively short time-span 
expected to intervene until the BOF shop would start up. 
a/ Furthermore these figures may well understate the true degree 
of capacity stretching actually achieved, because in the period 
1967-72 there was also a noticeable decrease in the fraction of the 
load to the Siemens Martin furnaces that consisted of liquid pig iron 
('hot metal') from the blast furnaces. (The fraction of hot metal 
charged to the small furnaces dropped from about 75% to about 50%, 
and in the large furnaces from about 60% to about 45%). This 
meant that a greater fraction of the load to the furnaces consisted 
of cold scrap that had first to be melted, which would, other things 
equal, lead to a slower working cycle and therefore to less heats per 
day. This was evidently more than compensated by changes in operating 
techniques which speeded up the overall production cycle, and produced 
the capacity stretching that we have observed. 
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In these circumstances, of clearly "present" increased demand, 
but unavoidable "delays" in satisfying it on the basis of the newly-
to-be-installed technology, the motivation for capacity-stretching 
at low investment cost seems clear enough, and bears an obvious, 
similarity to the situations which we have described previously for 
Acincar's Rosario plant and for USIMINAS. 
3.4. Summary 
In all three cases described above, capacity-stretching was 
extensively resorted to as a kind of "second-best" option when the 
conventional expansion options that the firm would have liked to 
engage in were blocked or delayed. 
The effects of these blocks and delays was that expansion could 
not -temporarily- be brought about in any other way than by 
capacity-stretching within a low-investment constraint.. 
Specificly it appears from the above cases that the following 
three kinds of circumstances provoked the blocks and 
delays to conventional expansion which in turn made capacity-stretching 
necessary. 
(i) Rather long normal timelags inherent in the technological 
aspects of planning, designing, procuring, constructing, 
and starting-up whole new plant stages or major sections 
thereof, (i.e. in "conventional" expansion) 
(ii) Expected and unavoidable political and bureaucratic delays in 
the process of securing official permission to undertake 
major "conventional" plant expansions, and in securing 
available government promotional incentives and/or financial 
guarantees. Plus the incidence of "unexpected" political 
and bureaucratic obstacles which lengthened the gestation 
period of the expansion project concerned and thus further 
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delayed the date on which the desired increased output 
from the new plant could be expected'to be available. 
(iii) Investment constraints produced by financial crises in 
the firm -or by management's decision to concentrate 
most of its available resources on rival technologies 
or other parts of its activities. 
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4 . EXISTENCE OF MANY OTHER INCENTIVES TO CAPACITY STRETCHING 
In the previous section we emphasized the major incentive 
to capacity-stretching that arose when conventional output expansion 
was blocked or delayed because of external factors, investment 
constraints, or inherently long delays in the gestation period of 
the major capital investments required for conventional expansion. 
However, the pervasiveness of capacity-stretching in the 
steelplants strongly suggests that incentives to it exist in a 
wider range of situations than merely those when it is a "second-
best" option to conventional expansion plans. 
Indeed it appears that pervasiveness is in large measure due 
to the sheer variety of different incentives that were observed in 
the case studies to have motivated capacity stretching projects. 
Without attempting to be systematic or comprehensive, the following 
list of incentives, all drawn from the case-studies, will be 
illustrative: 
(i) Indivisibilities in steelplant equipment, which meant that 
small increments in demand could not economically be met 
by adding whole new units. 
(ii) Disequilibrium inducements to stretch capacity caused by 
bottlenecks and/or imbalances in the capacities of 
different plant stages. 
(iii) Accumulation of experience due to learning-by-doing in the 
daily operation of plants. This leads to the improvement 
of operational routines and the spotting of many minor design-
defects and potential design-improvements which could raise 
capacity at low investment cost. 
(iv) Temporary demand-peaks, which lead to efforts to raise the 
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capacity of the existing plant, but which would not justify 
investing in extra new capacity. 
Stimulus provided by visits to other plants where capacity-
stretching techniques are seen at work. 
Stimulus provided by the wide diffusion in the trade 
literature of capacity-stretching innovations tried out 
successfully in other steel plants. 
Stimulus provided through technical assistance contracts 
with a foreign steel producer or engineering firm that 
provide a channel for recommending innovations, including 
ones that stretch capacity. 
The "performance-improving-instincts" of plant engineers 
keen to get more out of their existing equipment, which 
leads them to work-up and recommend capacity stretching 
projects. 
The need for capacity-stretching as a pre-condition for 
securing cost-reduction achievable through greater output 
levels. 
(x) The "spin-off" incentive in terms of capacity-stretching 
obtained "free" as a result of "Technical changes carried 
out primarily with other objectives in mind (e.g. to 
reduce production costs or improve product quality). 
This long list of different observed incentives for capacity-
stretching -in conjunction with the incentive discussed in the 
previous section- goes some way towards explaining the "pervasiveness" 
of capacity-stretching efforts that we observed in these plants; 
for, clearly, a very large variety of "trigger events", both external 
to the plant and internal to it, can -and did- activate one or 
more of the capacity-stretching incentives mentioned, a/ 
a/ Some examples of external "trigger events" which induced 
capacity-stretching in our plants included: (a) severe unplanned 
shortfalls in competing supplies or in imports due to production or 







Furthermore the disequilibrium inducement to stretch capacity 
caused by bottlenecks or imbalances in different plant stages seems 
to act as a "multiplier" of the number of capacity-stretching projects 
that steelplants engage in. This happens because almost any capacity 
-stretching initiative in one particular plant stage (whether-
originally inspired l>y external or internal stimuli) is likely to 
stimulate or induce a further stream of secondary capacity-stretching 
adjustments to correct the new bottlenecks and imbalances that 
then arise, b/ 
So both the variety of different external- and internal incentives 
to capacity-stretching and this "multiplier effect" help explain 
why capacity stretching projects were so "pervasive" in our plants, 
and also why their cumulative impact was so considerable. 
(continuation of footnote a/ from previous page) 
balance-of-payment problems -which led to temporary demand peaks for 
steel end products or intermediates, (b) currency devaluations, rapid 
inflation, and government price controls, which eroded steel firm 
profitability and led to investment constraints ruling out conventional 
expansion, (c) unusual or unexpected demand peaks caused by new 
government-subsidised public works programmes or by shortage of steel 
products on the world market, (d) changes of plans by the government 
which blocked or delayed conventional expansions, (e) autonomous demand 
increases which exceeded production capacity in different product lines. 
b/ "When a single innovation is adopted within an existing sys-
tem of production, it sets up pressures and open opportunities for 
successive 'ripples' of change in other parts of the system. Such 
pressures may be manifest in successive bottlenecks at different stages 
of production as management strives to realize the full potential of an 
innovation. Alternatively, the adoption of an innovation at one stage 
of the process may impose more, severe requirements for quality and 
uniformity at earlier stages. As a third, and more favourable possibility, 
the initial innovation may create or unblock a variety of possibilities 
for profitable change at other points in the production process — " . 
William S. Pierce. 7/ 
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5, 1 Existenee ©f a "generic" set ©f capacity-stretching methods! 
A further finding that emerges from comparing the steelplant 
case-studies is the great similarity that can be detected in 
the methods used to stretch capacity in the different plants. 
This similarity is specially notable, as would be expected, 
between technologically similar units in the different plants 
-e.g. as between the Siemens Martin furnaces of Acindar (Rosario) 
and the Siemens Martin furnaces of AHMSA, or the blast furnaces of 
USIMINAS and the blast furnaces of AHMSA, or between the various . 
rolling mills in the different plants. 
But even more significant is that one can clearly detect a 
"generic" similarity between the capacity-stretching methods used 
across all these different technologies. In other words what appears 
to be underlying all the methods of capacity stretching observed 
is a central cluster of generic techniques - which presumably could 
also be applied to other metallurgical and process plants beyond the 
confines of the steel industry. 
To make this clear, we shall now list these "generic" capacity 
stretching techniques, and then comment briefly on them. 
The generic techniques that were used to stretch capacity in our 
steelplants seem to have been: 
(1) Improving the characteristics .control,preparation LEADS TO HIGHER 
classification and standardization of the raw 
material "charge" to the process in question". 
OUTPUT YIELDS PER 
TON OF INPUT AND 
LESS PROCESSING 
DIFFICULTIES WHICH 
CAUSE HALTS IN 
PRODUCTION 
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(2) Increasing the usable volume of the contain-
ing vessels, in those cases where chemical 
reactions are involved. 
(3) Varying operational and equipment parameters 
so as to speed up cycle-times in each compo-
nent physical, mechanical or chemical stage 
of the process. 
(4) Speeding up materials handling and transport 
between stages via improved mechanization 
and better layout. 
(5) More precise and rapid process-control and 
quality control, via improved and more inten-
sive monitoring of process variables, and more 
rapid control-response-times. 
(6) Boosting the availability of processing units 
by incorporating more durable and reliable 
materials, components and accessories in those 
parts of the units most subject to wear out, 
and by developing maintenance and preventive 
maintenance techniques which reduce the "down-
time" of units needed for their cleaning, 
maintenance and repair. 
(7) Redesigning, or upgrading the numbers, 
capacity and reliability of auxiliary 
equipment units so as to match or permit 
faster cycle times in the main units. 
INCREASES BATCH 
SIZE AND THROUGHPUT 
PER VESSEL PER DAY. 
INCREASES NUMBER 








(1) HIGHER PRODUCT 
YIELDS PER TON OF 
INPUT 
(2) LOWER PRODUCT 
REJECTION RATES 
INCREASES NUMBER OF 
ACTUAL PROCESSING 
HOURS/DAYS PER 





CAPACITY IMPROVE- * 
MENTS OF TYPES 
1 to 6. 
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(8) Building up production experience which 
leads to improvements in labour 
operating efficiency. 
CONTRIBUTES TO 
FASTER CYCLE TIMES 
FASTER AND BETTER 
QUALITY CONTROL AND 
MORE RAPID MAINTE-
NANCE ACTIVITIES 
Abundant examples of all these generic capacity-stretching tech-
niques can be noted in the case-studies. 
To illustrate, let us take just one of the methods of capacity 
stretching mentioned above -that of speeding up processing cycle-
times. This theme appears again and again in the different equipment 
units in the different plants. Thus, in USIMINAS' and AHMSA's blast 
furnaces, cycle-timeswere raised by such steps as increasing blast 
pressures and temperatures, injecting oxygen into the furnaces, and 
more uniform operation obtained by closer process control. In 
Acindar's and AHMSA's Siemens Martin steelshops faster cycles were 
achi&ed by speeding up scrap-loading, by using more hot metal in the 
charge, by the use of higher flame temperatures and oxygen injection 
to speed up the refining reactions. In rolling mills in all the 
•5» 
plants, faster operation and cycle times were obtained by rewinding 
motors to increase rolling speeds, superior synchronization to lower 
"dead times" in between successive slabs or bars being rolled, more 
precise roll-guides and tension guides to avoid production halts and 
"cobbles" etc. All these methods are also used in steelplants all 
over the world. 
But, is this result in fact surprising? Perhaps not, if one 
realizes that the idea of speeding up process cycles, which in turn 
increases capacity,isa quite natural idea for steelplant engineers and 
technicians. Natural for engineers, too are such goals as minimizing 
production halts through better maintenance, and trying to acquire 
greater control over process variables, and indeed all the other 
goals in our list as well. 
157 
Thus, from an engineering viewpoint there is nothing actually 
surprising about our finding that capacity stretching projects in the 
categories mentioned above were found in all our plants. These are 
just the kind ofrthings that engineers are trained to do. 
Nevertheless, a caveat is -in order. Although the generic 
principles of how to stretch the capacity of steelplant units are 
easy enough to state, and can be seen embodied in many examples in 
our case-studies, this does not mean they were easy to implement. There 
are two main reasons for this: 
(1) the inherent complexity of process variables and lack of 
precise theoretical models to describe what is going on in 
blast furnaces, steel furnaces, and rolling operations mean 
that a great deal of empirical knowledge and experience needs 
to be gained so as to control and improve them successfully. 
(2) the actual detailed process conditions that characterize each 
steelplant are highly idiosyncratic because of innumerable 
variations between plants in terms of different equipment and 
raw material characteristics^ . uistint grades of steel being 
processed, different size ranges of intermediate products, 
variations in operating practice and end-product specification 
etc. - which means that simple copying of techniques used in 
other plants is usually impossible. 
As a result, capacity-stretching projects in our plants nearly 
always required a considerable input of in-plant know-how, design and 
experiment .: in addition to knowledge about those specific operational, 
equipment or maintenance innovations which might be suitable for the 
task. Also, of course, management agreement was required to invest 
the sums needed for modifying equipment, acquiring new auxiliary 
units, testing new operational methods etc. 
This means that, although the generic capacity-stretching tech-
nics used were common across all our plants, the extent to which 
capacity-stretching potential was actually exploited in each plant 
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was clearly dependent on (1) technical'capacity of the firm, (2) 
its access to information about possible capacity-stretching innovations 
that could be introduced, and (3) the structure of economic incentives 
and of expected costs surrounding individual capacity-stretching 
projects and the way these were evaluated by the firm bearing in 
mind its investment, policies, investment constraints and alternative 
investment projects. 
The impact of these three sets of variables ¿different in each 
plant) means that a simple comparison of our plants on the basis of 
their adoption or non-adoption of certain kinds of capacity-stretching 
methods would tell us next to nothing about the comparative "efficiency" 
of the firms in exploiting the capacity-stretching potential of their 
plants. 
Nevertheless the case-studies do provide some interesting "pointers" 
concerning some of the more efficient and systematic ways of 
exploiting capacity-stretching potential. This is the subject of the 
next section. 
5.2 Pointers towards the systematic exploitation of stretching potential 
Although a "direct" comparison of capacity-stretching efficiency 
in the three plants cannot be made, the case-studies illustrate two 
broadly different approaches to capacity-stretching, and also point 
towards an"evolution" from one approach to the other in each plant 
over time. 
These two broad approaches can be characterized as 
(1) The "ad-hoc, defensive" approach to introducing 
capacity-stretching innovations 
(2) The "systematic, offensive" approach to introducing 
capacity-stretching innovations 
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>) To see what is meant by these two labels, we shall give some 
examples from the case-studies. 
First of all consider the case of visits to other steelplants. 
In all the .case-studies such visits were reported as important sources 
of ideas both for capacity-stretching and other kinds of technical 
changes. However, one gathers from the interviews carried out, and 
the reports themselves, that the visits to other plants were not usually 
systematically programmed but took place under the influence of an 
essentially random, hazard, and fortuitous set of factors - e.g. 
the impulses of senior managers to see other plants, the opportunities 
seized by younger staff sent abroad for training to look at plants intheir 
host country etc. Indeed in the AHMSA Report it is clearly 
stated that "there did not exist an explicit and periodic programme 
of visits to exchange information about problems and solutions", aj 
An interesting contrast to this essentially "ad-hoc" approach 
to gaining information by visiting other plants is provided by an 
experience related in the USIMINAS Report. As from 1967 USIMINAS 
wanted to stretch the capacity of its steelsnop from 600,000 to 
700,000 tons per year, so what it did was to commission a study "of 
how its converters compared with those of 16 U.S. plants in terms 
of characteristics and production" b/, - and this study showed 
that the increased capacity could be obtained with only minor specific 
changes in operating practice plus stengthening of some auxiliary 
units. What this example illustrates is the use of a systematic 
and precise scanning approach to the information available from 
other plants - as opposed, to the essentially "random" approach 
implied by occasional visits. Interestingly, amongst our plants, 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 27 
b/ USIMINAS Report, p. 170 
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USIMINAS is also the one that most systematically scans the. world 
steel literature a/, and also the one that appears to make the most 
systematic and creative use of external technical assistance. In 
this regard, it is not surprising that one of the most important 
innovations introduced by USIMINAS to stretch the capacity of its 
original steel-shop was the "three-holed oxygen lance" that was 
suggested to the company by Nippon Steel with whom USIMINAS had a 
ten-year technical asistance contract, b/ External technical 
assistance has also been important in AHMSA and in the Acevedo and 
Marathon plants of Acindar. 
A quite different illustration of the differences between an 
"ad-hoc" and a "systematic" approach can be gathered from the record 
of capacity-stretching in Acindar's Rosario plant. In Acindar, 
Rosario -in contrast to USIMINAS- the sources of technical change 
have been almost exclusively internal to the plant. Rather than 
scanning the technological horizons, Rosario staff have always been 
concerned with "doing their own thing" and improving their 
technology with small resources and a lot of in-house ingenuity. In 
the rolling mills section, virtually all technical changes during 
many years were introduced as responses to particular machinery 
problems, breakdowns, and processing difficulties that cropped up 
during production and which interrupted smooth functioning - i.e. 
a/ USIMINAS's Center of Technical Information "has the best 
lib^ a-ry on steel in the country and maintains permanent contact 
with the main information organs in the country and in the world 
in order to collect information of interest.... The Research 
Center has its own technical library staffed with 19 persons 
with over 5,000 books and its own subscription to 329 relevant 
technical journals and magazines apart from those in the main 
library". USIMINAS Report, p. 216. 
b/ USIMINAS Report, p 172. 
161 
fundamentally an "ad-hoc" troubleshooting approach, a/ 
However, there was a further development, for in the period 
1969 - 71 the men who had spent many years attending to the Rosario 
mills with this "troubleshooting" approach, had the opportunity 
to introduce substantial design modifications of their own into the 
plant's billet mill and its bar 6 section mill. This led to two 
low-cost but highly effective projects -entirely designed in house-
which both had an extremely notable capacity-stretching impact. 
Analysis of these two projects shows that they were based on the 
long-experience and detailed familiarity of their designers with 
virtually every facet of these mills, their operation, their design 
problems, faults and possibilities. This enabled an extremely precise, 
detailed and comprehensive combination of modifications to be 
introduced in both cases which systematically exploited the available 
equipment5 motor-horsepower, and space-available to the maximum 
extent at minimum extra investment cost, b/ 
The critical point in this example is the shift from an "ad-hoc" 
troubleshooting approach to a "systematic approach" which is made 
possible by the growth of familiarity with the process to be improved 
- this growth itself occurring due to the experience acquired in 
by plant staff operating the process and coping with the difficulties 
involved. 
a_/ Indeed as experience built up, this came to be ratio-
nalized as a specific design philosophy, stated as follows: 
"To go along, eliminating passes, redesigning rolls so as to 
minimize problems, to roll with greater cross section wherever 
possible, to try to minimize production halts and nuisances, and 
if possible to withdraw men because it is pretty unpleasant type 
of work involving risks of getting burnt; to go along making 
adjustments in the elements or accessories of the mill which bring 
you problems". 
Source: Acindar Report (Draft Thesis Version), p. 9.25. 
b/ Both projects are described in detail in the Acindar 
Report (Draft Thesis Version) pp. 9.34 to 9.37. 
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This shift from an "ad-hoc" to a systematic approach based 
on growing process familiarity was clearly observed in all our steel-
plants. For example, in the AHMSA Report, we find the following 
passage which describes the sequence of events after 1971 when the 
firm acquired a great deal of sophisticated "best-practice" new 
technology (including BOF technology) for the first time: 
"The degree of foreign technological dependence increases during 
the guarantee period because during this time any operational 
problem with the technology must be directly resolved by the 
suppliers. Once this period is over, a period of learning is 
necessary so as to get to know deeply about the functioning of 
the process and the equipment, during which external assistance 
is sought sporadically. Finally, starting from this knowledge-
base, a process of trial and error is begun (without having 
a very solid theoretical basis ex-ante, but regularly generating 
one ex-post) in which the aim is to incrementally improve 
and optimize the operational routines laid down by the foreign 
equipment suppliers." a/ 
In other words, it requires a considerable period of prior 
familiarization and "trial and error", before plant staff develop 
a good understanding of the interplays and subtleties of the complex 
set of equipment and process parameters and variables that they ' 
control. So it is only to be expected that-early capacity-stretch-
ing efforts will be more ad-hoc than systematic, and that these early 
efforts will usually arise in the course of trying to keep the 
process going when it is faced with specific operational difficulties, 
rather than through unforced experimentation on potential improvements. 
This difference between "early" and "later" capacity-stretching 
is also borne out strongly by USIMINAS's experience. For example, 
in the sinter section 
"the initial effort was devoted to learning about the basic process 
itself, particularly the influence of various physical and 
chemical qualities of the process. As these were learned, 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 24 
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greater efforts were directed at controlling the basic 
characteristics of the raw materials- In large part this 
involved reaction to the variations in these qualities in 
the raw materials received. (Reactions to external fluctua-
tions). Third, as more experience was gained, better methods 
were developed, including not only changes in raw materials 
used, their handling, preparation, weighing etc., but also of 
the-'process itself. To do this it was necesarry to not only 
modify or add various pieces of equipment but to develop new 
organizational methods.involving training, learning and studying 
various aspects of the process, a/ 
So we see that USIMINAS's experience confirms AHMSA's and Acindar' 
in showing why one would expect to find later capacity-stretching 
efforts are characterized by a more comprehensive, sophisticated - and 
"theory- intensive" approach than earlier ones. 
A further important characteristic of "later" capacity-stretching 
efforts was also detected in the case-studies. This has to do with 
the problem that as the more "obvious" capacity-stretching steps 
are taken, any further stretching will often depend on extending 
efforts to hitherto neglected components and aspects of the process. 
For example a "saturation" of this kind was detected in USIMINAS's 
steelshop, where if one reads through the list of measures being 
considered by the company for its "fourth wave" of capacity-stretching 
in this steelshop, what is striking is the cumulative number and 
range of the efforts being considered and the number of components 
identified for improvement. (These included changed operating 
practices in charging the converters, redimensioned ingot moulds, 
special refractory bricks for scrap and steel-run-sites, new systems 
of inventories of spares, increased oxygen injection, holding extra 
pig iron reserves to insure against production halts, and improvements 
in calcination.) b/ What is reflected here is that USIMINAS 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p 
b/ USIMINAS Report, pp. 172-3. 
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apparently wanted "n© stone left unturned" in their efforts to 
stretch capacity further and further towards inherent design limits, 
and therefore were prepared to systematically try to improve 
virtually every component of the process - a task which evidently 
required extensive prior familiarity with the process concerned. 
A similarly "comprehensive" approach to capacity-stretching -via 
revising literally every possible component- was also a feature 
of the two projects in the Acindar Rosario rolling mills mentioned 
earlier. 
A final point worth making whilst dealing with the theme of 
"systematic" capacity-stretching is that neither in Acindar, nor 
in USIMINAS was there any clear idea beforehand of just now much 
they would in fact be able to stretch capacity. So far as Acindar 
is concerned, back in the 1950s no-one conceived it possible, or 
thought of planning to stretch the Rosario plant's capacity to the 
extent that was finally achieved. The actual cumulative stretching 
finally achieved was the unplanned outcome of a long series of efforts 
carried out successively given the reiterative blocking of conventional 
options. 
As for USIMINAS, as late as 1969 its Annual Report spoke of 
the achieved steel production level of 790,000 tons as the 
"maximum probable production" that could be obtained with its existing 
installations - and then went on in succeeding years to stretch 
this level up to nearly 1,200,000 tons, a/ 
This suggests that both Acindar and USIMINAS (and quite 
probably AHMSA too) ' "-. underestimated the terrific possibilities 
that actually existed for capacity-stretching. That they in fact 
achieved so much seems greatly due to adverse historical circum-
stances which made it economically urgent for them to stretch their 
plants to a high degree. In other words it seems that"historical 
jolts" (or sets of jolts) helped these firms to wake up to the 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 127 
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full-potential for capacity-stretching in their plants. Without 
these jolts (which involved mainly the blocks and delays in con-
ventional expansion plans) it is doubtful if they would have been 
so systematic or successful. 
This completes our survey of "ad-hoc" versus "systematic" 
methods of introducing capacity-stretching technical changes. Our 
survey has not been comprehensive -for space reasons- and, in 
particular, we have not mentioned several importart organizational 
steps which our firms took in order to reinforce their internal 
capability to identify and implement capacity-stretching and other 
changes (e.g. the setting up of a "standard-cost" system, a/ and 
the setting up or reinforcing of several technical departments 
within the plants). However, enough has been said to show that 
our plants were able to develop a number of systematic approaches 
to capacity-stretching. These ranged from the systematic scanning 
and exploitation of information from other plants and the use of 
external technical assistance, through to the executing of 
comprehensive process modifications based on plant staff's mastery 
of process know-how that they acquired through experience. 
So in addition to demonstrating the existence of several 
"generic" capacity stretching techniques common to all the plants 
the case-studies also demonstrate some ways in which the firms 
were able to exploit these techniques in a systematic way. 
a/ "Such capacity stretching (in the first 10 years of 
USIMINAS) was possible thanks to the implementation of a standard 
cost system with an elaborate organizational infrastructure to 
study its existing equipment, compare it to the best world 
performance, and then try to reach the same or higher levels." 
USIMINAS Report, p. 263; for details of the implementation of the 
standard cost-system see USIMINAS Report, p.p. 211-213. 
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6 . SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In the previous pages -Sections 1 to 5 of this chapter- we have sought 
to describe salient features of "capacity-stretching" observed 
in the steel plant case-studies. 
The main points which emerged were: 
1) the great quantitative extent of capacity stretching 
2) the fact that its implementation at low investment cost w a s TO 
a significant extent fuelled by the blocking or delaying 
of conventional output expansion plans. 
3) ther' were also many other kinds of incentives to capacity 
-stretching, which together with the "multiplier effect" 
of the bottleneck-imbalance incentive, help account for the 
"pervasiveness" of capacity-stretching projects that we noted 
in the plants. 
4) capacity-stretching was often the priority objective involved 
in carrying out technical changes, and cannot be considered 
as always a subsidiary objective related to cost-reduction; 
it has legitimate status as an independent category of 
technical change, though its complementarity to cost-reduc-
tion certainly deserves exploration. 
5) there appears to exist a "generic" set of methods for 
stretching capacity, whose use was common across all the 
plants and technologies within the plants; this is 
intelligible from an engineering viewpoint; however process 
-complexities and marked plant idiosyncracies mean that 
it was not a simple matter to apply these generic methods 
because straightforward copying of techniques used in other 
plants is not viable in this industry. 
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6) both "ad-hoc" and more "systematic" approacnes to Gtittchir.g 
capacity were detected in the study - the latter being 
closely related to gaining familiarity and knowledge about 
process variables and how to control them; also some 
systematic ways of exploiting information from other plants 
and from external technical assistance were noted; 
finally it was observed that at least two of our plants 
had initially greatly underestimated the extent of capacity 
-stretching that they would be able to achieve. 
Although these above results are drawn from case-studies 
on just a few plants, we believe that the phenomenon they 
describe -i.e. capacity-stretching- is a widespread one in 
steel-plants, which deserves to explicit recognition in the 
planning process. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4. 
Table 4.A.1 Production figures from the USIMINAS BOF Steel Shop N°1 
1963 - 1972 





1967 570,052 57,8 27.0 67.6 % 
1968 649,167 58.5 30.4 78.4 % 
1969 790,914 65.1 35.2 84.3 % 
1970 850,235 67.9 36.0 86.9 % 
1971 950,040 70.2 38.2 87.1 % 
1972 1,179,296 71.9 .'46.0 94.6 % 
Source: USIMINAS Report, Vol. II, p. 136. 
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Table 4.A.2. Capacity increases in AHMSA Siemens Martin furnaces, 1963-1973. 
Three small furnaces — Five large furnaces — 
(Average.per furnace) (Average per furnace) 
YEARS Heats/day—^ Tons/heat—^ Tons/day Heats/day—7' Tons/heat—^ Tons/day 
1963 1.79 126.93 227.2 2.20 178.43 392.5 
1964 1.70 130.40 221.7 2.33 186.28 434.0 
1965 1.78 128.46 228.7 2.18 200.10 436.2 
1966 2.00 130.49 261.0 2.30 224.24 515.8 
1967 2.51 127.47 319.9 2.22 211.70 470.0 
1968 2.68 127.47 341.6 2.50 215.75 539.4 
1969 2.75 130.59 358.8 2.59 218.85 566.8 
1970 2.87 131.21 376.6 2.69 221.49 595.8 
1971 2.95 132.24 390.1 2.64 219.31 579.0 
1972 2.84 136.10 386.5 2.75 220.55 606.5 
1973 2.80 146.52 410.2 2.65 222.89 590.7 
1974 2.76 143.39 395.8 2.56 220.09 563.4 
1975 2.77 145.90 404.1 2.56 221.80 567.8 
1976 2.76 148.16 408.9 2.57 221.80 570.0 
1977 2.58 150.35 387.9 2.41 223.29 538.1 
Source: AHMSA Report, pages 102 and 226. 
a/ These three furnaces were installed in 1944, 1945 and 1947 and their 
current (1977) capacities were nominally rated at 135 tons per heat. (See AHMSA 
Report, p.67). 
b/ These five furnaces were installed in 1953, 1957, 1960, 1960 and 1964. 
Their current (1977) capacities were nominally rated at 255, 215, 225, 225 and 
225 tons per heat respectively. 
c/ Average of first three columns of Table N°9, AHMSA Report, p. 102. 
d/ Average of columns four to eight of Table N°9, AHMSA Report, p.102. 
e_/ Average of first three columns of table in AHMSA Report, p.226. 
fj Average of columns four to eight of table in AHMSA Report, p. 226. 
171 

s _ wmmu Agggegg m e m ? wwm^& 
This chapter pravidGg briefD saisiy impressionistic0 evideaec on soae • 
other aspects e£ plaat ypgradisg beyoad the "capacity seretefoiag1" diaensioa 
discussed in the previous chapter0 
Taken in conjunction with the previous chapter,, it reinforces the view 
that plant upgrading^ and the cumulation of minor technical changes which make 
it possible,, should be considered as centrale, not marginal features in the 
techno-economics of steel plant development^ in spite of the "low visibility" 
of individual piecemeal changes» 
5.1 The Low Visibility.of Plant Upgrading in thé Literature 
One of the curious features of plant upgrading - considering its great 
importance - is how little this phenomenon is explicitly recognised or 
dealt with in engineering or economics literature» 
Engineering consulting literatures for examples typically refers only 
to various subdivisions of what we have called the "gestation period" and 
usually does not specifically identify a succeeding phase of plant upgrading 
or improvement during which several plant performance parameters may be 
improved beyond initially rated levels» In economics literature^ plant 
upgrading has also been a' rather neglected subjec£s though work by Enos(1958)s 
Hollander (1965) and Katz (1973s 1976) did at least help put it on the map.-'' 
"Consideration of investments at various plants suggests that relatively small 
investment expenditures incorporating modifications to existing plants are 
capable of generating large improvements in efficiency» Such improvements are 
sometimes sufficient to permit an older plant to produce at unit costs which 
are not substantially higher ... than those at a newly constructed plant 
embodying the latest technology"» Hollander (1965) 
This "low visibility" of plant upgrading in the literature is probably 
largely due to the fact that upgrading efforts mostly involve the piecemeal 
accumulation of quite minor technical changes, none of which individually 
seem very remarkable. This is in marked contrast to the high visibility 
of the changes that get introduced in the gestation period when an entire 
new plant or major expansion is put up. 
Indeed, evidence from interviews with engineers in some of our sample 
of steelplants shows that sometimes minor technical changes pass unhailed 
and unrecorded even inside the plants themselves. 
This is well illustrated in the following remark of an Acindar engineer 
who said that: 
"Often, with small changes - 'the ant's progress', we call it -
we just try to carry them out, and very few people even get to hear 
of it. It's not something you'd mention to the higher-ups in th^ 
company. After all, it's not for hanging a medal on anybody." — 
In effect then minor "small-beer" technical changes carry little prestige 
they are not "good public relations" in the same way that a brand new oxygen 
converter is to journalists or politicians. As a result, their ¿reat economic 
significance, of which we have been able to offer some instances in this 
case-study, is not fully appreciated. 
Further evidence of the neglected status of minor technical changes 
emerges from the Altos Hornos de Mexico case-study, from which ve draw the 
following extract:-
a/ From an interview by the author in Acindar's Rosario plant. 
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"In the plaafe wo víMteáp to Smmk c\ 'Aat'50 uuwbos 
incremental (mlmr) «Sodmieaü eta ago o ¿a ooefo of tho 
different sections'af eho a'¿Qat0 00 ssuefc so that it 
would require aa excessively long doeumeat to narrate 
each one of them acá their effects on plant productivity. 
Nevertheless, in spite of their- importance^ aa outstanding 
and surprising discovery was that on only a few occasions 
was there any written information on what the problem 
was, how it was resolvedB and the results« .These types 
of changes are generally implemented with the active 
participation of the plant's operations and maintenance 
personnel^ whop on most-occasions did not consider what 
they had done to be of special importances and whos once 
the problem was resolved^ considered that they had more 
important and urgent things to do than to sit down and 
write about solutions already achieved» What we wish to 
emphasize is the tremendous significance for our country 
(Mexico) of the fact that these innovative efforts are 
not getting duly publicised even within the firm that 
generates thems thus losing the benefits from diffusion 
of this knowledge» But even more serious are the costs 
which this procedure generates¡, because the fact that 
the information is embodied in physical persons means 
one has to start again from zero when the same problem 
crops up again if these people for any reasons abandon 
the firm concerned» 1/ 
Economists9 too5 have neglected minor innovations - as can easily be 
proved by consulting the economic literature on innovation in the steel 
2/ industry m the last fifteen years»-— Legislators have paid even less 
3/ attention to the phenomenon than economists»— 
Howeverg although minor technical changes may be individually relatively 
insignificantj they may "be cumulatively very important» We have already 
1/ Luis Alberto Perezs A Summary of the Principal Findings of the Case-Study 
' on the Technological Behávióúr óf the Mexican Stéél Fii^ m¿ Altos Hornos de 
Mexico, IDB/CEPAL Seminar» 6-10 November0 19780 Buenos Aires» 
2/ The literature contains several studies of major "breakthrough" innovations 
such as the oxygen converter9 continuous casting and direct reduction, but 
neglects minor and incremental innovations» 
37 "The Latin American systems of industrial property do not support^ in general, 
the results of adaptive activities or minor inventions"^ Carlos Correa and 
Eduardo Whites El Marco Jurídico de la Innovación Tecnologica an America Latina 
(The Legislative Framework for Technological Innovation in Latin America), 
Vol. 1, BID/CEPAL/BA/X5, p.28. 
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discussed the evidence for this in regard to the stretching of the capacity 
of the steelplants beyond rated levels (see Ch. A). Moreover, capacity 
-stretching was by no means the only dimension of upgrading in the plants 
we studied, as will now be seen from the material presented in the next 
section. 
5.2 The Multiple Objectives of Minor Technical Changes 
A broad range of objectives were involved in the minor technical 
changes introduced to upgrade the steel plants, going beyond just cost 
reduction and capacity stretching, to include improved end-product quality, 
changed input quality and input mix", and diversification of the product 
mix. These various objectives were important both as independent priority 
objectives in their own right, and as secondary objectives (or spin-offs) 
of technical changes carried out with other priority objectives in mind. 
The reader is referred back to Table 4.3, (a detailed Classification 
of the Objectives of 54 Acindar R & D Projects) for a clear illustration 
of the variety of objectives involved. Documentation of several different 
a/ 
objectives of minor technical change is contained in the AHMSA study.— 
Also, many examples of minor technical changes involving objectives other 
than just cost-reduction or capacity stretching can be found in the USIMINAS 
s tudy.—^ 
The introduction of these minor technical changes was by no means a 
a/ AHMSA Study, p. 71-86 
b/ USIMTNAS Study, pp. 58-65, pp. 147-182 
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"rare" or "marginal" activity 1« the p i n t , ve studied.^ Rath«, it w 
a pervasive activity going on all the time in most of the plants once 
started up. 
This evidence of the importance of minor technical changes and their 
range of different objectives in the plants studied gives occasion for a • 
brief theoretical aside: 
In the past, it has been conventional for economists to portray 
technology as being "frozen" into a world of specific techniques defined 
as fixed, singular points on a production function. However the world 
visualised by steelplant engineers is much more flexible. Engineers tend 
to view any particular technique or set of equipment as being capable 
of being operated within a rather wide margin of possible performance 
levels. Just how wide this margin is, will depend on (i) the particular 
production "mission" which the equipment is called on to fulfill (which 
may change), (ii) the particular working conditions to which the equipment 
will be subjected in normal operation, and (iii) the degree to which it 
may be possible to adapt the particular equipment and/or working conditions 
so as to obtain better performance from the equipment in the fulfillment of 
a 
its existing mission. Hence, from an engineering viewpoint, a "technique" 
is not nearly such a fixed entity as an economist's conventional representation 
of it would suggest. Techniques are, on the contrary, often highly flexible 
and, within limits, improvable, so that it is difficult for any static, 
non-chronological representation to capture what to engineers is a technique's 
most central attribute. 
a/ In Acindar even though minor "upgrading" type, technical changes tended to 
involve only minor incremental investments even so, they amounted cumulatively 
to some 25% of Acindar's overall investments in plant and equipment. 
(Maxwell (1982), p. 103 
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5.3 The Profitability of Minor Technical Changes 
Whilst we made no systematic study of profitability, some qualitative 
evidence from the case-studies suggested that minor technical changes 
introduced in both plants had been rather profitable. For instance, in 
Acindar's Rosario plant, considerable stretching of the plant's billet 
production capacity - which permitted increased sales by Acindar and higher 
utilisation of capacity in the Acevedo plant - was achieved by the introduction 
of minor technical changes at very low investment cost. In Acindar's 
Acevedo plant, analysis of a sample of 31 improvement phase investment 
projects showed short expected payback periods averaging around 2 years 
a/ 
for most of the projects analysed.— Furthermore, according to interview 
data, payback periods of less than 3 years and often less than 1 year were 
expected and considered the norm by Acindar's directors for investments 
involving minor improvement phase technical changes - in marked contrast 
to expected payback periods of 6 years or more on major new acquisition 
phase investments. 
This is a significant finding, because if minor technical changes are 
very profitable, there may be a case for steelplant managements to invest 
more in such changes than they are currently doing. In other words, 
managements might be underinvesting in minor technical change in terms 
of their own profit maximisation objectives; this could include under-
investing in absolute terms, or relative to what is invested in major new 
technology acquisitions. 
a/ See Maxwell (1981), Appendix 9 
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Apart from this hypothesis about underinvestment in minor technical 
changes, our case-studies also suggested some reasons why minor technical 
changes may turn out to be highly profitable, and in consequence deserving 
of special attention by steel firms. These can be seen in the situations 
depicted in Figs. 1 and 2. The common element in these two situations 
is that they involve a minor technical change which (a) is achieved by 
adding A K to the initial capital stock K.^  where A K is small compared 
with and (b) has the effect that the plant achieves a notable increase 
in its output to capital /ratio as a result. 
In the first case, described in Fig. 1, the output to capital ratio 
is first adversely affected by a situation exogenous to the plant. The 
cause shown is a decline in demand for an existing product line, but an 
equally plausible cause would have been a shortfall in the supply of a 
key raw material used by the plant. The minor technical change explained 
in the figure then has the function of restoring this ratio to something 
closer to its previous value.—' 
In the second case, described in Fig. 2, a "bottleneck-breaking" 
minor technical change is shown which succeeds in raising the output to 
capital ratio from its previous value to an improved one. This kind of 
minor technical change is" often highly profitable because the relatively 
small investment needed to improve the particular component or substage 
which represents the bottleneck then unleashes - as it were - the surplus 
If we had shown the short supply of raw material case rather than the 
demand-decline case, then the technical change required would have been 
one which adapted the plant to make use of a different type or quality of 
raw material so as to make up for the shortfall in the previously used one. 
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0 to t. The plant 1« producing quantity Q. of product A whose 
price Is using Installed Initial capital K.. out-
put to capital ratio * and the ratio of the economic 
value of output to installed capital is C^P^/X^ • 
t^ to t^ During this period demand for product A declines In 
favour of product B, which sells at price (it might, 
for example, be a sooevhat too re sophisticated or higher-
quality version of product 10 • Bowever, we aisuae that 
the plant cannot ¿¿¡mediately produce product B because 
either some a dap ration is needed to one of the existing 
processing stages, or because the addition of an extra 
processing stage is required. So output during this 
period falls to (1 - n>Gj' Cxn<l, and the out-
put-capital ratio declines accordingly. Meanwhile work 
Is starred at tlae t^  -on the needed adaptations to 
produce B, and these require the addition of AX to the 
capital stock« where LK. Is quite small compared with 
At time t j the needed adaptation to produce product B is 
complete, and the plant begins producing an output mix 
t 2 t o t , 
consisting of (1 - n)Q. 
the ratio of the economic value of the plant' i 
its installed capital then rises sharply from 
units of A plus Qg units of B. 
—*• ~ output to 
ci - »»«„V*; (i - "ìqaPa * e, 5~ 3. 
X. I &X 
Ratio of the 
soles value 





Figure 1. Technical change to counteract a demand decline for an 
existing product by diversifying the product mix. 
tj f * plant Is producing at full capacity output 
Output-capi tal ratio - • 
1 to 2 Desand at t, Is known to exceed the plant's full capacity supply» <!_.. "which is lisitad to this value by a bottleneck 
In one of"the plant's process stages. Work is started at 
involving an additional investment, 
esali compared with Jt.. LZ, which is relatively 
tj to t3 At tlae t2 the adaptation .(i.e. bottleneck-breaking) is 
complete and the plant's capacity and output both increase 
considerably to (1 * "id. (where.'in nost cases, 
- O.OS01O.S). The output-capital ratio now rises to 








Figure .2. Technical change to stretch plant capacity by relieving 
a bottleneck. 
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capacity which is already built into the other components or stages of the 
process. So the indremental output to capital ratio AQ/AK involved in 
bottleneck-breaking can easily be far higher than the original full-capacity 
output to capital ratio Q./K.. Bottleneck-breaking in these circumstances i i 
is then a low-cost way of stretching a plant5s capacity and hence a highly 
1/ profitable means of coping with demand increases.— 
5.4 The Significance of Minor Technical Changes 
Broadly speaking, the above-mentioned findings on minor technical 
changes combine into the following picture of their significance, on 
the assumption that one.can generalise from the-experience of the plants 
we studied. 
(1) Minor technical changes seem often to permit plants to respond 
to adverse factor market, market and production developments 
by restoring output to capital ratios (capacity utilisation 
ratios) to values resembling those obtained; before the adverse 
developments set in - i.e. minor technical changes can often 
enable plants to quite cheaply avoid the severe economic 
penalties inherent in low rates of capacity utilisation caused 
by factor market imperfections, competition, and demand changes, 
of production problems. 
(2) In addition, minor technical changes enable firms to take 
1/ The importance of bottleneck-breaking in industrial plants and processes 
was signalled early on by Rosenberg (1969). A pioneering paper offering 
an economic model of innovation to deal with bottlenecks is Teubal (1978). 
Bottleneck-breaking in Argentine petrochemical plants is examined empirically 
in Sercovich (1978b), and there is some discussion of the theme for U.S. 
chemical plants in Levin (1974). 
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advantage of the many upgrading possibilities that are 
"built in" to a plant's initial technological profile - e.g. 
surplus capacities in many, production stages, flexibility to 
produce a wider range of products, flexibility to adapt to a 
wider range of raw materials, or to produce higher-quality 
products, etc. ' 
We infer that a plant which can invest in, and implement, minor 
technological changes will be able both to respond to many adverse 
developments in the improvement phase and to exploit its technology's 
inherent upgrading possibilities so as to lower costs, stretch capacity 
to supply increased demand, improve product quality, etc. 
Conversely, we infer that a plant with a zero or very low capacity 
to invest in or implement minor technical changes is exceptionally vulnerable 
to adverse developments which will leave it with low-capacity utilisation, 
poor-quality products, static or declining productivity, and an inflexible 
product range. 
The conclusion is that since minor technical changes are apparently 
both necessary and profitable in steelplants so as to upgrade and adapt 
them, plant managements might be well advised to give explicit and systematic 
attention to their organisation, generation and incorporation, rather than 
relying on just an ad-hoc defensive approach. 
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Ch 6. From' "Defensive" to ,890f ChangerSt:r a t ogy_ 
Henceforth we shall take for granted the importance of upgrading steel-
plants through introducing technical changes into them® The purpose of this 
chapter is to present an hypothesis by Rosenberg to the effect that firms 
tend to introduce technical change "defensively" = as this hypothesis will be 
helpful in suggesting an analytical framework in which to cast our case-study 
results about how steelplant organizations meet the challenge involved xn 
introducing technical change. Then we shall contrast the essentially "defensive 
approach of Acindar with the ;more "offensive" approach of US THIN AS and draw 
some conclusions» 
6.1 The Rosenberg hypothesis 
Briefly, Rosenberg's hypothesis is that most firms do not possess anything 
like an "innate innovative animus" (our expression), hut introduce technical 
changes as a defensive response when forced by circumstances into doing so. 
As Rosenberg puts it 
"It is possible.... that threats of deterioration of 
actual deteriorations from some previous state are 
more powerful attention focussing devices than are 
vague possibilities for improvement. (. „ „ ) There may 
be psychological reasons why a worsening state of 
affairs, or its prospect, galvanizes those affected 
into a more positive and decisive response than do 
potential movements to improved states'® T/. 
Expressed in other words, what Rosenberg is suggesting is a 
distinction between unforced i.e. "offensive" technical changes 
forced Is."defensive" technical changes. "Offensive" technical 
changes represent active initiatives taken by a firm designed 
1/ N Rosenberg "The Direction of Technical Changes Inducement Mechanisms and 
Focussing Devices", Economic Development and Cultural"Change, October 1969» 
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t o i m p r o v e i t s p o s i t i o n e v e n t h o u g h t h e f i r m i s u n d e r no i m m e d i a t e 
p r e s s u r e t o do s o and c o u l d q u i t e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e m a i n o p e r a t i n g 
w i t h i t s e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e s f o r some t i m e . " D e f e n s i v e " t e c h n i c a l 
c h a n g e s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , a r e t h o s e w h i c h o c c u r when t h e f i r m 
i s s u d d e n l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h an a c t u a l o r i m m e d i a t e l y t h r e a t e n e d _ 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n i t s e x i s t i n g modus o p e r a n d i ( s u c h a s s e r i o u s 
f a l l - o f f s i n d e m a n d , s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e d c o m p e t i t i o n , p r o d u c t i o n 
b r e a k d o w n s , c u t o f f s i n n o r m a l raw m a t e r i a l s s u p p l i e s e t c . ) 
w h i c h c a l l s f o r an u r g e n t r e m e d i a l r e s p o n s e t o b e m o u n t e d i f 
s e r i o u s e c o n o m i c l o s s e s t o t h e f i r m a r e n o t t o e n s u e . I n s u c h 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i f a f i r m d o e s n o t h i n g , o r c a n n o t p u t t o g e t h e r 
an a d e q u a t e i n n o v a t i v e r e s p o n s e , t h e n c l e a r e c o n o m i c p e n a l t i e s 
w i l l e n s u e . The f i r m i s t h e r e f o r e v i r t u a l l y " f o r c e d " i n t o t r y i n g 
t o i n t r o d u c e t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s . 
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T h e R o s e n b e r g h y p o t h e s i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t o n e i n 
t h e c o n t e x t o f s t e e l p l a n t s b e c a u s e t h e e n o r m o u s t h e r m i c and 
m e c h a n i c a l s t r e s s e s i n v o l v e d i n s t e e l m a k i n g , c o u p l e d t o t h e 
s y c h r o n i z e d , m u l t i - s t a g e d n a t u r e o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s , 
m e a n s t h a t s t e e l p l a n t s a r e e x c e p t i o n a l l y v u l n e r a b l e t o b r e a k d o w n s 
a n d t o c o n s t a n t l y e m e r g i n g b o t t l e n e c k s i n p r o d u c t i o n o r i n raw 
m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t t r o u b l e i s c o n s t a n t l y b r e a k i n g 
o u t i n one o r m o r e p a r t s o f t h e l i n e o r s u p p l i e s , and r e q u i r e s 
a c o n s t a n t t a s k o f m a i n t e n a n c e , r e p a i r s , i m p r o v i s a t i o n and m o d i -
f i c a t i o n s t o k e e p t h i n g s g o i n g . I n s h o r t , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t 
r u n s t e e l p l a n t s a r e c o n s t a n t l y e n g a g e d i n " t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g " a n d 
i n t h e c o n s e q u e n t " d e f e n s i v e " i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e . 
I n d e e d , w i l l y - n i l l y , s t e e l p l a n t e n g i n e e r s , t e c h n i c i a n s 
a n d men f i n d t h e y h a v e t o l e a r n how t o " t r o u b l e s h o o t " i f t h e i r 
p l a n t i s t o b e k e p t g o i n g . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o f i n d i n g good c o r r o b o r a t i o n i n t h e s t e e l p l a n t 
c o n t e x t ( b e c a u s e a g r e a t d e a l o f t h e o b s e r v e d i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e i n s t e e l p l a n t s t u r n s o u t t o b e d e f e n s i v e ) , 
R o s e n b e r g ' s h y p o t h e s i s h a s a l s o s u g g e s t e d t o u s a f r a m e w o r k f o r 
a n a l y s i n g s t e e l p l a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h i s f r a m e w o r k c o n s i s t s i n 
e x a m i n i n g a g i v e n o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s c a p a b i l i t y t o i n t r o d u c e t e c h n i c a l 
c h a n g e s b o t h " d e f e n s i v e l y " (when u n d e r i m m e d i a t e p r e s s u r e ) a n d 
"effeasively" (when the innevatien repreyeitis a deyiraMa but 
unforced improvement). 
In such a framework one can incorporate the idea of a process 
of organizational maturing-over-time,, indicated by the gradual 
shift away from a purely defensive towards an increasingly 
offensive capability in introducing technical changes. This in 
turn suggests the need to probe into what specific organizational 
steps, tactics and strategies made such a shift possible, and 
into what factors may have delayed or accelerated this process 
of organizational maturing. 
This framework -consisting of looking at organizational 
maturity with respect to the defensive/ offensive dimension in 
introducing technical chanee- is the one we shall ador»t 4selow_-
in contrasting the kinds of technical changes introduced by two of the 
plants in the case—studies. 
6.2 "Defensive" Technical Change in Acindar, Rosario 
Acindar's Rosario plant was recognised as obsolete in the mid 1950s, 
but it was not scrapped until 1977 because (as explained in Ch. 4, Section 3.1) 
Acindar repeatedly found it necessary to keep it going for security of supply 
reasons. The firm's alternative projects to produce billets at lower 
cost by "integrating" their other more modern rolling plant with billet 
production facilities ran into trouble with the Argentine government steel 
planning authorities. However, since Acindar's directors always believed that 
their problems with the Argentine government would be solved in fairly short 
order (a belief which had some rational foundations), they always believed 
they would soon be closing their Rosario plant down. So, from the mid 50's 
through to 1977 it is fair to say that the Rosario plant was 
always under "suspended sentence of execution". Therefore, very 
little investment money was spent on it (compared to on Acindar' 
other steel plants), even though it had a vital role to play in 
servicing some 30% of the company's requirements for billets. 
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F u r t h e r m o r e , w h i l s t a l l t h e R o s a r i o p l a n t ' s s t a f f knew t h a t 
t h e a x e was l i a b l e t o f a l l a t a l m o s t any moment i n t h i s t w e n t y 
y e a r p e r i o d ( f r o m t h e m i d 5 0 s t o 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
o c c u r r e d t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h e p e r s i s t i n g b i l l e t s h o r t a g e s a f f l i c t i n g 
t h e A r g e n t i n e s t e e l i n d u s t r y , f r e q u e n t demands w e r e made on t h e 
R o s a r i o p l a n t t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r b i l l e t o u t p u t on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , 
s o a s t o s q u e e z e a s much o u t p u t a s p o s s i b l e f r o m t h e p l a n t ' s 
o b s o l e t e i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e t h e p l a n t was a l s o r e q u i r e d t o " u p g r a d e " i t s s t e e l 
o u t p u t i n t o t h e s p e c i a l ( q u a l i t y ) s t e e l s f i e l d t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
e x t e n t i n t h e e a r l y s i x t i e s , and a g a i n , t o some e x t e n t i n t h e e a r l y 
s e v e n t i e s . 
So t h i s was a p l a n t f r e q u e n t l y s u b j e c t e d t o h e a v y e x o g e n o u s 
( e x t e r n a l ) demands f r o m company h e a d q u a r t e r s t o i n t r o d u c e 
p e r f o r m a n c e i n c r e a s i n g t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e p l a n t 
w a s o b s o l e t e , u n d e r s u s p e n d e d s e n t e n c e o f e x e c u t i o n , and s u b j e c t e d 
b y HQ t o a l o w i n v e s t m e n t r e g i m e ! 
One m i g h t i m a g i n e t h a t , i n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e R o s a r i o 
p l a n t ' s e n g i n e e r s w o u l d h a v e p e r m a n e n t l y g o n e a b o u t w i t h l o n g 
f a c e s , d e p r e s s e d , e x p e c t i n g t h e w o r s t , and d o n e a k i n d o f 
" e n g i n e e r i n g go s l o w " . 
B u t t h e o p p o s i t e i s t r u e . T h e r e s e e m s t o h a v e b e e n a k i n d 
o f g r o w i n g l o c a l p r i d e w h i c h had t h e e f f e c t t h a t , , t o ward o f f 
t h e r e p e a t e d t h r e a t s t o t h e i r s u r v i v a l , t h e R o s a r i o t e c h n i c a l 
t e a m came up a g a i n and a g a i n w i t h i n g e n i o u s l o w - c o s t t e c h n i c a l 
s o l u t i o n s t o n o t j u s t k e e p t h e p l a n t g o i n g , b u t a l s o t o i m p r o v e 
i t s p e r f o r m a n c e o v e r t i m e b v a l o n g s e r i e s o f p i e c e m e a l i m p r o v e m e n t s . 
(as we noted in th. 4) . 
M o s t n o t a b l y , t h e y c u m u l a t i v e y m a n a g e d / t o " s t r e t c h " t h e c a p a c i t y 
o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s by 130% i n t h e c a s e o f t h e b i l l e t 
m i l l , b e t w e e n 66% and 1 3 0 1 f o r t h e i r o p e n h e a r t h f u r n a c e s , and 
70% for their commercial rolling mill. 
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In fact, there is no. ' doubt t h a t t h e Rosario c a s e provides . 
multiple examples of what we called earlier "defensive" technical 
changes, introduced under pressure, the cumulative effect of which 
-was substantial. 
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y , t o o , t h e r e i s c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t some o f 
t h e m a j o r c h a n g e s ' i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e R o s a r i o p l a n t ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w e r e o f t h e " d e f e n s i v e " v a r i e t y . T h i s c l e a r l y a p p l i e d t o t h e 
s e t t i n g up o f a g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d Q u a l i t y C o n t r o l d i v i s i o n i n 
t h e p l a n t i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 . What c a t a l y s e d t h i s c h a n g e w a s t h e 
i m p e n d i n g s t a r t up o f t h e s t a t e s t e e l p l a n t SOMISA, w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d 
t o t a k e away much o f A c i n d a r ' s m a r k e t i n common s t e e l s . R e s u l t : -
t h e R o s a r i o p l a n t was now o b l i g e d t o s w i t c h a p p r e c i a b l y i n t o t h e 
p r o d u c t i o n o f q u a l i t y s t e e l s , f o r w h i c h a g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d 
q u a l i t y c o n t r o l d e p a r t m e n t w a s e s s e n t i a l . 
A s e c o n d c l e a r e x a m p l e o f how t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a n e x t e r n a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t c a t a l y s e d a " d e f e n s i v e " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e i n t h e 
R o s a r i o p l a n t i s p r o v i d e d b y t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a c a s h s h o r t a g e i n 
A c i n d a r i n 1 9 6 8 / 6 9 . What h a p p e n e d was t h a t i n t h e s e years A c i n d a r 
h a d v e r y f e w f u n d s a v a i l a b l e f o r i n v e s t m e n t - f a r l e s s t h a n i n 
n o r m a l y e a r s d u e t o some s i g n i f i c a n t b u s i n e s s l o s s e s . >Iow t h i s 
w a s a s i t u a t i o n w h i c h h a d o c c u r r e d f o r r e a s o n s e x t e r n a l t o t h e 
- R o s a r i o p l a n t . H o w e v e r t h e e f f e c t s o f t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e 
R o s a r i o p l a n t w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l b e c a u s e t h e c a s h s h o r t a g e made 
i t i m p o s s i b l e t o r e p l a c e many e s s e n t i a l w o r n p a r t s a n d m a c h i n e r y . 
T h e r e s u l t w a s t h a t b y 1 9 6 9 t h i s h a d l e d t o a n o t a b l y i n c r e a s e d 
i n c i d e n c e o f m a c h i n e r y b r e a k d o w n s and s t o p p a g e s o f p r o d u c t i o n i n 
t h e p l a n t . T h i s i n t u r n t h e n p r o v o k e d t h e u r g e n t n e e d t o i n t e n s i f y 
p r e v e n t i v e m a i n t e n a n c e p r o ^ c e d j a r e s . j ^ t h e ^ g l a n t s o a s t o k e e p t h e 
m a c h i n e s r u n n i n g and avoid Darts / l e d t o f a r g r e a t e r a r t i c u l a t i o n 
a n d f o r m a l s t r u c t u r i n g o f t h e p r e v e n t i v e m a i n t e n a n c e f u n c t i o n • i n 
t h e p l a n t - i . e . t o an i m p o r t a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e . 
S o , i n t e r e s t i n g l y , we f i n d t h a t t h e r e a r e n o t o n l y " d e f e n s i v e " 
t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s , b u t a l s o " d e f e n s i v e " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e s i n 
s t e e l p l a n t s - t h e l a t t e r b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d u n d e r u r g e n t p r e s s u r e 
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which an organizational innovation is the appropriate management 
response. 
But what about "offensive" technical change in the Rosario 
plant ?. 
Here, the key result to emerge from the Rosario plant case-
study is that there was an important connection between the 
exercising of defensive capability and the subsequent emergence 
of offensive capability. 
Thus, for one thing, we noted how the strengthened quality 
control department and preventive maintenance department in the 
Rosario plant quickly became regular sources of ideas, suggestions 
and data for improving product quality and modifying machinery 
independent of particular, urgent needs to do so. In other words, 
although These departments got strengthened originally for 
defensive reasons, this very strengthening helped to equip the 
plant with greater "offensive" technical change capability. In 
fact, most of the new technical improvement suggestions made by 
these strengthened departments "were not even thought about when 
the original decisions to strengthen these departments were made. 
Additional evidence of a maturing process from defensive to 
offensive capability was gathered by looking at the 1970-71 
engineering modification project on the Rosario plant's commercial 
rolling mill - a highly profitable, efficient, and low-cost project 
entirely planned, designed, and executed by the plant's own 
technical staff. 
Here what happened is that, given their repeated historical 
exposure to successive survival crises, the plant's technical 
staff realised they ought to have something "up their sleeve" for 
when the next crisis came along. So they designed this engineering 
project for the rolling mill with one stage for immediate 
implementation and two further evolutive stages "standing by" for-_-
implementation at a moment's notice. Rather than simply responding 
to crisis, this staff had learned to engage in some active 
contingency planning : 
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But i t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o ask wh£ were the plant's t o e h n i c 
s t a f f . a b l e t o d e s i g n s u c h an e f f i c i e n t low c o s t project (and two 
f u r t h e r e v o l u t i v e s t a g e s ) a t t h a t p o i n t i n t i m e ? The e x p l a n a t i o n 
seems t o b e t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e o f many y e a r s o f p r e v i o u s 
" t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g " on t h i s r o l l i n g m i l l , t h e t e c h n i c a l s t a f f h a d 
b e c o m e h i g h l y f a m i l i a r w i t h e v e r y f a c e t o f t h e s e m i l l s , t h e i r 
o p e r a t i o n s , d e s i g n p r o b l e m s , f a u l t s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h e y w e r e 
t h u s e q u i p p e d n o t m e r e l y t o r e s p o n d t o c o n c r e t e d i f f i c u l t i e s - and 
d e m a n d s , b u t t o v i s u a l i s e how t o e x t e n d t h e m i l l ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s 
i n v a r i o u s new d i r e c t i o n s , w i t h o u t t h e p r i o r n e e d for some u r g e n t 
s i t u a t i o n t o p r o v o k e t h e i r i m a g i n a t i o n s i n t o a c t i o n * 
So b o t h t h e r e p e a t e d ' n e e d f o r d e f e n s e , and t h e f a m i l i a r i t y 
w i t h t h e t e c h n o l o g i e s i n v o l v e d w h i c h was b r e d b y s u c c e s s i v e 
d e f e n s e s , h e l p e d t h e s t a f f c o n c e r n e d t o s e e t h e n e e d f o r and h a v e 
t h e t o o l s f o r a more o f f e n s i v e a p p r o a c h . 
I n s u m m a r y , w h i l s t t h e R o s a r i o p l a n t c a s e i l l u s t r a t e s , 
p r o t o t y p i c a l l y , a l o n g s u c c e s s i o n o f e f f e c t i v e d e f e n s i v e m e a s u r e s 
t o i n t r o d u c e t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s t o c o p e w i t h c h a n g i n g e x t e r n a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h r e a t s t o i t s s u r v i v a l , i t a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s how 
t h i s l o n g d e f e n s i v e p r o c e s s l e d t h e p l a n t ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n t o m a t u r e 
b o t h i n t e r m s o f s t r e n g t h e n e d d e p a r t m e n t s and h e i g h t e n e d a w a r e n e s s 
and c a p a b i l i t y t o i n t r o d u c e t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e o f f e n s i v e l y . 
6.3 From Defensive to Offensive Technical Change in USIMINAS, Brasil 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e s m a l l - s c a l e and o b s o l e t e R o s a r i o p l a n t 
b e l o n g i n g t o A c i n d a r , t h e U s i m i n a s c a s e r e f e r s to one 
o f t h e g r e a t e s t s t e e l p l a n t s i n L a t i n A m e r i c a , a s w e l l a s t h e m o s t 
o u t s t a n d i n g l y s u c c e s s f u l a m o n g s t t h e c o n t i n e n t ' s s t a t e - r u n p l a n t s 
T h r e e m a i n s t a g e s c a n b e n o t e d i n U s i m i n a s ' e x i s t e n c e 
I 1 9 5 6 - 6 6 P l a n n i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n and s t a r t - u p o f t h e 
5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o n p e r annum p l a n t , u n d e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n 
o f Nippon S t e e l ( J a p a n ) e n g i n e e r s and m a n a g e r s . 
D u r i n g t h i s s t a g e , t h e B r a s i l i a n s l e a r n t h e r o p e s . 
* The following description is entirely based on the findings of Dahlman (1978) 
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J/ n 1166 = 72 Th© Brtillimi t&k© ever frem th© Japan©§©, but 
¿here- is an acute financial crisis in Usiminas due' 
to inflated construction costs coupled to the . 
Brasilian steel market recession, and controlled 
l o w . ' s t e e l p r i c e s . T h i s f o r c e s t h e company ( a ) 
t o u r g e n t l y s e e k e x p o r t m a r k e t s , f o r w h i c h 
h i g h e r s t e e l q u a l i t y , and q u a l i t y c o n t r o l , i s 
e s s e n t i a l , ( b ) t o s e e k t o e x p a n d t h e p l a n t ' s 
o u t p u t by s t r e t c h i n g t h e c a p a c i t y o f i t s i n s t a l l a t 
i o n s a t l o w e s t p o s s i b l e i n v e s t m e n t c o s t . ( d u e ' t o 
l a c k o f f u n d s ) - t h e p o i n t i s t h a t e x p a n d e d o u t p u t 
w i l l p e r m i t h i g h e r s a l e s , and l o w e r o v e r h e a d c o s t s . 
2 0 3 1 S 
B o t h t h e s e / l . e . h i g h e r q u a l i t y l e a d i n g t o e x p o r t s 
a n d g r e a t l y s t r e t c h e d p l a n t o u t p u t , a r e b r i l l i a n t l y 
a c h i e v e d b y U s i m i n a s t e c h n i c a l s t a f f . 
T h e l a t t e r g o a l i s a c h i e v e d v i a t h e c u m u l a t i o n o f 
s c o r e s o f p i e c e m e a l t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s i n t r o d u c e d 
i n t o t h e p l a n t b a s e d on o p e r a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e and 
a l s o on s y s t e m a t i c c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e p l a n t w i t h 
s i m i l a r p l a n t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t o s e e w h e r e U s i m i n a s ' 
p e r f o r m a n c e c o u l d b e i m p r o v e d . 
I l l 1 9 7 3 - 8 0 D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e company c a r r i e s t h r o u g h 
s u c c e s s f u l l y a v a s t programme o f e x p a n s i o n i n i t s 
o u t p u t f r o m j u s t o v e r 1 m i l l i o n t o n s p e r annum 
up t o 2 . 4 m i l l i o n t o n s and t h e n o v e r 3 m i l l i o n 
t o n s p e r annum. T h e s e e x p a n s i o n s a T e b a s e d m a i n l y 
on t h e p u r c h a s e o f new u n i t s t o add t o t h e p l a n t ' s 
e x i s t i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n s ; v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t d e s i g n and 
e n g i n e e r i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e s e e x p a n s i o n s a r e 
m a d e - b y U s i m i n a s ' own p r o j e c t e n g i n e e r i n g s t a f f , 
who i n f a c t t a k e o v e r c o m p l e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
t h e e x p a n s i o n t o a b o v e 3 m i l l i o n t o n s . 
N o t o n l y a r e U s i m i n a s ' s a m b i t i o u s e x p a n s i o n s 
a c h i e v e d on t i m e ( i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e o t h e r g i a n t 
B r a s i l i a n s t e e l p l a n t s , and s i m i l a r o n e s i n t h e 
r e s t o f L a t i n A m e r i c a ) , b u t t h e company a l s o b e g i n s 
t o o f f e r t e c h n o l o g y and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o 
o t h e r B r a s i l i a n and f o r e i g n s t e e l c o m p a n i e s . From 
i t s d e p e n d e n t p o s i t i o n on t h e J a p a n e s e i n S t a g e I , 
t h e company h a s p r o g r e s s e d t o b e i n g an e x p o r t e r o f 
t e c h n o l o g y a t t h e end o f S t a g e I I I . 
What we now do i s t o b r i e f l y a n a l y s e some a s p e c t s o f t h i s 
a b o v e r e c o r d w h i c h b e a r on the t h e m e o f t h e " d e f e n s i v e " v e r s u s 
" o f f e n s i v e " i n t r o d u c t i o n o^ t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e , and how t h e 
U s i m i n a s o r g a n i z a t i o n m a t u r e d i n t o one c a p a b l e o f o f f e n s i v e 
t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e . * 
a/ This period was described in more detail earlier in Ch. 4, Section 3.2 
* Again, we emphasize that this present account of the USIMINAS record is 
entirely b a c p H n n n a h l m a n f l Q 7 f l \ » w w • • M - n iiiiuii ^ i _/ s w y 
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So f a r a s S t a g e I i s c o n c e r n e d , l e a r n i n g f r o m t h e J a p a n e s e , 
two comments a r e a p p r o p r i a t e . F i r s t , Nippon S t e e l who w e r e 
U s i m i n a s ' s " t u t o r s " , w e r e l a t e r t o p r o v e t h e m s e l v e s t h e w o r l d s 
t o p s t e e l company i n t e r m s o f s i z e and a l l - r o u n d e f f i c i e n c y . 
T h e r e f o r e t h e B r a s i l i a n s w e r e l u c k y t o h a v e o u t s t a n d i n g t u t o r s - , 
y e t t h e y m u s t b e c o n g r a t u l a t e d f o r m a k i n g . w h a t ( a t t h a t t i m e i n 
1 9 5 6 ) was an u n c o n v e n t i o n a l c h o i c e . ( F o r i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n m o r e 
n o r m a l t o h a v e h a d U . S . , German o r B r i t i s h , r a t h e r t h a n J a p a n e s e 
p a r t n e r s ) . S e c o n d , U s i m i n a s was a v e r y a c t i v e l e a r n e r . R a t h e r 
t h a n j u s t s i t t i n g b a c k a n d l e t t h e J a p a n e s e r u n t h e p l a n t , t h e 
U s i m i n a s m a n a g e m e n t w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o make maximum u s e o f t h e i r 
l e a r n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and t h e y d i d s o . 
Coming now t o S t a g e I I , t h i s was a c l e a r l y " d e f e n s i v e " s t a g e , 
when t h e company w a s , l i t e r a l l y , f i g h t i n g f o r i t s f i n a n c i a l 
s u r v i v a l , and w h e n . t h e t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s n e e d e d t o i m p r o v e p r o d u c t 
q u a l i t y and s t r e t c h p l a n t c a p a c i t y a t low i n v e s t m e n t c o s t w e r e 
u r g e n t l y , i n d e e d d e s p e r a t e l y n e e d e d . The r e s u l t was a s e v e n y e a r • 
p e r i o d o f m a i n l y " d é f e n s i v e " t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e , i n w h i c h U s i m i n a s 
e n g i n e e r s and t e c h n i c a l s t a f f , l i k e i n t h e A c i n d a r R o s a r i o c a s e , 
p r o v e d e q u a l t o t h e c h a l l e n g e s e t t o t h e m . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t w o u l d 
a p p e a r t h a t i n t h e U s i m i n a s c a s e , t h e y e a r l y on d e v e l o p e d - e v e n 
w i t h i n t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y " d e f e n s i v e " t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s t r a t e g y -
a c l e a r l y more s y s t e m a t i c , o f f e n s i v e a p p r o a c h t h a n i n t h e A c i n d a r 
c a s e . F o r , on t h e one h a n d , t h e y o r g a n i z e d a s y s t e m a t i c c o m p a r i s o n 
o f how U s i m i n a s ' s p l a n t c o m p a r e d t o many o t h e r s i m i l a r p l a n t s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t o s e e e x a c t l y w h e r e t h e i r p l a n t c o u l d b e i m p r o v e d . 
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y made much more s y s t e m a t i c u s e t h a n d i d t h e 
A c i n d a r , R o s a r i o s t a f f , o f o u t s i d e t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e and 
o u t s i d e t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . 
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However i t i s r e a l l y i n S t a g e III, where we s e e t h e f u l l 
f o r c e o f U s i m i n a s ' " o f f e n s i v e " t e c h n i c a l c h a n g e s t r a t e g y d i s p l a y e d . 
And h e r e , t h e p o i n t o f c r i t i c a l i n t e r e s t t o o u r t h e m e i n t h i s 
p a p e r i s t h a t U s i m i n a s a c h i e v e d t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y t h r o u g h t h e 
a n t i c i p a t e d ( i . e . " o f f e n s i v e " ) b u i l d u p o f i t s own t e c h n i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . ' 
I n d e e d U s i m i n a s ' s m a n a g e m e n t had a l o n g t e r m s t r a t e g y f o r 
U s i m i n a s t o d e v e l o p , w i t h i n i t s own o r g a n i z a t i o n , s t r o n g 
c a p a b i l i t i e s i n w h a t was c a b l e d t h e f o u r s i d e s o f t h e " t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
p r i s m " - v i z . R e s e a r c h , E n g i n e e r i n g , E q u i p m e n t M a n u f a c t u r e , and 
P r o d u c t i o n . I t was a l s o r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e v e r y f a s t r a t e o f 
e x p a n s i o n p l a n n e d w o u l d r e q u i r e a g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d o r g a n i z a t i o n 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e v o t e d t o e x p a n s i o n , t o h a n d l e i t s u c c e s s f u l l y . * 
B a s e d on t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s by U s i m i n a s ' m a n a g e m e n t , t h e 
c a s e - s t u d y r e c o r d s t h e f o l l o w i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n n o v a t i o n s made 
b y U s i m i n a s , i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r . 
Y e a r T e c h n o l o g i c a l P r i s m E x p a n s i o n 
C o n c e p t C o n c e p t 
1967 T r a i n i n g o f P e r s o n n e l f o r 
R e s e a r c h C e n t e r b e g u n 
1968 C e n t e r f o r t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a 
t i o n s e t up 
M " E x p a n s i o n Group 
s e t up 
i/ 
1970 R e s e a r c h C e n t e r s e t up and 
b e g i n s w o r k 
General Superintenden 
cy of Development 
created to coordinate 
development of plant 
expansions 
* All of this is fully set out in Dahlman (1978) 
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Year Technological Prism 
Concept 





A subsidiary company to manu-
facture steelplant machinery 
and other capital goods is 
set up 
Dept of Information systems 
(computer) set up 
Gen.Superintehdency 
Development, Enginee-
ring wing, strengthened 
by sub-departments 
specializing in (i) 
Process engineering 
(ii) Basic engineering 
(iii) Equipment engi-
neering (iv) Enginee-
ring services (v) 
Research and Informa-
tion services 
Furthermore, besides greatly strengthening its technical 
organization in the above ways (and others not covered in the 
table), Usiminas simultaneously invested unusually heavily in 
technical assistance contracts with leading outside steel firms, 
and heavily in the training and qualifying of its own technical 
staff. 
In this way, by "taking the offensive" in terms of systemati_ 
cally building up the level of both its own technical organization, 
and its staff's qualifications, Usiminas equipped itself to 
successfully introduce the manifold technical changes required "by 
its existing plants and expansions thereof, and in this way managed 
to become the most successful large state steelplant in Latin 
America. 
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6.4 Conclusion from the two cases 
(Rosario) 
Both the Acindar/and Usiminas cases offer interesting 
material on the potential efficiency of the mechanisms of 
"defensive" technical change and defensive organizational 
change when steelplants are "faced by the urgent need to 
react to crisis conditions of one kind or another. 
Psychologically this makes sense, as we all have had 
experiences of suddenly finding ourselves with three times 
our normal resourcefulness when our backs are "against the 
wall", or when critical deadlines approach. 
But, useful though this defensive mechanism often is in 
ensuring that plant production can continue, and useful though 
a succession of defensive technical changes may be in promoting 
improved plant performance over time, one can hardly doubt that 
there are additional benefits to be gained for a steelplant 
which can add an anticipative and "offensive" dimension to its 
ability to introduce technical changes. 
Progress towards this "offensive" capability is what we 
have called maturity in steelplant organizations. It can arise 
as a kind of natural result of a long sequence of defensive 
technical and organizational changes (the Acindar, Rosario case) -
but it can evidently be accelerated by a deliberate "organization 
building" approach (the Usiminas case). 
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6.5 Further arguments for an offensive, rather than defensive strategy 
Further arguments i^f|vour of offensive strategies can be advanced. The 
first is, simply, / defensive strategies for investing in minor technical 
change are not optimal. In fact they imply underinvestment by firms in 
the technical change process. A main reason is that a firm which follows 
a purely defensive strategy will, by definition, fail to invest in any 
of the multiple plant upgrading and improvement possibilities which it 
is not absolutely forced by pressing circumstances into exploring and 
attending to. In other words, its technical change efforts will only be 
focussed on a strictly limited region of the " innovation possibility set" 
(improvement possibility set) with its technology, rather than choosing its 
projects from the whole set. 
Undoubtedly one of the reasons why firms may not take advantage of the 
entire improvement possibility set is that they may seriously underestimate 
its scope and extent, and the feasibility of exploiting it through incremental 
technical change. 
In summary our hypothesis is that most LDC steel firms - and especially 
inexperienced ones - will (a) not perceive the full extent and potential 
of, the improvement possibility set with their technologies, and, (b) will 
therefore fail to engage, of their own accord, in the privately optimal level 
of investment in minor technical changes so as to exploit this potential. 
6.6 Natural trajectories of technical change, and their relevance to 
offensive strategy 
Offensive strategy implies active, systematic exploration and exploitation 
of the improvement possibility set with a steel plant's technology. The 
possibility to conduct this kind of active and systematic approach gains 
support from the idea due to Nelson and Winter that there may exist 
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"natural trajectories" of technical change, appropriate to the particular 
"technological regime" with which a firm is working, that "focus the 
attention of engineers on certain directions in which progress is 
possible, and provide strong guidance as to the tactics likely to be 
fruitful in probing in that direction", and for which the "payoffs from 
advancing in that direction exist under a wide range of demand 
conditions".''' This idea was strongly corroborated in our steel plant 
case-studies in AHMSA, USIMINAS and Acindar in which a good number of 
"natural trajectories" appropriate to technical change in steel plants 
2 
were independently discovered. Sixteen of these natural trajectories 
are listed below. 
1) Resolving bottlenecks 
2) Stretching the capacity of existing units through mechanization 
layout changes, faster loading, simplified product mix, lowered 
rejection rates etc. 
3) Reducing process cycle times 
4) Minimization of non-recuperable metallic losses and recycling of 
recuperable losses 
5) More intensive utilization of by-products 
6) Improved in-plant materials handling 
7.) Establishment of operating routines for the principal equipment 
units and process optimization 
8) Minimization of maintenance and repair down-times 
9) Standardization and beneficiation of raw materials leading to 
more successful operating routines and more consistent product 
quality 
10) Cost reduction through altered input mix 
11) Saving on energy consumption through greater thermic efficiency 
12) Extending the useful like of equipment units 
13) Extending the useful like of refractories, mill rolls and ingot 
moulds 
14) More exact and intensive quality control 
15) Product diversification and new product development on the basis 
of existing equipment 
16) Organizational innovations to meet the challenges inherent in 
the immense scale and multi-departmental complexities of modern 
steelmaking. 
The argument is that there is no inherent reason why all these natural 
trajectories should only be followed "defensively" i.e. when necessity 
arises. They can also be pursued "offensively" by a combination of 
capital investment, and in-house technical, engineering and research 
efforts. In this perspective, an explicitly offensive technical change 
policy, coordinated with investment, and aiming at rapid advance along 
these natural trajectories,. could make a lot of sense. 
•^ For the concept of "natural trajectories", see R Nelson and S Winter, 
"In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation", Research Policy (6) 1977. 
o The researchers involved were Luis Alberto Perez and Jesus P^rez y 
Peniche (Mexico), Carl E&hlman and Fernando Valadares Fonseca (Brazil), 
and the author (Argentina) 
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Ch. 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Aims and Scope of the Study 
This study has sought to trace out and compare the technology selections 
and subsequent "paths" of learning and technological evolution in five 
Latin American steel firms. Technology has been at the centre of the 
analysis. The individual case-studies carried out by different authors 
on the individual plants have been the empirical basis of the comparison 
conducted. 
Throughout the analysis, our belief has been that some plants will have 
made a better job of technology selection and subsequent plant upgrading 
than others, and that a close look at the actual historical experience of 
selection and upgrading in our sample of plants would throw light on the 
nature of the criteria that make for successful or unsuccessful 
performance, so that lessons can be learned. In looking at the 
learning/technological "paths" of the various plants, what we have 
focussed on is relative, not absolute learning performance. What 
learning sequences seem to have worked better in plants, and what 
sequences worse? Can one detect any determinants for why some plants 
seemed to have chosen their technology more effectively, or improved it 
more efficiently, than others? 
The goal of this comparative analysis has been to arrive at practical 
policy conclusions for steelplant managers, government steel planners and 
institutions providing finance for the steel industry. 
This final chapter is therefore devoted to the statement and discussion 
of practical policy conclusions, whilst relating them to evidence and 
findings from earlier chapters of the study. The conclusions are 
presented under the following headings:- 1. Towards a realistic planning 
picture of steel plant learning paths; 2. Planning for technology 
selection and gestation; 3. Planning for minor technical change and the 
upgrading of technology; 4. The representativity of the findings; and 5. 
The need for more research to guide the planning process. 
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7.1 Towards a Realistic Planning Picture of Steel Plant Learning Baths 
A principal finding which emerged clearly in the "synthesis" of the 
case-studies provided in Ch. 2 is that the traditional scheme of stages 
in the life of a steel plant - i.e. a planning stage, a construction * 
stage, and then a start-up stage whilst the plant is brought up to rated 
capacity - is too simplified, because it leaves out important stages in 
the subsequent evolution of plants, once rated capacity and performance 
has already been attained. For one thing, the traditional scheme leaves 
out the impact of minor technical changes to already fully operational 
plants to upgrade performance beyond rated levels. These changes, made 
at relatively low levels of investment, involve minor, incremental 
technical changes, and may be considered as occurring within an 
"improvement stage" which succeeds the end of the start-up stage. 
Furthermore in all five plants, we found that major expansions (i.e. 
non-incremental) had been introduced, often doubling or tripling 
installed capacity and sometimes causing major upheavals to pre-existing * 
operations involving very much greater costs-of-disruption than 
anticipated. These successive "expansion stages" need to be considered 
as integral parts of the overall technological path of steelplants, in 
addition to the improvement stage mentioned above. (Furthermore, each 
major expansion stage itself can be decomposed into its own planning, 
construction, start-up and improvement stages). 
A second key finding from Ch. 2 concerns the complex, long-drawn out, 
uncertain, and idiosyncratic nature of the "path" of each of the steel 
plants. This path was, in each case, more like what Hirschman (1963) has 
called a "voyage of discovery" than an assured progression down some kind 
of "standard" infant industry learning curve. 
In other words, we found no such thing as just one "standard" path of 
evolution in the life of a steel plant. Rather each plant's path was 
notable for the idiosyncracy of the evolution of its technology, and its 
markedly individual character. So much so that, rather than refer to 
standardised steel plant evolutionary paths, or technology paths, we w 
prefer to refer to such paths as "biographical". 
198 
Me?@©ver, all the ease^-etuiies is aany ^oopoefeo, whafe a 
difficult, mistake-filled and unpredictably) business atoa.l plaafc 
evolution can be. In none of the plants did things work out according to 
plan. In two of the plants - Chimbote and Paz del Rio - the material 
documents what can only be described as badly mistaken initial choices of 
technology (at least with the benefit of hindsight), followed by long and 
difficult years of "remedial" efforts to try to compensates In USIMENAS, 
the enterprise had to wrestle with a major financial crisis in its first 
years of operation, and attempt to squeeze additional output from its 
existing plant with minimal additional investment., Acindar-, for its 
part, had to cope with very erratic government policies which prevented 
it for many years from integrating its plant. AHMSA experienced severe 
problems in adapting itself efficiently to run its new investment in BOF 
steelmaking. 
Indeed all the plants had many problems in trying to select, finance and 
operate their technology, in trying to cope with their government 
sponsors and political opponents, and in seeking to adapt to major 
fluctuations in raw material supplies and in steel demand levels. The 
point is that steel plant planning, financing, construction, operation, 
modification and expansion involves many uncertainties and an exceedingly 
complex and difficult learning process in the technological, management, 
logistical, financial and political spheres. Few outsiders not familiar 
with the industry readily appreciate this. Many insiders only seem to 
acquire this knowledge by painful trial-and error. 
The first lesson, therefore, is that Latin American steel planners need 
to be much more realistic about the intrilnsically difficult, long 
drawn-out and, in some respects, non-standardized nature of the learning 
challenge they face when planning to build, improve or expand their steel 
plants. 
In other words, making a success of the steel plant "learning curve™ is 
very far from being the assured thing that project promoters and 
economists often seem to assume. It therefore becomes incumbent on 
planners to become as familiar as possible with the nature, 
idiosyncracles and determinants of steel plant learning paths and with 
the factors that make for relative success or failure in the evolution of 
steel plants. 
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In this regard, it is relevant that the synthesis of the case-studies 
offered in Ch. 2 pointed to a fundamentally common set of basic 
"influential factors" which seemed to be generating the observed 
"biography" of plant evolution in each case. These factors included (1) 
the technology initially selected, (2) "internal technical capability" 
factors (very different between the plants*), and (3) external factors 
- especially the role of the government (but also the inpact of the 
nature, quality and reliability of raw material supplies to the plant, of 
demand conditions, and of the terms on which external finance were made 
available for investments in building or expanding plants). 
Whatever the exact influence of these three sets of factors was, it is 
clear that some of the plants made better technology selections than 
others, some got througjh the gestation period more quickly and 
efficiently, and some subsequently made more systematic use of the 
upgrading potential of their plants than others, and handled their major 
expansions better than others, etc. Moreover the comparative analysis 
carried out in Chs. 2 to 6 enabled us, to some extent, to understand or 
to hypothesise some of the reasons for this differential performance, and 
to deduce some implications for planners. The next two sections take up 
these implications. 
7.2 Planning for Technology Selection and Gestation 
The topic of technology selection and the overall gestation period of 
major new investments is extremely important in steel plants. Its 
•^It was obvious from the case-studies that a wide gulf in capability 
separated the quality of the initial teams of engineers in Acindar, AHMSA 
and USIMINAS from the teams in Acerias Paz del Rio and Siderurgica del 
Chimbote, and there were also major differences in the extent to which 
additional skills and capability were acquired in the different plants 
subsequently. 
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importance derives partly from £he great difficulties that beset the 
making of satisfactory initial choices of technology, scale and suppliers 
for new plants and expansions in this industry s and partly from the sheer 
length of time involved in project gestationo ¥e showed in detail in Ch. 
1 how both these features were, in turn, due to the intrinsic 
technological and capital-intensive characteristics of steel plants, as 
well as to the extensive range of financial, political and planning-
factors that impinge on plant technological choices and bias their 
outcome. 
The first half of Ch» 3 explained how the actual technology selection 
process in our sample of steelplants was not an "open scanning™ over many 
alternatives followed by optimal choice- Instead it was the result of 
"restricted search", because several kinds of constraints meant that only 
a quite limited part of the techno-economic horizon was explored for 
selecting the technology of each plant concerned. The constraints 
included financial ones, political ones, planning criteria (including a 
bias towards large scale plants), machinery supply restrictions9 and 
"heritage" constraints (the latter referring to the characteristics of 
the pre-existing plant in the case of major expansions)» In some cases 
it was clear that the very restricted nature of the scanning of 
alternatives for technological choice had seriously prejudiced the 
quality of the choices actually made. The conclusion drawn was that 
planners of steelplants should be aware of the severe dangers and 
potential costs of "restricted search", and should aim for a broader, 
more open scanning of alternatives. 
The second half of Ch. 3 was concerned with the empirical analysis of the 
duration of the gestation period, and of the determinants of this 
duration, both for the greenfield plants and the major plant expansions 
examined in the case-studies. The analysis divided up the gestation 
period into the "pre-investment period", the "construction period" and 
the "start-up period". Within our sample of plants the duration of the 
pre-investment period was found to range from 0 to 8 years«. The 
construction period from 1 to 7 years; and the start-up period from 1 to 
8 years. The time involved in the overall gestation period ranged from 3 
to 19 years. Average overall gestation lasted 11 years for greenfield 
plants and 10 years for major expansions. Each of the three sub-periods 
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was found to last, on average, about 3 to 4 years.These figures 
-demonstrated both the sheer length of the overall gestation period in our 
sample of plants, and also the enormous variations as between plants in 
the speed of getting through the gestation stages. 
What caused such major differences in gestation time? The main 
hypothesis developed in Ch. 3 was that the scale of a steel plant 
project, the complexity of the technology involved, the extent of the 
firms previous experience in steel plant planning, design, construction 
and operation, and the extent of the "jump" the firm was making from its 
previous experience of scale and technology would all be influential 
determinants of gestation time and unplanned gestation delays. (A 
concise statement of these hypotheses is also set out in Appendix 1). 
Besides this hypothesis, some empirical evidence from the case-studies 
about the causes of gestation delays was also presented. In particular, 
long pre-investment periods appeared to be caused mainly by shortages of 
finance, and by political and planning obstruction. Construction period 
delays were caused by things such as delays by suppliers, dock strikes, 
problems in foreign exchange remittance, and sometimes by bad 
organization of construction work; long start-up periods were mostly due 
to problems in the specification/design of the plant, including often its 
insufficient adaptation to "localised" conditions; other contributing 
factors to prolonged start-ups were defective construction work, 
inadequate training of the workforces, shortages in raw materials, 
shortages in key services, and overoptimistic demand forecasts. It was 
also clear how many of the factors causing long delays in the start-up 
period (i.e. in achieving rated capacity) had originated in decisions 
made earlier on in the pre-investment period - e.g. decisions on 
technology specification/design and on plant sizing, overestimates of 
staff capability, inaccurate forecasts of raw materials availability 
etc. This in turn suggests that the methodology and biases prevalent in 
feasibility reports are not all they should be. 
To conclude Ch. 3, several planning implications were then derived from 
the analysis of factors that had been influential on technology 
selections and gestation times in the plants in our sample. These will 
now be listed:-
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First the need for a more "open scanning" of alternatives prior to 
selecting technology scale and suppliers for plants was re-emphasized. 
A second conclusion was that planners should carefully consider building 
smaller plants so as to render the expansions more easily manageable, and 
to help ensure shorter, and more predictable gestation periods. 
A third conclusion related to the need for the most careful possible 
examination of plant-specific factors In technology selections; (these 
Include (a) technological factors related to the localization of the 
plant, (b) technological factors related to plant heritages and (c) the 
need sensibly to choose the scale/complexity of any proposed expansion, 
bearing in mind limitations in the technical capabilities and experience 
of plant staff to cope with too ambitious a jump in scale or complexity. 
A fourth, related conclusion was about the need for explicit 
consideration by planners of what level of investments in staff training 
and in first-class technical assistance will be needed by a steelplant to 
ensure that its staff's technical knowledge and capabilities will be 
on-par with the scale and sophistication of the technology it is seeking 
to acquire. 
"A final conclusion was that at the project planning and feasibility 
report stage, serious sensitivity analysis should be performed of how 
project profitability will fall if the gestation period for the new plant 
or major expansion takes longer than expected. 
7.3 Planning for Minor Technical Change and the Upgrading of Technology 
The main planning conclusion to emerge from Chs» 5 and 6 was that 
minor technical changes need to be considered as a central, not a 
marginal feature in the techno-economic development of steel plants. 
Each of the three chapters described a different facet of this reality 
and we shall therefore briefly summarise them in turns-
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Ch. A was about "capacity-stretching" in the steel plants, i.e. the 
phenomenon whereby the capacity of plants is increased beyond rated 
capacity in small, incremental steps without the requirement for large 
new investment programmes. Empirical evidence was presented from four of 
the five case-studies to show (a) the great cumulative extent to which 
the effective capacity of the units had been stretched beyond nominal 
capacity, and (b) that capacity-stretching technical changes were 
"pervasive" in the plants, and that capacity-stretching was often the 
primary objective of technical changes, rather than merely a secondary or 
spin-off objective. 
It was also shown that a principal reason leading three of the steel 
firms greatly to stretch the capacity of their existing plants had been 
the long delays experienced in being able to undertake "conventional" 
(i.e. capital-intensive) expansion plans. These long delays were due to 
various factors, which included financial problems in the firms concerned 
or shortages of loan finance, the inherently long planning period needed 
for capital intensive expansions, and the incidence of unexpected 
political and planning delays due to the non-agreement of government 
planners to each firm's major expansion plans. Because of these long 
delays, low-cost capacity stretching of existing plant then became a 
valuable "second-best" option. In addition a large variety of other 
incentives to capacity stretching projects were identified - helping to 
explain their observed pervasiveness and cumulative large impact. 
Two contrasting approaches to capacity stretching were identified in the 
plants:- namely the "ad-hoc defensive" approach and the^"systematic, 
offensive" approach. In general, a more systematic approach was adopted 
over time as a plant's technical staff developed both familiarity with -
and a more scientific understanding of - the processes concerned. In at 
least two of the plants, capacity stretching potential was greatly 
underestimated. It was only the fact that the blocking of their 
"conventional expansion" plans had made capacity stretching so repeatedly 
necessary that led the men in these plants to fully discover and utilize 
the stretching potential that was there. 
From the planning viewpoint, this phenomenon of capacity stretching is 
important. It seems to be a common occurrence not just in Latin American 
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steel plant85 but ia industrial plants more generally® To judge from our 
own sample, the main planning implications appear to be (a) the need for 
better recognition by planners of the very long gestation delays often 
inherent in conventional expansion^ (b) the need for better estimations 
by planners of the impressive extent of capacity stretching potential 
that exists in many steel plants, and (c) the adoption by plants of 
systematic methods to exploit this potential both as a substitute and a 
complement for conventional expansion» 
Chapt er 5 dealt briefly with some further aspects of plant upgrading8 
going beyond just capacity stretching» I.e. it tried to cover aspects 
relating to the introduction of any kinds of improvements in the plants 
that involved minor technical changes aimed at improving their 
performance above rated levels» Incorporation of these minor technical 
changes was shown to be a pervasive activity going on all the time in 
most of the plants» These changes were devoted not only to stretching 
the capacity of the plants but also to several other objectives» too, 
including reducing production cost, changing input mixa raising product 
quality, diversifying the product mix etc» 
Moreover these minor technical changes often permitted the plants to 
respond to adverse market, production and factor supply developments by 
introducing needed adaptations9 as well as to take advantage of the many 
upgrading possibilities that were built in to their initial technology. 
Indeed minor technical changes appeared to be both necesary and 
profitable In our steel plants so as to upgrade and adapt them. Our 
conclusion was that plant management should give explicit and systematic 
attention to the organisation and generation of minor technical changes 
in their plants rather than simply introducing minor technical changes in 
an ad hoc fashion, as dictated by pressing circumstances» 
Ch. 6 built on Ch» 5 by further discussing and contrasting the 
"defensive" versus the "offensive™ approach to the introduction of minor 
technical changes» In particular it examined and contrasted the 
experience of Acindar in its Rosario plant and USIMIWAS as an 
illustration of the differences between the defensive and offensive 
approaches and the transition between them which plants can make as their 
staff gain more experience» 
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The suggestion was made that defensive strategy Implies underinvestment 
in technical change. Finally attention was briefly drawn to the 
existence of so-called "natural trajectories" of technical change in 
steel plants, which could guide plant managers as to some directions in 
which minor technical change was likely to be worth pursuing on a ' 
systematic basis. 
The main planning conclusion which emerges from Ch. 6 is to reinforce the 
conclusions of Chs. 4 and 5 that plant managements can, and should, 
organize systematically to introduce technical changes into their 
plants. They should not allow the build-up of their plant's technical 
organization to be merely implicit - i.e. a sort of evolutionary 
by-product of the firm's experience. Instead, this build-up should be 
the objective of specific management attention - e.g. through training 
its technical staff, setting up and strengthening technical departments, 
trying to advance up natural trajectories, etc. 
7.4 The Representativity of the Findings 
The sample of steelplants examined in the study has been small. It is 
based on the experience of only 5 Latin American firms, whereas Latin 
America has well over 100 sizeable steel firms. 
Nevertheless, some of the key findings reported here do appear to hold 
true for steel plants more generally - and may be partly applicable to 
other kinds of heavy industrial plants, too. 
In particular, our empirical findings about the unduly long gestation 
periods for our sample of steel plants correspond with what is known to 
be a frequent characteristic of large industrial investment projects, 
particularly in LDCs. For example, as Little and Mirrlees wrote in their 
well known book on project evaluation* 
r. 
iLi 
ttle, I., and Mirrlees, J., Project Appraisal and Planning for 
Developing Countries, Basic Books, 1974 
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"Despite exceptions it has been the rule in developing countries 
(and common in all countries) that major projects take longer to 
complete than is allowed for in the project report" 
Secondly, the period between when a plant is finished and when 
the new management team and labour force are sufficiently 
skilled to be able to operate it at its rated capacity has 
usually been underestimated" 
Also, our findings about difficulties and mistakes in initial technology 
selection (both for greenfield plants and major plant expansions) match 
with the findings of literally scores of case-studies of LDC industrial 
plants reported in the transfer of technology literature and in the 
literature on technical change in LDCs which have pinpointed the "lack of 
adaptation of the technology to local conditions" as a major difficulty 
in the technology selection and transfer process. 
Furthermore the findings about the empirical importance of minor 
technical change in the plants, and the tendency of managements to 
underestimate the value of minor technical changes and to fail to exploit 
them systematically are in line with the findings of many other recent 
1 2 
case-studies in Latin American plants (see Katz, 1978, 1980) and 
elsewhere» 
A further reason for believing that the results from our small sample of 
plants are relevant to steel plant planners everywhere is that technology 
selection difficulties, long gestation periods, and the subsequent need 
to upgrade plants at low investment costs can be seen as intrinsic 
planning features of the steel industry which arise from the central 
technological and investment characteristics of steel plants, (as we 
showed in Ch. 1 in some detail)» 
Therefore, although the sample of case-studies (five) on which this study 
has been based is clearly too small for reaching firm conclusions, the 
study hasj we believe, thrown some light and some extra evidence on 
planning issues which are very important and relevent to most steel plant 
managementsj planners and financiers in Latin America and elsewhere. 
Katz, J. (1978b) Technological Change, Economic Development and the Intra and 
Extra Regional Relations of Latin America. Working Paper No. 30, BID/CEPAL 
BA/36, August 
2 
Katz, J. (1980b) Domestic Technology Generation in LDCs: A Review of Research 
Findings, Working Paper No. 35, IDB-ECLA Programme, CEPAL Offices, Buenos Aires. 
7.5 The Need for More Research to Guide the Planning Process 
In view of the grave problems experienced in the past three decades not 
only in the Argentine steel industry* but in major sections of the 
Columbian, Venezuelan and Peruvian steel industries - as well as, to a 
lesser extent, in sections of the Mexican and Brasilian steel industries 
- it seems likely that Latin American government planners and steel firm 
executives, as well as international financial institutions lending money 
to Latin American steel firms might be able to benefit from systematic 
retrospective analyses and comparisons of past firm learning paths and 
performance in the steel plants of these countries. 
Regrettably, however, the past record of the Latin American steel 
industry is only sparsely covered by retrospective scholarly analysis. 
Indeed we reckoned in the Introduction that for every $1 million invested 
in the continent's steel plants, less than $30 on average - at the most 
generous estimate - has been spent on independent scholarly evaluations 
of how these investments have developed. 
This is not nearly enough, if one considers the enormous levels of social 
investment that are involved and the enormous social costs incurred when 
these investments go wrong. Indeed, these levels of investment make it 
quite irresponsible for each firm and country merely to proceed by 
trial-and-error in project selection and planning for its basic 
industries. Certainly, some learning through mistakes will always be 
involved - but there is no good reason why this should not be 
s-jpplemented by some learning from "systematically analysed and compared 
previous experience". 
•'•The social costs of the failure of steel industry planning in 
Argentina may have been especially high, because of steel's large share 
of the entire Argentine import bill which meant that failure of import 
substitution in the steel sector probably had a substantial "multiplier" 
effect in contribution to Argentina's persistent macroeconomic 
instability. 
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This is why further research - designed to equip planners with an 
improved body of historical data and comparisons from which to develop 
better planning guidelines - would be amply justified. Moreover it is 
independent, scholarly research that is most needed, because steel 
industry consultants cannot be relied on to provide a sufficiently 
critical view of past performance. Nor can a government's own steel 
planners, who are necessarily enmeshed in politics. So the small 
Investments needed for further independent scholarly studies are 
especially important. 
Such research could help to equip LDC planners with detailed historical 
comparative data on the outcomes of many previous steel plant planning 
efforts - at many different scales of plant, different technologies and 
under different constellations of government politics, ownership and 
intervention in the industry, and under different market constraints and 
conditions. This body of data would very likely suggest more realistic 
planning criteria for steel plants than have often been followed In many 
LDCs to date - and would give honest, realistic planners a firm point of 
reference in trying to defend their viewpoints against the Inflated 
claims often made by project promoters, including their own planning 
colleagues. 
Even if - quite realistically - one takes the view that political, not 
economic considerations, are often over-riding in how decisions are made 
on major LDC industrial projects in many countries, the existence of a 
body of systematically organised and widely-available cross-national 
comparative findings on past project performance in basic industries 
could help limit the extent to which political considerations dominate 
sound economic ones in project selection. To contribute to building that 
body of cross-national, comparative data - not only for steel plants, but 
hopefully for all basic industries is the main research challenge which 
has emerged from examining the technological evolution of the five plants 
described in this study. 
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APPENDIX 1 î'. GESTATION PERIOD DETERMINANTS AND SCALE OF PLANT 
(as per hypotheses put forward in Ch. 3) 
The following symbols and discussion summarise what was suggested in 









= Scale of pre-existing plant 
= Index of the "complexity',of the technology of the 
pré-existing plant 
= Index of-.previous experience of steel firm in 
steelplant design, construction, and operation 
= Scale of new/expanded plant 
Index of the "complexity""of the technology of 
the new/expanded plant 
= Investment in training/education/qualification 
of plant's own staff for specifying, constructing, 
operating new/expanded plant 
= Investment in technical assistance in connection 
with entire gestation of new/expanded plant 
= Expected overall gestation period 
= Unexpected gestation period delays 
= T - T 1 o 
*- T • 
S - S 1 o 
So 
E* - E < V *EE* *TA > mcr. 
incr = Signifies an increasing function of the variables in 
the brackets 
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Next, denote ' £ ' as the " scà le economies benef i t funct ion " , which describes 
the t r a d i t i o n a l l y ekpected capital cost benef i ts and operating cost benef i ts to 
be derived from bu i ld ing larger p lants. 
Denote 'g' as the ""scale diseconomies function", which describes the extra 
costs that arise from building larger plants as a result of both longer expected 
gestation periods than in smaller plants and longer "unplanned" gestation lags 
as well. 
Net benefits ÎT of building larger plants are given by 
TT = ' f , - V 
TT = i n i r < W ' g ( 6 ( 2 ) 
According to our gestation period hypotheses, 
6 +A6 = . h (S*, T*) 
1I1Cr (3) 
so TT = f fs*, - g L J inc 
For the scale economies benefit function, it is normal to expecy that 
• 02f 
— >\0 — < 0 
bs as 
However, for the scale diseconomies function, we are inclined to believe that 
«>2g — > 0 _ > o 
ds, bs, 
based on the hypothesis of more than proportionally longer gestation periods 
as the scale built rises higher and higher. 
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However apparently gestation periods and hence scale diseconomies are also 
very sensitive to E*. 
If the problem is to choose the profit maximising scale of plant to build, 
with given technology T^, and with a budget limit, then our hypotheses suggest 
there is a trade-off between expenditures on capital equipment which rise 
with the scale of the plant built, and investments ! „ and I which augment the 
£>£< -LA 
"experience" with which the plant can specify, construct and operate its proposed 
expansion, and thus reduce gestation periods and scale diseconomies. This trade-
off also depends on how much experience, E , the plant has already accumulated o 
previously. The less previous experience it has, the more "economies" will be 
purchased by buying one dollars worth more of I _ and and one dollars worth EE TA 
less of I . 
v 
The problem with many feasibility reports, in the light of the above 
discussion, is that they simply assume that gestation will occur smoothly in a 
definite period of years (often optimistically underestimated), and also do not 
perform sensitivity analysis with respect to unplanned gestation lags - i.e. they 
underestimate or ignore the scale diseconomies arising from longer expected 
gestation periods and unplanned gestation lags caused by building larger plants. 
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APPENDIX 2 : •GESTATION PERIOD OVER-RUNS AND PROJECT COST OVER-RUNS 
One main effect of long project gestation times is to make projects more 
vulnerable (i) to inflation in the costs of domestic inputs to the investment, 
(ii) to inflation in the costs of the foreign inputs to the investment - mainly 
equipment and engineering services, and (iii) to local currency devaluations 
which increase the burden of the project-promoting firm's hard currency debts. 
These inflationary effects played a central role in causing hugely increased 
capital investment burdens to SOMISA and USIMINAS in their greenfield -plants. 
Also the sharp 1976 devaluation of the Mexican peso had a grave effect in 
increasing AHMSA's investment costs in their second oxygen steelshop mentioned 
in Tables 1 or 2. Though we do not have exact figures to quote, investment 
cost over-runs in all three cases were large. 
A second effect is that long project, gestation periods increase the 
financing charges on the money borrowed to plan, construct and start-up plants, 
and so inflate project investment costs. 
A third effect in boosting investment costs arises when long gestation 
times are caused by start-up periods which get prolonged by the need for 
"remedial measures" .to be taken, i.e. design changes, modifications, and extra 
installations must be added to the plant as originally planned to get it working 
properly. (This is what happened notably in the Acerias Paz del Rio greenfield 
plant and in the AHMSA and SOMISA expansions). The effect is that capital 
investment costs get inflated by the costs involved in the remedial measures. 
One more interconnection between long gestation times and inflated project 
investment costs has already been cited earlier. This is that unexpected project 
cost inflation (for reasons unconnected to gestation time) may put project 
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owners is great difficulties to raise the extra finance needed. This may 
then in turn cause delays in securing this extra finance, thus prolonging 
the pre-investment period (e.g. the Acerias Paz del Rio and SOMISA greenfield 
plants), thus further extending the period during which inflation can swell 
up project investment costs. 
Inflated capital investment costs in turn help cause higher fixed costs 
per unit of output. This is in addition to the contribution to higher fixed 
costs per unit which occurs when capacity utilization is slow to build up 
to expected levels either bacause of lower-than-expected demand, or because 
there is an insufficient supply of raw materials or services to the plant. 
Variable production costs can also be negatively affected by prolonged 
plant gestation periods, to the extent that slow start up involves a period 
of lower than planned labour productivity and raw materials productivity. 
•Higher than planned fixed and variable costs, translated into higher than 
planned steel product prices, can in turn have a feedback effect on demand, 
and may reduce final demand below planned levels (even though the actual "state 
of demand" was correctly forecast in the market studies). The consequent low 
capacity utilization level helps reinforce the high steel product prices, and 
a vicious circle effect is present. 
It is true there can also be some favourable effects on investment and 
production costs of long gestation times:- thus, in some circumstances taking 
somewhat longer in construction may enable the job to be accomplished cheaper 
and more reliably, (crash programmes can be very risky) and may permit more 
time for recruitment and suitable training; also when a plant gets going later 
than expected, the demand for its products may be higher and firmer than if 
it had started up e'arlier. As Marglin has noted - if not only plant construction 
but also its associated construction costs can be postponed, then this will 
reduce the size of the present value of construction outlays (so long as 
their absolute cost does not increase over time and the interest rate is 
positive, so 
"the loss in the present value of benefits from postponement 
may be more than offset by the savings in the present value 
of cost" 1/ 
This kind of situation envisaged by Marglin is more likely to occur 
(a) the lower the expected initial capacity utilization level (for demand 
reasons) of the "unpostponed" plant would be, and (b) the greater the rate 
at which the demand curve is currently shifting outwards. Nevertheless -
whilst the situation envisaged by Marglin is certainly an important variant 
to be considered - we shall not explore it further here. 
The main thrust of our above discussion is simply that the problems of 
avoiding prolonged gestation times, inflated project investment costs and 
inflated production costs are significantly related. It follows that under-
estimated gestation time will, in many circumstances, lead to overestimated 
project profitability in steelplant investments. Hence a more explicit 
consideration of steelplant gestation times and their determinants should be 
a valuable input to the planning process. 
1/ S.Marglin, Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning, North Holland, 
Amsterdam 1963. 
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Gestation time and economies of scale: 
The most significant planning implication of the gestation lags observed 
in our steelplant sample is - to our way of thinking - the need to look closely 
at the way in which "economies of scale" concepts are used (or perhaps one 
should say manipulated) in the pre-feasibility and feasibility reports, and 
other project evaluations, on steelplant projects which are performed during 
the pre-investment stage. 
The reason is that, whilst the capital cost savings and operating cost 
savings obtainable from bigger and bigger plants have received much attention 
in the industrial economics literature on the steel industry, and get 
endlessly repeated by consultants, banks, and government planners, far less 
attention gets paid to the dis-economies of scale which may also attend the 
building of bigger and bigger plants, and which may turn out to be greater 
than the economies.^ 
1/ There is nothing new about this:- "biting off more than one can chew" is 
a familiar situation. 
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APPENDIX 3 : THE RISE OF THE LDC'S IN WORLD 
STEEL PRODUCTION 
Steel is a primary input to such industries 
as capital goods, armament3j construction, the 
automobile and consumer, durables sectors, etc., 
and this fact has long given rise to the view, 
that steal- is a "strategic" industry, vital for 
a country's security, essential for its future 
development.-^ 
As a consequence of steel^s importance, all 
the worldfe traditionally industrial countries? and 
most of the newly industrializing less-developed 
countries have sought to promote their steel 
industries so as to accompany their economic growth 
aspirations, and this is reflected in the continuous 
growth of steel production that can be observed 
since 1950 in all the regions of the world. (See 
Chart 1.) 
Of course, as can be observed in Chart 1, 
the growth rate in output has not been identical 
1/ The Ruhr steel centres fed pennan military might, 
whilst it was Pittsburgh, U.S.A., that produced 
'the steel for America's guns and tanks and 
planes. Britain's Labour party nationalised steel 
on the grounds that it was one of the "Commanding• 
Heights" of the Economy. The Soviet Union 
emphasized its steel industry right through the 
days of Lenin, Stalin and Khruschev «= and Uao's 
China made steel production its priority target 
in the bold days of the "Great Leap Forward". 
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CHART WORLD STEEL OUTPUT BY REGION, 1950 -I975 
(thousands of ingot tons) 
amter?§?e 
IVe&ion 1950 i960 1970 1975 growth of Production Í Production Í Production L Production d output 19^0-~ 1975 % 
Western Europe 52,100 27,5 108,769 31,5 161,521 27,1 155,043 23,8 7,54 
Eastern Europe 8,100 4,3 21,181 6,1 40,082 6,7 51,850 8,0 7,71 
USSR 27,300 1-4,4 65, 294 18,9 115,886 1 9,5 142,000 21,8 6,82 
Northamerica (l) 90,900 48,0 95, 337 27,6 130,340 21,9 118,987 1.8,3 1,08 
Latin America 1,400 0,7 4,316 1,2 13,181 2,2 18,611 2,9 10,40 
Africa 800 0,4 2,199 0,6 5,326 0,9 7, 773 1,2 9,52 
Middle East - - 40 0,01 525 0,1 1 » 225 0,1 » 
Asia(i) Japan (2) 4,839 2,6 22,138 6,4 93,322 1 5,7 102,313 15,7 12,98 
Asia (ii) Non Japanese( 3) 2,661 
Asia 
1,4 22,539 6,5 28,347 4,8 45,939 7,0 8,92 
Oceania 1,300 0,7 3,753 1,1 6,996 1 , 2 8,054 1,2 7,57 
WORLD TOTAL 189,400 100,0 345,666 100,0 595,526 100,0 651,795 100,0 5,07 
Prinoipal Souroet International Iron and Steel Institute and U.N. Statistical Yearbook, as quoted in Instituto 
Chileno de Hierro y Aoero Estudio sobre Teonología en la Siderurgia Latinoamericana, 
BID/CEPAL/BA/14, Comisión Económica para América Latina, Buenos Aires, Deoember 1976. 
(1) Mexico is included in "Latin America. 
( 2) The figures for Japanese production are derived from "Nippon Steel News", Nippon Steel Corporation, Tokyo, 
No. 80, December 1976. 
(3) The figures for "non-Japanese" Asia were derived by the author by subtracting the figure for Japanese output 
from the figure for "Asia" appearing in the principal Source referred to above. 
in all regions. In particular, there are two striking 
features.in the Chart to which we wish to draw 
attention. 
The first relates to the astonishingly rapid 
emergence of Japan as a first-rank steel power producing 
more than 15;® of total world output. 
; The second is the rapid growth rate • of steel 
output in less developed regions, i.e. in "non-
Japanese1' Asia (which includes India, Korea, and Taiwan) 
in Latin America and in Africa. 
In fact, if we consider less developed countries 
as a group, their growth performance in steel output 
.since 1950 has been far more xapid than the growth 
performance of the developed countries considered aB a 
group. This can be seen clearly in Chart 2 below. 
Chart 2 shows an 11,7$ annual growth rate in LDC 
steel production between 1950 and 1975 compared to 
only 5> annual growth rate in developed country 
steel production in the same period. 
This chart also shows that by the mid seventies, 
LDC production of steel had climbed to the 60-70 nillior 
tons per year mark, representing roughly 10^ of total 
world steel production, which was in the region of 
65O to 700 million tons per year» 
So far as future projections of world steel 
output are concerned, the LDC share of world steel 
output is expected to go on rising rapidly in the 
next few decades. This is largely because LDC 
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CHART 2I THE EVOLUTION OF LDC COKFARED TO DC ST32L OUTPUT 
Source: UlïIDO Consultaras report, Dec. ï3~fb, reproauced In 
"Primera Reunión de Consulta sobre Siderurgia", 
Siderurgia Latinoamericana, ÎJo. 20 2, Febrero, 1977. 
policies aim at steel self-sufficiency, which means 
the progressive elimination of current steel imports 
from DCs in favour of local steel production which 
is favoured "by promotional incentives and tariff 
protection. 
Ehere are, moreover, some further reasons going 
beyond the drive to self-sufficiency which ".reinforce the 
prediction of a continued rapid build up of LDC steel 
output compared to DC steel output. 
First of all, some LDCs - such as Brasil, 
South Korea and Taiwan » are actively planning to 
export steel on a sizeable scale during the 1980s», 
Second - and related to this - some LDCs have immense 
potential for further exploiting some very significant 
comparative advantages which they have in steel productic 
compared to many of the more traditional steelmaking 
countries. Such comparative advantages include 
proximity to cheap sources of iron ore and energy, 
relative freedom from pollution problems, cheaper 
real wages, etc. 
Thirdly, - in spite of soqe current (1977) 
indicators that a newly protective trend is underway 
in advanced countries - the political notion promoted 
by the United Nations that a greater share of the 
world1s industrial output should be located in 
less-developed countries could well have some influence 
on international negotiations and growth targets in 
the next few decades. 
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So far as the announced targets of LDCs are 
concerned, the LDCs gathered within the forum of 
.UNIDO are officially on record as projecting to 
achieve at least 25^ of world steel output by the 
year 2000^, and they have actually set 30$ of world 
steel output as their official target-^ . 
If this target is to be achieved, and if a 
figure of 3-4$ annual growth in world, steel demand 
until the end of the century is accepted as reasonable, 
then LDC steel output would have to quintuple from 
around 100 million tonB in 1977 to over 500 million 
tons in the year 2000, whilst DC output would merely 
double from around 600 million tons in 1977 to around 
1200 million tons at the end of the century. 
In practice, however, there are some factors 
that could upset this forecast of how world steel 
•output will evolve. To "bagin with, there is 
currently (1977) a large volume of excess steelmaking 
capacity in developed countries, particularly in the 
United States, Western Europe, and to a lesser extent 
Japan, and there are also some major steel capacity 
expansion plans still in the pipeline, particularly 
1/ This 25^ target for LDCs in steel is in line with 
the target for LDCs of 25$ of all industrial 
production by the end of the centuiy adopted in 
the "Declaration of Lima", resulting from the 
2nd UNIDO Conference on Industrial Development 
held in Lima in Karch 1975. 
2/ The 30'/9 target was set by the First Consultancy 
Meeting on the Steel Industry held by UNIDO in 
Vienna in February, 1977, as part of the follow-u 
to the Lima conference. 
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i n J a p a n . ^ 
This, situation has already mad© the world export 
market for steel extremely competitive so 'far as 
prices are concerned and is leading to very strong 
2 / 
pressures in the USA—' and.the Common Market to protect 
their domestic markets from the low-priced steel 
imports of more efficient producers (©specially Japan)• 
iChesè protective pressures are reinforced by the 
enormous employment and regional economic problems that 
would be involved for U. S„ and Common Market producers 
in winding down their steel industries "by closing down 
their many obsolescent plants. 
1/ For example, Japanese capacity of around 140 
million tons per year in the mid 70s is scheduled 
to reach over 160 million tons in 1980« 
2 j Steel imports amounted to 14$ of U.S. steel 
consumption in 1976, and there are very real 
• worries that imports could rise to capture 30$ 
of the U.S. market. This prospect has generated 
fierce pressures for protective measures. Much 
use is being made of the "strategic" argument 
for not becoming dependent on foreign sources of 
steel supply. Another, much less convincing, 
argument being used by the American steel industr. 
is the prospect of world shortages of steel . 
"which "'could occur at any moment after I98O", 
according to the Putnam, Hayes and Bartle Consult* 
report prepared for the American Iron and Steel 
Institute. Sources "El comercio internacional 
del acero y sus implicancias en la siderurgia 
norteamericana" (International commerce in steel 
and its implications for the North American steel 
industry), Siderurgia Latinoamericana, So. 208, 
Agosto 1977. 
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I f these protective trends gath9r force and 
continue, then logically the perspectives for 
sizeable LDC exports of steel products to DC markets 
•would not he so good. 
. Another important obstacle to raising LDC steel 
output as high as 30$ of total" world output "by the 
year 2000 is the enormous volume of investment 
finance that would be required-greatïy ^ exceeding the 
"budgetary possibilities of LDCs on their own. On 
the "basis of 31,000 investment per annual ingot ton 
which steelmakers rise as a rough rule of thumb for 
new integrated plants (1977), one can see that roughly 
U.S. $400 billion would be required to instàl thé 
"new capacity needed to "boost LDC output to . over 
500 million tons of steel per year by the end of the 
century, i.e. an average of over 317 billion per year 
^ m » + Vi ir« o -w o Î S m ^ "f* T a v-t liCA u w trcn v j win g c j o a i o • u r e u a. a. L j/v/u vâki* 
finance half this total, there is some doubt that the 
other half will in fact prove to be available from the 
international aid and export finance market. 
Another possible perturbing factor is that 
the. managers, technologists and skilled labour . 
•needed to make the new steel investments operate 
- efficiently may not be available from LDC 
educational institutions and industry in time or in 
sufficient numbers to match such a rapid investment 
prograaae. In that case, the growth rate of LDC 
steel output could lag very considerably behind the 
steel investment programme and thus prevent the 
output targets from being achieved on time. 
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All these factors, then, cast serious doubt on 
whether LDC output will in fact quintuple by the year 
2000. Equally, these same factors suggest that DC 
output may well do more than just double in 
magnitude by then. 
nevertheless, what can hardly be doubted iB 
that LDC steel output will ¿row much more rapidly 
between now and the end of the century than DC 
out-put and nowhere is this more true than in Latin 
America, which, of all the LDC regions^ is the one 
whose current steel programme and forecast steel 
plans are the most expansive. 
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APPENDIX 4 i LATIN AMERICAN STEEL PRODUCTION, PROSPECTS AND EXPERIENCE 
Latin American production of steel in 1978 stook at around 24 million ton 
per mark — , having grown at over 10% compound per annum since 1950. Consumption, 
2 / 
however, was nearly 30 million tons— and some 20% of steel consumption" was still 
imported. 
Given that self-sufficiency is the broad goal, the future targeted growth 
of steel output must not only aim to keep up with the projected rapid growth 
rates of steel consumption iji Latin American economies but must also exceed 
those rates so as to cut into the remaining proportion of imports in total steel 
consumption. According, to Dr Argenis Gamboa, President of the Corporacion 
Venezolana de Guayana, the minimum predicted average annual growth rate in 
Latin American steel consumption between today and the year 2000 is 6%, the most 
likely rate:is 7.5% and the maximum forecast is 9.5%. Any of these figures -
even the minimum - necessarily requires a strong expansion of the steel industry 
given self-sufficiency goals. 
A further important spur to the growth of steel production is the existance 
in Latin America - e. pecially in .Brasil and Vene uela - of nearly 30% of world 
iron ore reserves (in terms of recuperable iron content). ,.In 1977s the region 
p duced 113 million tons of which 84 million were exported. The incentive to 
convert a higher proportion of this ore into steel both for. internal consumption 
3/ and export is therefore a strong one. — 
1/ Source ILAFA: Siderurgia Latinoamericana No. 229, Mayo 1979, p.21 
2/ Source ILAFA: Siderurgia Latinoamericana No. 226, Febrero 1979, p.25 (From a 
speech by Dr Darío Vallejo Jaramillo, President of ILAFA, during its 19th Annual 
Congress: His estimate for 1978 consumption was 29.5 million tons). 
3/ As the President of the British Metals Society has succinctly/fexplained:- "The 
Third World does not wish to go on forever exporting its iron ore at $15 a ton 
so that the old world can convert it into steel and sell it at . 300 a ton". 
Cited by L Garcia, Siderurgia Latinoamericana No. 229, Mayo 1979, p.51. 
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Plentiful reserves of gas, hydroelectricity and petroleum in some Latin 
American countries also make the setting up of steel plants economically 
attractive in these countries. 
These factors, plus the considerable confidence developed in the Latin 
American steel industry as a result of their experience so far, have led to 
very ambitious expansion plans being set underway. 
According to forecasts made by ILAFA (the Latin American Iron and Steel 
Institute) in 1976, based on Latin American governments' and firms' announced 
expansion plans, it was calculated that Latin American steel making capacity 
would rise to 51 million tons by 1980 and to 90 million tons by 1985 - an 
incredible rate of expansion when compared to the 1976 production of around 
1/ * the 19 million tons mark.— 
More recent forecasts, also by ILAFA, have revised these figures downwards 
very considerably - so that now steelmaking capacity is scheduled to reach only 
27 
around 60 million tons by 1985, and 90 million tons by 1990-- - yet this still 
represents an extremely rapid expansion rate. 
Furthermore, these are not merely paper plans. In recent years, Latin 
American steel investments have been running at over U.S.$2.5 billion per year, 
representing some 15-20% of total world investments in the steel industry in 
- „ 3/ this period.— 
1/ These forecasts were published in ILAFA, La Siderurgia Latinoamericana en 1975-76 
y sus perspectivas a 1985, (The Latin American Steel Industry in 1975-76 and its 
perspectives for 1985), ILAFA, Santiago de Chile, 1977. 
2/ The exact figures forecasted are 59.6 million tons capacity by 1980 and 91.6 
million by 1990. ILAFA, "Panorama de La Siderurgia Latinoamericana y Mundial", 
Siderurgia Latinoamericana, No. 229, May 1979 
3/ Source: ILAFA 
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Even with the more "conservative" expansions now forecasts the additions 
to installed capacity in the near future involve a very rapid overall growth 
rate of the industry in Latin America. For the leading four Latin American 
steelmaking nations, Brasil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela, the figures are 
as follows:-
Table A.4.1 Production Capacity Growth in Latin America's Four 
Leading Steelmaking Countries 




in 1975 J/ 




Brasil 9 28.3 12.1 
Mexico 7.5 11.1 4.0 
Argentina 4.5 8.0 5.9 
Venezuela 1.5 7.7 17.8 
4 Countries Combined 22.5 55.1 9.4 
This table makes it clear that policy for the Latin American steel industry 
will be profoundly affected by the challenges and problems which derive from 
seeking to grow at very rapid rates. 
It is true that Japán managed to grow its steel industry at the astonishing 
3 / compound rate of nearly 15% per year between 1950 and 1973,— yet this was very 
1/ Data drawn from the International Iron and Steel Institute, reporduced in ILAFA, 
La Siderurgia Latinoamericana en 1975-76 y sus Perspectivas a 1985' (The Latin 
American Steel Industry in 1975-76 and its perspectives for 1985), ILAFA, Santiago 
de Chile, 1977. 
2/ ILAFA, "Panorama de la Siderurgia Latinoamericana y Mundial", ILAFA, Siderurgia 
Latinoamericana, No. 229, May 1979. 
3/ This compound rate - actually 14.9% - was calculated by the author from figures 
originally supplied by "Nippon Steel News", quoted in " Treinta anos de continuo 
progreso en la Siderurgia Japonesa", El Informativo, No. 5598, 28 Febrero, 1977, 
Santiago. 
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such the exception on the international scene. Can Srasil grow its steel industry 
at 12% compound froift now on? And can Venezuela succeed in growing its steel 
industry at over 17% compound? These are important questions for the future. 
However, from our own viewpoint in this book, we are naturally more interested 
in the historical experience that has been accumulated up until now by the Latin 
American steel industry - in particular the experience in matters having to do 
with technological learning and technological change. 
This historical experience is, by any standards, quite considerable, as is 
-Table A.A.2 
indicated by the following / which shows the dates of the start of production 
and the initial and recent steelmaking capacities of Latin America's 15 biggest 
steel producing firms. 
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Table. OT'FBTÜET LARGEST LAÏE? /Ú3AIC¿ir sssa PHOSUCSIO FUKS LEJMSD E? KE O.TDSH 
CS* TEE "Ï2AÏI OF STAHT-ÍJT CF ÎEHA ORIODIAII PLATO */ ' 
ÍTeme of Fi-nn Location of Plant 
Countiy Toar of plant 
start f.p 
Initial Plant Capacity 
Ingot tons 
Approximate plan 
oaraoity Ingot tons 
Fundidora de 
Monterrey 
Kcsvterrey Kexioo 150Ì 90,000 1,000,000 
CoapaHia Siderúrgica 
Belgo Ilineira 
lîonl evade Brasil 1937 50,000 720,000 
Altos Hornos de 
Mor ico 
Hoaclorva . Eexico . 1944 '60,000 '2,500,000 
Compañía Siderúrgica 
Racional 
Yolta iîedonda Brasil 1946. 300,000 2,000,000 
Hojalata y lamina líaaterrey Eexico 1945 20,000 . 1,000,000 
ConpaHía de Acero 
del Pacifico 
Huachipato Chile I95O 300,000 (est.) 1,000,000 
Acesita Itahira Brasil 1951 . - 300,000 
Coapenhia Siderurcica 
KEnnesaami 
îîinas Gérais Brasil 1954 60,000 600,000 
Acerías Paz del Bio Paz del Rio Colombia 1955 150,000 .(est,) 300,000 
Tubos de Acero 
de Ilexico 
. , .Veracruz Ilexico • 1955 5°%C00 350,00c 
Sidoxperu (Sopesa) Chimbóte Perà • 1958 50,000 500,000 
Son isa 5aa Nicolás Argentina I960 ' 600,000 2,500,000 
Sidor Ciudad Guyana Venezuela 1562 700,000 1,200,000 
Usiminas Vale do Bio Doce Brasil 1962 500,000 2,400,000 
Cosipa Santos Brasil 1965 600,000 1,300,000 
SOURCE: Autkor1 s compilation "based on diverse sources,, the .two most important of which were Institute Chileno de 
Hiexro y Acero, Estudio sotro Tocr.olorfla en la Siderurfria La'tinoancricena, BID/C3PAL/EA/14, Cocaisi&i 
Econ&iica para An&rica Latina, Buenos Aires, Deceaher 1976; and 3. Leuschner, The Transfer of TocVmical 
Bicw-hot7 in the Steal Indc.-ti-. jr. Brs-sil, United rations IScononic and Social Council, CIT.12/922, ' 
Cctobor 1971» English (original Spanish). . ' ' 
tJ These f i m s vers the largest in ter=s of their capacity to produce steel ingots in 1976. ITote that 
quite a few fires (including Ac in oar S.A. of Argentina vhich is examined later an in the case-sttdics)' wor.lc 
enter into tho list of the top 15 f i m s if tho size of their rolling operations was the criterion. 
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This chart shows a length of production experience ranging from one to 
seven decades for the 15 plants mentioned, and makes it clear that there is 
a rich fund of technological learning and experience which empirical studies on T 
Latin American steel plants could explore. 
This is particularly so in Mexico, Brasil and Argentina, the three Latin 
American countries with the longest steel-making tradition.—^ 
Argentina' long steel tradition appears considerably under-represented in the 
Chart because it has at least two large private firms which in 1976 had much 
bigger steel finishing capacities than steelmaking capacities, and which there-
fore did not enter into our Chart of the top 15. These firms are Acindar 
(start-up in 1943), and Dalmine Siderca (start-up in 1954), both of which are 
now fully integrated plants in the top 20 if not the top 15. 
Argentina was also in the lead, together with Brasil and Mexico, in the formation 
of state steel companies. Thus, Altos Hornos Zapla in Jujuy, Argentina, started 
production in 1945 but has not grown fast enough to be included in the top 15 
steel producers in 1976. Also Argentina's SOMISA was formed in 1949, but for 
reasons did not start production until 1960. 
Finally, although Chile, Colomiba and Peru appear ahead of Argentina in our 
Chart in terms of years of experience of their biggest steel producing firm, 
it should be noted that Argentina's SOMISA is a bigger fine than the biggest 
firms of the other three put together, and in addition, none of these three 
countries have "second-string" firms of either experience of size comparable 
to Acindar or Dalmine, in Argentina. 
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